










Discovery as invention: a constructivist alternative to the 
classic science documentary. 
 
Robert J. Sternberg 
 




This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 2010. 
 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 








Discovery as Invention: 






Robert J. Sternberg 











Thesis submitted to the University of Westminster in partial fulfilment of 




This thesis is a practice-led exploration of how science is represented in the 
documentary film.  The practice part is a science documentary that deliberately 
eschews a number of key stylistic elements common to what may be called the 
‘classic’ science documentary.  The aim is not to arbitrarily restrict the filmmaker but 
rather to explore what sort of a documentary of science might be possible in the 
absence of certain features that, on the face of it at least, appear to be predicated on an 
out-dated positivism.    
 The film, Hopeful Monsters: An Experiment, is not in itself an argument for 
these post-positivist ideas but an experiment that implicitly critiques the philosophical 
underpinning of the classic science programme.  This written dissertation is designed, 
therefore, to make that critique explicit.  It demonstrates, first, how the classic science 
documentary is indeed informed by an outdated view of the nature of science —the 
so-called ‘received view’—and second, it develops an alternative, ‘constructivist’ 
view of science in light of which the film, Hopeful Monsters is evaluated. 
 The dissertation concludes that in its combination of documentary modes and 
its inconclusive narrative structure, Hopeful Monsters, succeeds in representing 
science and the scientific-self as distinctly different from the representation of science 
in the classic science documentary.  Furthermore, this alternative representation is 
indeed consonant with a post-positivist, ‘constructivist’ view of the nature of 
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This thesis is an exploration, both practical and theoretical, of the possibilities of 
the science documentary.   It comprises two parts.  The first is an experimental 
science documentary—my film, Hopeful Monsters: an Experiment—and the 
second is this written dissertation which explores a number of broadly 
philosophical issues that emerged during the making of the film.  Taken 
together, the film and the dissertation argue two main points: (a) that the 
‘classic’ science documentary represents an out-dated view of the nature of 
science and (b) that a more current view of that nature may only be represented 
by developing a different approach to the classic form.  The dissertation 
concludes that Hopeful Monsters exhibits some important features of this 
alternative form.  
  
Background to the issues 
In 2009 a number of emails were stolen from the Climate Research Unit at the 
University of East Anglia.  These messages supposedly revealed a scientific 
scandal.  Climate scientists were stifling doubts and hiding inconvenient 
evidence that would otherwise undermine confidence in the reality of global 
warming.  Whatever the basis of these allegations, what is illustrative from the 
point of view of this thesis is why this story had the potential to be scandalous in 
the first place.   The reason, I suggest, is because good science is commonly 
understood as apolitical and governed by selflessness and trust and it is also 
considered a strictly logical process against which it is easy therefore to 
distinguish error and fraud.  The scientists of the Climate Research Unit are 
villains because they have been cast, not least by their own rhetoric, in a drama 
governed by this particular and, I will argue, problematic view of the nature of 
science.   
The picture of science implicit in the criticisms of the Climate Research 
Unit is a familiar one that, as Carl Gardner and Robert M. Young write, ‘is 
positivist in that it privileges scientific knowledge above other forms of inquiry 
and in that it separates facts from their contexts of meaning and represents them 
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as above the battle of competing interest groups and classes.’1  Dubbed the 
‘received view’ by philosophers of science, this notion of science as a method 
for extracting true theories from the observation of nature, unencumbered by 
social influences, is widely evident in the discourse of scientists and commonly 
repeated in the media but it has been found wanting by philosophers and 
sociologists for over half a century.2   Indeed, many recent scholars of science 
who take issue with the received view would understand what went on at the 
University of East Anglia as anything but scandalous; instead they would 
recognize it as part of normal scientific practice.  They would argue that 
discarding or massaging observation data to fit, for example, a pre-determined 
theoretical curve, is common in science; indeed, some of the great scientific 
achievements, such as Millikan’s discovery of the charge on the electron or 
Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory of relativity, are founded on just 
this sort of practice.3  The problem with the emails from East Anglia is not that 
they reveal unscientific behaviour so much as that they expose the failure of 
science to conform to a philosophically and sociologically naïve view of 
scientists and scientific practice and of the nature of scientific knowledge.   
That naïve idea of science—the ‘received view’— also, of course, 
governs our common understanding of how the documentary film itself works to 
provide a ‘window on reality’ and so any critique of the received view also 
threatens to undermine the confidence we place in the documentary, to 
undermine, that is, the commonsense distinction we maintain between 
documentary and fiction.  The film theorist, Michael Renov, for example, 
queries the notion that there are fundamental distinctions between documentary 
and fiction.  Instead, he defines the documentary film as a discourse adept at 
‘selling rhetorical arguments as truths, visions of the world as objective accounts 
of history.’4  Some filmmakers, such as Trinh T. Minh-ha, go so far as to deny 
the very existence of the thing we casually call ‘the documentary.’5  
These challenges to the epistemological warrant of the non-fiction film 
are at the heart of nearly all documentary film theory.   However, in practice 
                                                 
1
 Gardner, C. and R.M. Young (1981) p. 177 
2
 See Suppe, F. (1977) p. 3ff 
3
 For Millikan see Holton, G. (1978), for Eddington see Niaz, M. (2009) 
4
 Renov, M. (2004) p. 133 
5
 Minh-ha, Trinh T. (1993) p. 90 
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such postmodern concerns have impinged relatively little on the production 
techniques or popular understanding of the vast majority of documentaries made 
for television.  It seems that the possibility of knowing and stating things about 
the world with certainty is so important to us that, whatever philosophical 
misgivings we might have, we nonetheless need to believe in what science, and 
its offspring, the documentary film, appear to promise.  
In ‘Science on TV: A Critique’ (1981), Gardner and Young examine, as 
they put it, the ‘existing ideologies and conceptions of science which TV ‘feeds 
off,’ and, in doing so, deconstruct ‘the various televisual styles and techniques 
usually regarded inside television as ‘common sense’, ‘natural, and 
‘transparent.’6  In considering the idea of science that my film, Hopeful 
Monsters, represents, this dissertation will pick up and expand on some of the 
ideas that Gardner and Young began to explore in 1981.  There are, of course, 
other issues that might be important in a thesis on the science documentary such 
as the social and cultural formation of TV’s practitioners, the specific labour 
process of television and the economic determinations governing television 
science but these are not relevant in the narrow context of considering Hopeful 
Monsters which was made outside of these potentially determining factors.   For 
the same reason, I will not examine the representation of science by various 
news and current affairs programmes that are not primarily designated as 
‘scientific’.7   
This dissertation, then, focuses primarily on exploring what conceptions 
of science are communicated by Hopeful Monsters and by the ‘classic’ TV 
science programme, and asks how these compare to philosophical and 
sociological developments in our understanding of the nature of science.  The 
question of how science is represented in documentaries is important not just 
because TV science is how the majority of the general population ‘gets’ their 
scientific knowledge, but because, as Gardner and Young, and the cultural 
theorist Roger Silverstone agree, the representation of science on television is a 
key to making sense of all non-fiction programmes on TV.  Television 
documentary science, writes Roger Silverstone, ‘sets the paradigm’ because it so 
                                                 
6
 Gardiner, C. and R. M. Young (1981) p. 171 
7
 As of May 2010, this question is being explored on behalf of the BBC Trust by The Science 
Communication Group at Imperial College London of which I am a member.  
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clearly ‘mediates between two dominating discourses: the specialist and the 
general.’8   
It is perhaps surprising, then, that the science documentary per se has 
received relatively little attention by theorists since the 1980s.  Recently, 
however, there has been some new activity in the field.  Mark Wolf and Anneke 
Metz, for example, have both explored how computer imaging technology has 
led to the development of increasingly fiction-driven science documentaries in a 
mode they term ‘the subjunctive’ while José van Dijck, in somewhat similar 
vein, has examined the use of computer simulations, particularly in medical 
documentaries.9  In addition, Tim Boon, Chief Curator at the Science Museum, 
London, has published a history of the science documentary in the UK titled 
Films of Fact (2008) which traces the story up to the launch of the first BBC 
Horizon programmes in the mid 1960s.  But although these works are interesting 
and valuable, the most useful studies, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
remain Gardner and Young’s 1981 article and a number of scholarly works by 
Roger Silverstone, specifically his 1984 paper, ‘Narrative strategies in television 
science—a case study’; an ethnographic study, Framing Science: the making of 
a BBC documentary (1985) and a follow-up paper, ‘The Agonistic Narratives of 
Television Science’ (1986).10   
In Framing Science Silverstone reports on his ‘participant observation’ 
of the making of a science documentary called ‘A New Green Revolution?’.  He 
argues that although the film production he chose to study is ‘not typical’, 
nevertheless his case is of general value:  ‘Every single film,’ he writes, ‘is 
unique in its content and is the product of the work of unique individuals 
working in unique situations and working creatively in them.  But if no film is 
typical then every film is.’  Having said this, Silverstone also acknowledges that 
every case study necessarily has limitations.  For example in making ‘A New 
Green Revolution?’ the director never had to ‘come to grips with the difficulties 
of presenting a detailed explanation of a complex piece of natural science to the 
lay television audience…’ and so in his book Silverstone does not analyse how 
                                                 
8
 Silverstone, R. (1986) p. 81 
9
 Wolf, M. J. P. (1999); Metz, A. (2008); van Dijck (2005) 
10
 Silverstone, R. (1984, 1985, 1986) 
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this might be done.11  Each case study can only deliver a partial perspective on 
the kinds of issues that face the makers and viewers of science documentaries. 
However, one issue that is necessarily explored, at least implicitly, in all cases is 
how the nature of scientific practice and scientific knowledge are represented in 
the documentary film.  In the films Silverstone analyses science is represented 
according to the received view and the formal characteristics Silverstone 
identifies in these science documentaries match those of what the documentary 
theorist Bill Nichols calls the ‘expository mode’, a format that continues to be 
popular among producers of science programmes today.12  It is central to this 
dissertation that the received view and an expository presentation seem to 
constitute defining characteristics of the ‘classic’ science documentary. 
 
The Received View    
Ian Hacking sets out the key features of the received view in his introduction to 
Scientific Revolutions (1981).  Among them are the following: science is a set of 
statements with a logical structure that can be tested empirically by the 
observation of reality (any other sorts of statements are ruled inadmissible as 
science); scientific knowledge is objective, that is to say, transcultural and 
independent of the personality or social position of the scientist and is thereby 
different from other kinds of belief; scientific knowledge is cumulative, each 
new correct theory expands our scientific knowledge and merges seamlessly 
with earlier true theories; and thus, in principle, there is but one science that 
underlies all scientific disciplines, one way of understanding a singular reality.13 
Such a view is well-matched by the ‘expository mode’ of the classic 
science documentary which commonly takes the form of an illustrated lecture.  
The classic science documentary, however, is distinct from a lecture in that the 
lecturer is generally unseen, elevated to a so-called ‘voice-of-God’ that 
commands authority.  In such films, this voice tells a story or develops an 
argument in the soundtrack and supports this argument by evidence from 
interviewees and illustrations of one sort or another.  This style of presentation 
is entirely appropriate to the received view of science as a method for 
                                                 
11
 Silverstone, R. (1985) p. 162 
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 See Nichols, B. (1991) pp. 34-38 
13
 Hacking, I. (1981) 
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discovering laws of nature that are true in all circumstances, transcending the 
limits of individual experiments and observations. The expository mode, in 
reflecting this view, purveys reassuring certainties to the viewer.   
As I will explore more fully in chapter three, the received view has come 
under scrutiny from a number of directions.  Over half a century ago, 
philosophers of science found they were struggling to specify a satisfactory and 
robust principle by which scientific statements could be empirically verified; 
and since the 1970s, ethnomethodologists and other scholars of ‘science 
studies’, interested in the actual practices of science have become sceptical that 
there is, after all, a single method shared by all scientists in all disciplines.  An 
alternative view about science has gradually come into focus that pictures 
scientific knowledge as resulting from a messier ‘political’ process of 
knowledge-manufacture in which persuasion rather than proof is the name of the 
game.  
‘What has been involved,’ writes Roger Silverstone, ‘is a deconstruction: 
a radical redefinition of both science and…the factual media, as social products, 
a radical reconstruction of them as discourses—relative, indeterminate, 
ideological, whose relationship to something called reality, truth, facts is at the 
very least bracketed, at the most totally denied.’14  Silverstone perhaps 
overstates the case but certainly many philosophers, sociologists and others have 
come to the conclusion that science may not be governed by an epistemology 
that distinguishes between science and pseudo-science or between science and 
metaphysics on a basis that is as sound as the received view would have us 
believe.   
Taken together and worked through, these recent doubts about the 
apparent objectivity and simplicity of the scientific ‘method’ and the consequent 
safety of scientific knowledge have given rise to an alternative view of how 
science gets done that is known as social epistemology or constructivism.  In 
this view, a new scientific theory, especially one that challenges accepted 
wisdom, is freighted with political significance for members of the scientific 
community and its reception is understood by many philosophers and 
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 Silverstone, R. (1989) p.187 
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sociologists of science studies to be not so much logically as socially 
determined.     
   
Constructivism 
The difference between the constructivist and received views of science is 
encapsulated in the distinction that the philosopher of science, Hans 
Reichenbach made in the 1920s between the so-called context of discovery and 
the context of justification.15  The context of discovery, he argued, is 
traditionally explored by historians, sociologists and psychologists who are 
interested in who made a scientific discovery and when and how, while, by 
contrast, the end point of a discovery is an intellectual product like a theory or a 
law and that emerges from the context of justification which is traditionally the 
province of epistemologists concerned with the stringency of testing, i.e., the 
soundness of methodologies and the logic of arguments.  According to 
Reichenbach, how the scientist hits upon a good idea is not open to logical 
analysis but testing that theory is.  Testing is a matter of timeless logic entirely 
sequestered from social influence, its historical and social context irrelevant.   
By 1960, Reichenbach’s distinction, so crucial to the received view, had 
been shown to be philosophically untenable and the received view had all but 
collapsed.  Sustained criticism from philosophers of science such as Carl Gustav 
Hempel, Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn had made it appear rooted in a mythical 
view of science.  These philosophers argued against the received view by 
noting, for instance, that all observations of nature are necessarily impregnated 
with theoretical assumptions thus blurring Reichenbach’s commonsense 
distinction between the contexts of ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’.   
Inspired, in particular, by Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(1962), a number of other scholars began to look at science afresh.  These 
included the sociologists David Bloor and Michael Mulkay and the 
ethnomethodologists Karin Knorr-Cetina and Bruno Latour whose ideas I will 
explore later.16  Their field of ‘science studies’ covers a range of ‘postmodern’ 
approaches.  Emblematic of these, as the critics Gross and Levitt write, is the 
treatment of science as a discursive practice and scientific texts as rhetorical 
                                                 
15
 Reichenbach, H. (1938) chapter 1 
16
 Kuhn, T. (1996 [1962]) 
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devices by which scientists claim authority, plausibility, coherency and truth.17  
This means that scientific discoveries are to be understood not as discrete events 
with clear causes but as categorizations achieved by scientists pursuing 
particular aims in particular professional and social contexts.  The outcome of 
this multi-faceted assault on the received view has been the development of a 
different conception of science.  Called constructivism, this view reconceives 
discovery as invention; it understands scientific knowledge as manufactured 
within the institutions of science. 
Some areas of documentary production, in particular ethnographic or 
anthropological filmmaking have responded to these philosophical challenges; 
indeed Jean Rouch’s phrase ‘shared anthropology’ might be applied equally to 
the activities of scholars in science studies.  Rouch writes: ‘the observer has left 
the ivory tower; his camera, tape recorder, and projector have driven him, by a 
strange road of initiation, to the heart of knowledge itself.’18  But outside of 
ethnographic filmmaking, the documentary, including the ‘science’ 
documentary, remains relatively untouched by the philosophical scepticism of 
the constructivist view.  The science documentary takes much the same form 
and expresses much the same attitude to science as it did thirty or more years 
ago when Horizon was first broadcast on the BBC.   
The aim of this thesis, then, is to explore first in practice (the film 
Hopeful Monsters) and then in theory (this written dissertation), how a science 
documentary informed by a constructivist epistemology might differ from the 
familiar, ‘classic’ form that is predicated on what I will argue is a 
philosophically naïve view of science.  My thesis, therefore, fits beneath the 
combined umbrellas of science studies and film studies as it sets out the 
rationale for this rethinking of the science documentary and lays out the terms 




In January 2000, a radio programme of mine was broadcast in the ‘Discovery’ 
strand of the BBC World Service, a series of weekly half-hour science 
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 Gross, P. R. and Levitt, N. (1998) 
18
 Rouch, J. (2003) p. 44 
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documentaries.  My contribution explained the theory of evolution by 
symbiosis.  In the course of researching the programme I had come across 
Donald Williamson of the Marine Biology Station of the University of 
Liverpool on the Isle of Man.  He had contributed a chapter to a symposium 
report I was reading (Organisms and the Origins of Self, 1991) titled, 
‘Sequential Chimeras’ and I was extremely struck by the highly unorthodox 
explanation he gave for how animals with larvae in their life histories evolved 
their multiphasic life cycles.19    
 A great many animal species have life-histories comprising multiple 
phenotypes at different stages of their life cycles.  Each of these phenotypes is 
adapted to a different environment and is ecologically distinct from its other 
life-history stages.  The larval form of a starfish, for example, is a relatively tiny 
organism that drifts or swims only feebly among the plankton, consuming 
diatoms or other micro-organisms but when it metamorphoses into a juvenile 
starfish it takes up a very different life on the sea floor where it grows to 
maturity. 20  This form of multiphasic life history is found in thousands of 
animal species and across most major lineages.  We are all familiar with the 
tadpoles of frogs and toads, the caterpillars of butterflies and moths and there 
are numerous other examples from fish and marine invertebrates.21  
The orthodox view of the evolution of multiphasic life histories is that 
they result from natural selection adapting the early and late stages of an 
animal’s life cycle to different ecological conditions.  Thus the larva of the 
starfish floats in the plankton, sifting microbes from the water and drifting to 
unexplored regions far from its parents while the adult phase, by contrast, has 
become adapted for eating crabs in a relatively small territory on the sea floor 
and reproducing.  Classical theory argues that while evolution favours the 
divergence of the body-forms of each life cycle phase to optimise their fit to 
different ecologies, it also constrains that divergence so that the two forms do 
not become so dissimilar as to undermine the biological processes of 
metamorphosis.22  The outcome of this combination of adaptation and 
constraint, as the biologists, Hart and Grosberg write, has ‘produced an 
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 Williamson, D. I. (1991)  
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 Emlet, Maslakova, Shanks and Young, (2009); Williamson, D. (1992 & 2003) 
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 See Ruppert E. (2004) 
22
 Hart and Grosberg, (2009)  
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astonishing variety of similarities in larval form among species with different 
adults, differences among larvae that metamorphose into similar adults, and 
similarities between the larvae of some species and the adults of others.’23  This 
can present a very confusing picture to the traditional taxonomist who must 
choose which phenotype—larval or adult—to use in deciding a species’ correct 
place in the so-called tree of life.   
The tree of life, at least as we know it, is largely Charles Darwin’s idea.  
Faced with the problem of placing animals with larvae on his tree, Darwin 
argued that the larval form was less derived, ‘closer’ to the ancestral form of the 
animal than the adult phenotype, and should therefore be used for the purposes 
of classification: 
 
It is highly probable that with many animals the embryonic or larval 
stages show us, more or less completely, the condition of the progenitor 
of the whole group in its adult state.  In the great class of the Crustacea, 
forms wonderfully distinct from each other, namely suctorial parasites, 
cirripedes, entomostracan, and even the malacostraca, appear at first as 
larvae under the naupliusform…It is probable that at some very remote 
period an independent adult animal, resembling the Nauplius, existed, 
and subsequently produced, along several divergent lines of descent, the 
above-named great Crustacean groups.24 
 
Although an adult barnacle looks like a mollusc (and Cuvier thought it was), it is 
correctly classified as a crustacean because it has nauplius larvae.  The so-called 
‘parasitic barnacle’ or rhizocephalan (literally ‘root head’), on the other hand, is 
a parasite of crabs (which are also crustaceans) and although it is termed a 
barnacle, it looks nothing like one.  It neither resembles a mollusc nor any class 
of crustacean but it is nonetheless classified as a crustacean because it too has 
nauplius larvae. 
 This approach to taxonomy takes for granted the Darwinian view of 
speciation; it only makes sense if one assumes larvae are ancestral to adult 
forms, but Don Williamson, the scientist at the heart of my film, is unusual 
among biologists in being sceptical of this orthodox view.  He does not believe 
larvae resemble the ancestral form of current adults with multiphasic life 
histories.  He claims the nauplius larva of rhiozocephalans was added to the life-
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 Darwin, C. The Origin of Species, 6th London edition, p. 437 
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history of the animal after the adult form had already evolved and that the 
source of the larva was probably the crab that the rhizocephalan parasitized.  He 
argues that the genes coding for the nauplius larva were somehow added to the 
rhizocephalan’s genome in one generation creating a multiphasic life-history 
that conferred an advantage over the ancestral rhizocephalan that has been 
retained by all descendants of this hybrid organism ever since. (The crab, in its 
turn, must also have already been a hybrid that had gained its nauplius larva 
from another source before somehow passing it to the rhizocephalan.)   
 The parasitic barnacles are one of literally hundreds of species whose 
life-histories, Williamson argues, are inexplicable in orthodox evolutionary 
theory and can only be adequately explained by what he calls his theory of 
larval transfer.  Here are two other examples.  First, the starfish Luidia sarsii.  
As an adult, this animal is radially symmetrical but as a larva its body-plan is 
bilaterally symmetrical, a profoundly different structure.  The radial juvenile 
grows like a parasite within the very large bilateral larva (called a bipinnaria).  
When it is ready, it migrates through the outer wall of the bipinnaria and drops 
off to take up life crawling on the sea floor where it grows to adult maturity.  
Meanwhile, the larva goes on swimming in the water above and does not 
degenerate and die for many months.  One can hardly say, argues Williamson, 
that in this case the larva develops into the adult and it is certainly difficult to 
understand how classical theory can account for the evolution of such a complex 
life history in which two individuals with entirely distinct basic body-plans (and, 
presumably, genetic programmes of development) hatch from the same egg.25   
A second example also comes from the echinoderms but this time from a 
group of animals called brittle-stars.  In this group the majority of species have a 
planktonic (bilateral) larval stage called a pluteus but a minority are without any 
larval stage and instead develop directly from egg into adult.26  Brittle-star eggs 
(in common with many other animals) develop by first dividing until they have 
formed a hollow ball of cells, one layer thick, called a blastula.  The blastula 
then invaginates so that this single layer of cells folds in on itself, like a finger 
pushed into the skin of a balloon, to form a two-layered structure called a 
gastrula which now has a hollow space inside that will later form the primitive 
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gut or archenteron.  The point where the blastula invaginates—the mouth of the 
archenteron—is a hole called the blastopore.  In those brittle-stars that develop 
directly into an adult, the blastopore eventually becomes the mouth of the adult 
animal but in those brittle-stars that develop first into a larva, the blastopore 
eventually becomes the anus of the larva.  These two distinct forms of 
embryonic development are said to represent a profound division of the animal 
kingdom and taxonomists use the distinction to decide the basic relatedness of 
all animal species.27   It is most bizarre therefore to find a class of animals that 
spans such a fundamental divide.  Something is wrong, argues Williamson, with 
the classical idea that larvae are the key to adult taxonomy.      
Williamson argues instead that the adult phenotype and the larval 
phenotype of all animals with larvae were once separate species, free-living 
individuals in their own right that came together only by chance at some point in 
the distant past.28  His explanation of how the butterfly got its caterpillar can 
serve as an exemplary narrative.  In the beginning, a butterfly (or its ancestor) 
grew from egg to adult without an intervening caterpillar stage while at the same 
time some caterpillar-like animal (e.g., an onycophoran like Peripatus) enjoyed 
a full life, breeding with other caterpillar-like animals to produce caterpillar-like 
offspring.  Somehow these two unrelated organisms accidentally came together; 
the eggs of one were fertilised by the sperm of the other but rather than 
producing a blended (and infertile) mixture like a mule (or nothing viable at all), 
what resulted was a fertile hybrid.  This hybrid, however, did not express its new 
mixture of genes simultaneously (like the mule) but in sequence.  First one set of 
genes in the fertilised egg was activated giving rise to the caterpillar then the 
other set switched on and in a somewhat violent immune reaction orchestrated 
by this second set of chromosomes, the first animal (the caterpillar) was 
destroyed.  At the same time, from just a few surviving stem cells or basic 
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 See Williamson, D. I. (1992, 2003, 2009); Williamson also speculates that the blastula stage 
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fashion as the more strictly larval stages he discusses in his papers and books.  The source of the 
blastula, a hollow ball of cells, could have been something like a colony of Volvox. (Personal 
communication) 
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structures, now under the influence of the second set of genes, the butterfly was 
constructed, completing the process we call metamorphosis—change of form.   
Thus metamorphosis, in Williamson’s theory, is not a switch from one 
phenotype to another within a species (the classical view) but from one lineage 
to another (i.e., a change of taxon) and the more distant the lineages the more 
catastrophic the metamorphosis.29  Larvae cannot be a safe guide to the 
taxonomy of animals as Darwin suggested because they and their corresponding 
adults are not, Williamson argues, necessarily derived from the same lineages.  
Williamson names this mechanism of speciation ‘Hybridogenesis’ and it is 
difficult to overemphasise just how unorthodox the idea is.   
In conventional neo-Darwinian evolution and in orthodox genetics such 
an evolutionary mechanism for making new species is outlawed.30  Indeed, the 
word species is defined precisely to rule out the possibility of hybridisation or at 
least to rule out the possibility of hybridisation producing fertile offspring that 
might contribute to evolution.31  Williamson’s theory is therefore quite radical in 
its implications and may be compared to other saltationistevolutionary theories 
such as Richard Goldschmidt’s thesis of the 1930s in which macro-mutations 
provide the genetic variation required for the evolution of new species in one 
single, large mutation event. 32  Goldschmidt called such saltations, ‘hopeful 
monsters’; Williamson’s creatures are similarly hopeful monsters created not 
gradually but in a single generation and I have borrowed Goldschmidt’s 
resonant phrase as the title of my film.   
Darwin had explicitly argued that nature does not work in leaps and 
saltationist theories of evolution like Richard Goldschmidt’s were largely swept 
away by the so-called ‘modern synthesis’ of Darwinism and Mendelian genetics 
that the zoologist Julian Huxley developed in the 1940s and that today we call 
neo-Darwinism.  Neo-Darwinism stresses the gradual, incremental nature of 
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leap): ‘On the theory of natural selection we can clearly understand the full meaning of that old 
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by my theory be strictly true.’ Darwin, C. (1964) p. 206 
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evolutionary change. 33    This gradualist picture remains largely unchallenged in 
scientific circles and is today championed with great energy by writers and 
broadcasters such as Richard Dawkins.  It is in this context of a dominant and 
dominating neo-Darwinism that we must position Williamson’s somewhat 
anachronistic theory of hybridogenesis.34   
 
Context 
This Ph.D. thesis is not of course about biology, nor theories of evolution, but it 
is important to stress, despite the hegemony of neo-Darwinism, just how 
unresolved some basic problems in evolution remain (at least in the opinion of 
certain scientists).  Darwin’s great contribution to biology was to persuade us 
that change really happens.  As Theodosius Dobzhansky famously wrote over a 
century after Darwin: ‘Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of 
evolution.’35  Ernst Mayr points out, however, that Darwinian evolution actually 
comprises five sub-theories: evolution per se (i.e., change), common descent, 
gradualism, speciation and natural selection and one may be persuaded by one 
or more without being persuaded by all.36  Darwinian evolution is the theory that 
all life forms descend (i.e., change, evolve) from one or a very few ancestral 
forms (common descent) by a process called ‘natural selection’ (by analogy with 
the ‘unnatural’, deliberate selection by plant and animal breeders) which acts on 
heritable variation within populations to select the best adapted individuals, a 
process that under some circumstances and over many generations (gradualism) 
may produce a population of a new species (speciation).    
Darwin could not, however, explain the nature and causes of the 
heritable variation on which natural selection acts and a great deal of the history 
of evolutionary biology since Darwin has been concerned with solving this 
particular problem.  In fact, Darwin’s theory or theories of evolution are actually 
extremely general.  As Jablonka and Lamb point out in their recent textbook: 
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[Darwin’s theory] says nothing about the processes of heredity and 
multiplication, nothing about the origin of the heritable variation, and 
nothing about the nature of the entity that is evolving through natural 
selection. … it is possible to be a perfectly good Darwinian without 
believing in Mendel’s laws, mutating genes, DNA codes, or any of the 
other accoutrements of modern evolutionary biology.37   
 
Although Hybridogenesis forces a reappraisal of two of the five sub-theories of 
Darwinism, namely gradualism and common descent, Williamson is not wrong 
in positioning his hypothesis within the Darwinian tradition.  Indeed, we can 
even imagine that Darwin might have welcomed it as offering a solution to a 
problem that stumped him, namely the origin of heritable variation.  It is 
important to remember that Darwin himself had less confidence in the totality of 
his ideas than many of his followers today.  For example, despite what one reads 
in school textbooks, in Darwin’s own day his theory did not displace from 
evolutionary thinking the so-called Lamarckian ‘mistake’ that use and disuse of 
an organ or structure might be a source of permanent, heritable variation.   
Indeed, as long as there was no agreed theory of heredity the idea of the 
inheritance of ‘acquired characters’ persisted in the mainstream of evolutionary 
thinking and in The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication 
(1868) Darwin himself essayed a possible mechanism to explain it: 
 
I assume that cells, before their conversion into completely passive or 
‘formed material,’ throw off minute granules or atoms, which circulate 
freely throughout the system, and when supplied with proper nutriment 
multiply by self division, subsequently becoming developed into cells 
like those from which they were derived.  These granules for the sake of 
distinctness may be called cell-gemmules, or, as the cellular theory is not 
fully established, simply gemmules.  They are supposed to be 
transmitted from the parents to the offspring. … Gemmules are supposed 
to be thrown off by every cell or unit, not only during the adult state, but 
during all stages of development. … Hence, strictly speaking, it is not 
the reproductive elements, nor the buds, which generate new organisms, 
but the cells themselves throughout the body.  These assumptions 
constitute the provisional hypothesis which I have called Pangenesis.38 
 
It would require a lengthy book to trace the development of theories of heredity 
and evolution since Darwin.  However, it is crucial to appreciate that despite the 
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successes of molecular biology and today’s neo-Darwinian orthodoxy there is 
still scope for a range of theses about the nature and sources of variation and 
consequent mechanisms of evolution.  The neo-Darwinian consensus is that 
variation arises by a combination of gene mutation and chromosomal 
recombination but some biologists deny that these sources of variation are 
sufficient or claim there are additional mechanisms like symbiosis, lateral gene 
transfer, epigenetic imprinting, macromutations and Williamson’s 
hybridogenesis which are equally, if not more, significant as sources of the 
variation on which natural selection acts.  These are still live issues in biology 
which is why, like Goldschmidt in his day, Williamson’s most recent paper 
(2009), published in the peer-reviewed, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, was met with such heated debate.  A review article in Scientific 
American, for instance, quotes Fred Nijhout of Duke University saying ‘it would 
be better suited for the ‘National Enquirer than the National Academy.’39 
 
Pre-Production 
When I first came across Williamson’s ideas they were less well known than 
today and I simply thought they chimed nicely with the theory of endosymbiosis 
I was then exploring (a theory about the origin of eukaryotic cells by the 
physical and genetic merging of early prokaryotes (i.e., bacteria)).  Williamson 
had worked mostly on marine invertebrates like starfish, sea urchins and sea 
squirts which, like flowering plants, release their gametes into the ocean currents 
where they mix randomly, a form of cross-fertilisation he could recreate 
artificially in the laboratory.40  However, by the time I interviewed him for my 
Symbiosis programme his experimenting days were over, cut short in 1990 by a 
stroke after a fall on the beach collecting sea urchins.  His halting, slurred 
speech proved too difficult to follow on the radio and failed to make the final 
cut.  I was, however, fascinated by his unorthodox ideas and impressed with his 
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frustrated passion.  Although he has many detractors, I found that a number of 
scientists, and one very eminent one, Professor Lynn Margulis of the University 
of Massachusetts Amherst, supported Williamson’s work and believed he was 
on to something significant.    
Margulis had been the star of my radio programme on symbiosis, a 
theory of evolution she spent forty years persuading the scientific establishment 
to accept.  She has since included an entire chapter on Williamson in her book, 
Acquiring Genomes (2002) and promoted his ideas strongly at the International 
Symbiosis Society congress in Halifax, Nova Scotia which I attended (and 
filmed) in August 2003.41  Williamson is also the joint subject with the 
entomologist Vincent Wigglesworth of a new book by Frank Ryan titled 
Metamorphosis.42  Ryan, Margulis and Williamson all contributed to the 2008 
conference, The Driving Forces of Evolution: from Darwin to the modern age, 
at the Linnean society, that was organised to celebrate the 150th anniversary of 
the first reading of the Darwin and Wallace papers and at which Margulis was 
honoured with a Darwin-Wallace medal in recognition of her work in 
evolutionary science. 
Both Margulis’s and Ryan’s books lay in the future when I first met 
Williamson but I could see then that his unorthodox theory fitted in with both 
Margulis’s theory of endosymbiosis and a number of what one might call neo-
Lamarckian ideas that have been developed recently.43  Furthermore, his 
struggle to persuade others to take him seriously and to publish his ideas seemed 
a good example of the dynamics of scientific discovery.  (What goes 
unpublished, after all, can never play a role as scientific knowledge.)  In 
Williamson’s theory I recognized an example of what Thomas Kuhn calls 
‘extraordinary’ research, work done under the sign of ‘crisis’: speculative, 
questioning of fundamentals, in a word, controversial.  It was also, importantly, 
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 18 
incomplete.  Indeed all science that is controversial is, by definition, 
incomplete—the closure of controversy goes hand in hand with its completion, 
its acceptance as fact by the majority of scientists concerned.  
In exploring how controversies in science are settled, the constructivist 
scholar of science, Bruno Latour, distinguishes between what he calls ‘ready 
made science’ and ‘science in the making’.44   If Latour were to make a film 
about Williamson’s science he would chart the processes by which 
Williamson’s controversial ideas (science in the making) are transformed into 
the stuff of textbooks (ready made science), a process that constructivism 
pictures very differently to the received view.  In the received view a scientific 
controversy is closed (i.e., becomes ready made) when the facts support the 
theory but in constructivism it is the process of closure that itself ‘precipitates 
out’ the facts.  This constructivist picture (which I will explore in detail in a later 
chapter) is unfamiliar and represents a serious challenge to our received view of 
how scientific knowledge comes about.  To explore how the science programme 
might represent such a counter-intuitive process, I needed to document an 
example of incomplete and controversial science and Williamson’s work has, 
therefore, provided an ideal subject for me.   
 
Making the film 
Williamson was born in 1922 and he had already retired when he suffered his 
stroke in 1990.  When I met him a decade later he had largely recovered 
mentally but remained physically disabled.  We therefore made a mutually 
beneficial agreement.  I would help him resume his experiments but in return for 
my assistance he would let me film our work together.  I did the bulk of filming 
in the first year of the project, spending two months living with Williamson on 
the Isle of Man and acting as his laboratory technician and general factotum in a 
series of breeding experiments.    
Williamson has not been a ‘maverick’ all his career and he is no stranger 
to what Thomas Kuhn calls ‘normal’ scientific research.  Indeed, he contributed 
greatly to the mainstream work of the Marine Biology Laboratories of the 
University of Liverpool at Port Erin for over forty years and was head of the 
                                                 
44
 Latour, B. (1986) 
 19 
labs for some of that time.  When I met him, however, he held an emeritus 
position which meant we would be working in a different context to the rest of 
the scientists at Port Erin.  Williamson’s status meant we enjoyed the same 
technical and financial support as the others but without the usual pressures felt 
by employees who, more often than not, were on short contracts and whose 
work was therefore expected to bear fruit quickly.  In contrast to this 
industrialised, post-doctoral scientific research, our work more closely 
resembled ‘pre-professional’ science of the sort the founders of the Royal 
Society would have recognized, in which, as the sociologist, Steve Fuller writes, 
‘leisure was the sole necessary condition for sustained reflections’.45    
I recorded our efforts over that first summer and interviewed Don a 
number of times about his ideas.  Three years later I took him (by then largely 
wheelchair-bound) to Italy to a conference in Bellagio on Lake Como organised 
by Professor Margulis.  There he delivered a paper to a small group of scientists 
and I was able to record his experience.  I have also returned periodically to visit 
Don to record further experimental work.  In July 2008 I brought him to London 
to the Linnean Society for a reunion with Margulis.  I also visited the USA to 
interview a number of key figures in marine biology whose comments provide a 
context and contrast to Don’s.   
Don was only interested in the scientific work and, while he co-operated 
fully in the filming, he never asked to see any of the rushes or even the finished 
film.  For the most part, I filmed hand-held but whenever I needed my hands 
free I used a tripod.  Our laboratory was a cramped, damp and noisy 
environment and much of the day was spent simply waiting for animals to 
spawn.  While this was initially frustrating, I gradually became accustomed to 
the leisurely pace and repetitious nature of our work and indeed benefited from 
it because it meant I often had several chances to document particular 
procedures.  Of course eggs and sperm are small and much of our work required 
microscopes which meant some specialised equipment for gathering images but 
by far the greatest problem, both during filming and later in editing, was to 
locate the lines of a narrative.  I amassed around 100 hours of material and it 
was a considerable task to construct from this a story of our work together.  But 
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this is not quite the right way to put it.  The story I finally constructed is the 
outcome of an exploration of the formal possibilities of the material.  This 
written dissertation, then, sets out to explore the nature of those possibilities.  It 
seeks to understand how this particular documentary constructs a world on 
screen and what picture of science, broadly speaking, it represents; furthermore 
it seeks to evaluate the extent to which this picture is consonant with a 
constructivist view of science. 
 
Structure of the dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into two parts.  In Part one, (chapters one and two), I 
lay out the picture of science I have here called the ‘received view’ and analyse 
a ‘classic’ science documentary, The Ghost in Your Genes (2005), in light of 
that view.  In part two of the dissertation, I outline (chapter three) those 
developments in the philosophy of science that have resulted in the 
‘constructivist’ view of science.  In chapter four I explore their implication for 
our understanding of scientific practice and in chapter five I examine the impact 
of such ideas on our understanding of the nature of scientific discourse.  These 
chapters lay the groundwork for an analysis of my own attempt at a science 
documentary, Hopeful Monsters: an Experiment.  This analysis is divided 
between chapters six and seven.  Chapter six deals with issues of documentary 
style while chapter seven looks at the narrative structure of the film.  I conclude 
that Hopeful Monsters does go some way to representing an alternative, 
‘constructivist’ picture of science and consider the implications of the film’s 
representation of science for our appreciation of the nature and meaning of the 

























In this opening chapter I lay out the main features of the received view, 
exploring the orthodox idea of scientific practice and of scientific discourse so 
that, in the following chapter, we may evaluate the effectiveness of the ‘classic’ 
science documentary in representing this view of science.  
According to Isaiah Berlin, the central propositions of the received view 
arose in the Enlightenment and may be boiled down to three:   
 
First, that all genuine questions can be answered, that if a question 
cannot be answered it is not a question.  … The second proposition is 
that all these answers are knowable. … The third proposition is that all 
the answers must be compatible with one another, because, if they are 
not compatible, then chaos will result. … If all answers to all questions 
are to be put in the form of propositions, and if all true propositions are 
in principle discoverable, then it must follow that there is a description of 
an ideal universe—a Utopia, if you like—which is simply that which is 
described by all true answers to all serious questions.46 
 
The important idea is that every serious question has only one correct answer 
and that that answer is to be obtained not by revelation or tradition or dogma but 
by the correct use of observation and reason.  Science, in this Enlightenment 
view, is a painstaking activity rather like the piecing together of a difficult 
jigsaw puzzle and, so conceived, it is intolerant of contradiction and cannot live 
even with dissent for very long.47  This commonsense picture of science and 
scientific practice persists today, evidenced in both technical and popular 
scientific writing as well as films and television programmes.   
Modern science has stimulated many technological developments and 
there is a close, synergistic relationship between science and technology.  The 
distinction, however, is important.  Whereas technology seeks to control the 
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environment, science, in the received view, aims at the opposite—to be 
controlled by it.  As the historian of technology, Maurice Richter, writes:   
 
Scientists characteristically seek to surrender their freedom of choice 
with respect to their interpretations of the natural world, and to have 
those interpretations determined precisely and completely by the natural 
environment… Scientists in their research are, in effect, asking questions 
of nature, and they commit themselves in advance to accept whatever 
answers nature may give, no matter what these answers may be.48   
 
Although science and technology have different aims, scientific 
experiments often rely on technology to ‘pose’ those questions and indeed one 
might argue that the very idea of intervening artificially in nature marks the 
transition from a pre-modern science interested in explaining why things happen 
to a truly modern science that asks how?  
In The Great Instauration of 1620, Francis Bacon’s project for 
compiling all human knowledge, he explains the foundational value of manmade 
experiments compared to mere observations of nature (or ‘accidental’ 
experiments): 
 
I seek out and get together a kind of experiments (sic) much subtler and 
simpler than those which occur accidentally. For I drag into light many 
things which no one who was not proceeding by a regular and certain 
way to the discovery of causes would have thought of inquiring after, 
being indeed in themselves of no great use; which shows that they were 
not sought for on their own account, but having just the same relation to 
things and works which the letters of the alphabet have to speech and 
word—which, though in themselves useless, are the elements of which 
all discourse is made up.49 
 
Bacon is also at pains to emphasise the fundamental difference between this 
empirical approach and the scholasticism it replaces.  He implores King James 
to recognise the distinction and, like King Solomon…   
 
…further follow his example in taking order for the collecting and 
perfecting of a natural and experimental history, true and severe 
(unincumbered with literature and book-learning), such as philosophy 
may be built upon… so at length, after the lapse of so many ages, 
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philosophy and the sciences may no longer float in air, but rest on the 
solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same well 
examined and weighed. I have provided the machine, but the stuff must 
be gathered from the facts of nature.50 
 
The ‘machine’ of Baconian empiricism remains a guiding light of the received 
view: no statement can claim scientific validity if it cannot be traced back to 
sensory data—‘that which is laid down’ (positum).  The received view holds that 
nature obeys general laws which may remain hidden under normal 
circumstances but which can be made to reveal themselves through systematic 
observation and experiment.    As the Nobel laureate, Richard Feynman writes 
on page one of his Lectures on Physics (1963): ‘The principle of science, the 
definition, almost, is the following: The test of all knowledge is experiment.  
Experiment is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth.’’51  
Despite what Feynman says, in practice experiment is not always 
possible and not all natural sciences employ exactly the same methodological 
practices.  Modern science has become internally divided into different 
disciplines or ‘branches’ and into sub-disciplinary ‘fields’ of specialisation.  
Some disciplines are as old as science itself—physics for example—with an 
impressive body of knowledge, while others are newer and less highly 
developed.  In some disciplines, like astronomy or geology, planned intervention 
is very difficult if not impossible.  In these cases experimentation is replaced by 
structured observation.  As for paleontological and evolutionary events that have 
been influenced by non-replicable contingencies, these must, according to 
Stephen Jay Gould, rely on historical methods of investigation.52  However, 
modern science, in the received view, whether experimental, observational or 
historical, appeals to nature as the final arbiter of the truth of its propositions.   
What makes the statements of science meaningful is that they can be verified by 
comparing their claims to how nature really is.  This means that science makes a 
fundamental distinction between subject and object, between value and fact.   
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The role of experiment in science (accidental or manmade) has, 
however, taken time to develop.  In his study, ‘Reporting The Experiment’, 
Charles Bazerman analyses a hundred papers from the first century and a half of 
The Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society (from 1665-1800).  He 
finds that experimental reports are actually rare before the nineteenth century: 
only between 5% and 20% of reports of any volume of the Transactions until 
1800, when the number rises to just under 40%.  And the experiments that are 
described change in character over that period: 
 
The definition of experiment moves from any made or done thing, to an 
intentional investigation, to a test of a theory, to finally a proof of, or 
evidence for a claim.  The early definitions seem to include any 
disturbance or manipulation of nature, not necessarily focused on 
demonstration of a stated preexisting belief, nor even with the intention 
of discovery.  With time, experiments are represented as more clearly 
investigative, corroborative, and argumentative.53  
 
By volume 80 (1790) of the Transactions, experiments have become 
‘subordinated to the conclusions the authors have come to’ and just ten years 
later, in volume 90 (1800), authors talk about ‘the role of experiment in testing 
our beliefs as well as filling out our knowledge.’54  In the beginning, then, 
experimental reports were treated as news about nature but as nature started to 
be treated ‘as a matter of contention and then a puzzle,’ experiment became part 
of an argument and was subordinated to theory.55 
‘Theories’, writes the twentieth century philosopher, Frederick Suppe, 
‘are the vehicles of scientific knowledge, and one way or another become 
involved in most aspects of the scientific enterprise:’  
 
A philosophy of science’s analysis of the nature of theories, including 
their roles in the growth of scientific knowledge, thus is its keystone; and 
should that analysis prove inadequate, that inadequacy is likely to extend 
to its account of the remaining aspects of the scientific enterprise and the 
knowledge it provides.56 
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Theory, according to the received view, is arrived at by generalising from 
observations, in other words, by induction and it expresses an expectation of 
observing facts of a certain kind under certain conditions.  A scientific ‘law’, on 
the other hand, can be defined as the proposition that under conditions of a 
certain kind, facts of a certain kind are uniformly observable.  In the received 
view, any theory or law that cannot be defined in these terms is to be written off 
as pseudo-theory or pseudo-law.  A central tenet, therefore, of the received view 
is that one can make a clear distinction between theory and observation—the 
latter guarantees the former—and in this way science provides good reasons to 
believe what we believe about nature. The received view of science then has two 
aspects: it is understood as a body of validated knowledge and a set of practices 
that ensures the rigour of the experiments and observations that lead to 
validation.   
 
Scientific practice 
Scientists often work in teams and within institutions that have relationships to 
government and civic society and they work within conceptual and 
methodological traditions.  Thus, scientific work is done neither in a cognitive 
nor a social vacuum and scientific knowledge is therefore necessarily a 
sociological phenomenon.    For the received view, this represents an implicit 
danger; there is a fear that social forces might distort objective science.  This 
fear is hardly new.  In his Novum Organon of 1620, Francis Bacon warns of the 
various ways our minds might be influenced away from the truth.  These baleful 
influences he calls the ‘four idols’, mental images that cloud or confuse our 
knowledge of external reality (‘For what a man had rather were true he more 
readily believes’):57  
 
The idols and false notions which are now in possession of the human 
understanding, and have taken deep root therein, not only so beset men’s 
minds that truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance is 
obtained, they will again in the very instauration of the sciences meet 
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and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the danger fortify 
themselves as far as may be against their assaults.58 
 
Bacon believes that true knowledge of the objective world is possible only if we 
guard against such deception.  
Subsequent to Bacon, sociological theories of scientific knowledge were 
also construed as therapeutic, rooting out necessarily false—because socially 
influenced—beliefs.  The philosophy of knowledge and the sociology of 
knowledge were thus kept comfortably apart.  Epistemologists dealt with how 
we come to have true knowledge and sociologists with how this truth might be 
obscured and the institution of science maintains this distinction by the careful 
training of new practitioners in this distinction.  Bad science—error—is only 
avoided by careful and vigilant acculturation of scientists who may only practice 
after a long apprenticeship during which they absorb the traditions and rules and 
corporate authority structure of a fundamentally conservative institution.  It is a 
paradox that although science is concerned with innovation, this is sought within 
such an authoritarian framework.59  
In the 1940s, the sociologist Robert Merton took up the challenge of 
explicating the ethos of this authoritarian institution.  Merton acknowledges that 
individual scientists may have their own aims and interests in doing science, 
such as acquiring wealth, fame or power but, he suggests, the institution of 
science reconciles these divergent aims through a system of safeguards, 
penalties and rewards and through adherence to certain codes of behaviour.  He 
identifies four behavioural norms as central to the ethos of science: 
universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organized scepticism.60   
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The norm of Universalism ensures that scientific claims are evaluated 
irrespective of the identity of the scientist making them and the peer review 
system is in place to safeguard this ideal.  Communism expresses the idea that 
science is a collective activity and so knowledge should be shared openly. 
(Individuals may nonetheless be rewarded with prizes and by way of citation in 
each other’s publications.)  Disinterestedness ensures integrity and rules out 
fraud while Organised Scepticism guards against the acceptance, too easily, of 
new ideas; by this norm scientists should withhold judgement and fiercely 
question new ideas, even ones they wish to promote.  It is important to note that 
these moral norms say nothing about the content of science but are understood 
to act externally (i.e., institutionally) on the conduct of scientists.   Merton’s 
norms remain, to this day, widely accepted and influential.61   
 We shall have reason to reconsider these assertions about the nature of 
scientific knowledge and the practice of science but for now let us accept this 
received view and examine how it might be promoted by the sort of scientific 
discourse that, as the media theorist, Roger Silverstone points out, is the most 
common source of scientific ideas for the documentary film maker: the journals 
and magazines of science and popular science.62  
 
Scientific discourse 
In Literature and Science (1963), Aldous Huxley seeks to characterise scientific 
writing by contrasting it to literature.  ‘All our experiences are strictly private’, 
he writes, ‘but some experiences are less private than others’.63  Literature, he 
argues, reports private experience while science documents the less private. For 
example, faced with a burning building we can expect the visual, auditory and 
olfactory experiences of a group of people to be pretty much the same.  This, 
then, says Huxley, is the domain of scientific writing.  However we cannot 
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expect these same people to share similar emotional responses.  One person may 
find the fire beautiful, another ghastly; one may look upon the fire with 
malicious glee while another feels sympathy.  These experiences, says Huxley, 
are more private than our sense experiences and they fall within the domain of 
literature.  Scientific discourse, he suggests, orders and communicates our more 
public experiences while literature presents man’s private emotions and explores 
the interaction of this private realm with the public spheres of social convention 
and ‘objective reality’.  
On the face of it, this looks like a compelling distinction.  Certainly, 
from the beginning of his or her training, the contemporary scientist learns to 
present ideas and practices in a very particular form.  In his paper, ‘Linguistic 
Aspects of Science’ (1987), Leonard Bloomfield describes it as follows: 
 
The forms of the scientist’s speech are so peculiar in vocabulary and 
syntax that most members of his speech-community do not understand 
them.  If one wants to read an English treatise on mechanics, it is not 
sufficient that one be a native speaker of English: one needs also a severe 
supplementary training. 
 The effect upon hearers of the scientist’s speech is even more 
remarkable.  In a brief utterance the scientist manages to say things 
which in ordinary language would require a vast amount of talk.  He 
‘manages to say things’—that is, his hearers respond uniformly and in a 
predictable way.  Indeed, their response is even more uniform and 
predictable than is the hearer’s response to ordinary speeches.64  
 
The linguistic form of science, then, represents what Bloomfield calls a 
‘technical dialect’ and hearers of the dialect do not respond, he says (in 
agreement with Huxley), to anything going on ‘inside’ the scientist:  
 
Science, we say, is ‘objective.’  And when his turn comes to speak, the 
scientist knows that he may not expect any allowance to be made for his 
‘subjective’ adventures,—for anything that may go on inside him,—and 
that his audience will respond only to the exact stimulus-value of his 
words, determined according to well-fixed conventions….what is spoken 
is accepted at face value.65  
 
For a number of reasons this technical dialect, especially in its written form, is 
often difficult to follow.  First, scientific papers may use abstruse jargon 
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understood only by others familiar with the field (exalting and reassuring those 
inside while rejecting or even offending those outside66); second, such writing is 
distinguished by the persistent use of the passive voice; and third, in scientific 
writing (in contrast to journalistic of ‘creative’ writing) there is a proliferation of 
noun-phrases.   
The use of the passive voice in modern scientific papers has evolved 
over time and only became the style we recognise today when scientific writing 
made the switch from book to journal.67  While the passive voice serves to 
emphasise the role of the scientist as an objective observer, nominalisation 
further ‘passifies’ the scientist by converting his perception of ‘objects’ such as 
lines in a bubble chamber or blots on an electrophoresis gel into noun-phrases 
that displace the scientist from the subject position in the sentences of scientific 
discourse.  By this rhetorical means objects and processes become the active 
players of scientific statements—the causes of events.  Alan Gross takes the 
example of a series of papers on cancer by Racker et al. in which there is a 
notable coincidence of scientific and linguistic change that is paradigmatic of 
nominalisation:  
 
In a typical instance, Racker and his associates cease to observe the 
laboratory event, the blob in the fifth lane of the autoradiogram, and 
begin to see the physical object: the kinase PKL.  Next, the physical 
object PKL begins to appear in the subject position in their sentences.  
Afterwards, PKL becomes part of a network of meaning, a causal chain: 
the kinase phosphorylates, the phosphorylated kinase phosphorylates 
another kinase. Finally, the nature and activities of all phosphorylated 
kinases are abbreviated in a new noun phrase, a new scientific term: the 
kinase cascade.68 
 
Thus does the language of the scientific paper convert the observations of the 
scientist into natural objects ‘out there’.  The scientist as a subject is rendered 
absent, leaving the physical world as the ontological source of the knowledge 
that research reveals.  This absent story-teller is a common feature of the 
rhetoric of the classic science documentary in which, although there is 
commonly a narrating ‘voice of God’, it is a disembodied and omniscient voice,  
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not so much of an anthropomorphic god as of Nature, with a capital ‘N’, that is 
indifferent to the thoughts and desires of mere mortals.   
Scott Montgomery traces the historical origin of this rhetoric of 
objectivity to the diary and the public talk, both forms of discourse that, 
ironically, stress the author as subject, a witness to his work.  Montgomery 
notes, for example how, unlike Bloomfield’s scientists, in ‘New Theory About 
Light and Colour,’ Isaac Newton vouchsafes certain details of his ‘inner life’ in 
order to authenticate his work:  
 
To perform my late promise to you, I shall without further ceremony 
acquaint you that in the beginning of the year 1666 (at which time I 
applied myself to the grinding of optic glasses of other figures than 
spherical) I procured me a triangular glass prism to try therewith the 
celebrated phenomena of colours. And in order thereto having darkened 
my chamber and made a small hole in my window-shuts to let in a 
convenient quantity of the sun’s light, I placed my prism at his entrance 
that it might be thereby refracted to the opposite wall. It was at first a 
very pleasing divertissement to view the vivid and intense colours 
produced thereby; but after a while, applying myself to consider them 
more circumspectly, I became surprised to see them in an oblong form, 
which according to the received laws of refraction I expected should 
have been circular.69 
 
In Huxley’s terms, Newton is here poised between ‘literature’ and ‘science’.  He 
confesses to emotions (‘pleasing divertissement’) but also, as Montgomery says, 
gets ‘down to business…he is interested in documentation more than 
autobiography.’70   
In the early years of the Royal Society, experiments destined for report 
in the Philosophical Transactions were usually done in public places before a 
large audience who could witness what was demonstrated.  However, as 
experiments became more subtle and had to be conducted in laboratories, large 
audiences became impracticable.  Instead, individuals, the more distinguished 
the better, were invited to observe proceedings and validate them.  Eventually, 
as lab work became more time consuming, involving sometimes a whole series 
of experiments and often carried out with the help of assistants, the practice of 
inviting witnesses died out entirely leaving only the author’s (or authors’) own 
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account to give access to events.  This account, then, had to be plausible, an act 
of ‘virtual witnessing’ for the reader, as Charles Bazerman writes: 
 
Since neither the reader nor any surrogates or representatives, except for 
the author himself, have witnessed the series of experiments, the account 
must stand in place of the witness.  The reader in order to understand the 
experimental argument must vicariously witness the experiment through 
the account.  In order to earn the trust of the reader, the story of the 
experiment must be told plausibly if not persuasively, and the events 
reported must provide sufficient good cause for the investigator to come 
to the conclusions he reports.71 
 
Bazerman argues that Newton’s audience were not persuaded by his ‘New 
Theory About Light and Colour’ because Newton focused too much on 
describing his personal experience.  In subsequent writing, in order to better 
compel consent, Newton took himself out of the picture altogether, developing 
the prooflike form of argument that we read in the Principia which, in being 
logical rather than descriptive, could forestall serious controversy. 72   And so 
the rhetoric of scientific reports gradually changes from Newton’s day onwards.   
The personal journey is transformed into a retrospective tour of evidence that 
removes, by means of the passive voice and nominalisation, all trace of the 
scientist as a subject.  Scientific discourse becomes the rhetoric of objectivity 
described by Bloomfield.  
 
The objective observer 
‘To be objective.’ argue Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, in their book, 
Objectivity (2007), ‘is to aspire to knowledge that bears no trace of the 
knower…73  This is very much the rhetoric of the documentary film and it is 
hardly surprising, as Daston and Galison argue, that photography itself has 
played a part in the apotheosis of objectivity as the touchstone of science.  The 
camera, like the anemometer, the hygrometer and any number of other scientific 
instruments that the sociologist, Bruno Latour calls ‘inscription devices’, 
transformed the idea of what counts as scientific knowledge in the nineteenth 
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century.  Such devices seemed to ‘speak without prejudice,’ to ‘say … out loud’ 
what has been observed, writes Brian Winston in Claiming the Real (1995). 74   
Daston and Galison argue that before the invention of photography in the 
nineteenth century, prejudice (i.e., pre-judgement) had been a necessary practice 
in scientific representations.  Before photography, images in science were hand-
drawn and necessarily distillations of experience into which scientists put those 
features they recognised as important and relevant.  This pre-judgment is what 
Daston and Galison call the Truth-to-Nature philosophy.  Such a philosophy is 
predicated on an eighteenth century view of the self as an essentially passive 
centre receiving sensations from its periphery—what Karl Popper calls the 
bucket theory of the mind.  In the centre of the self reside reason and the 
imagination and this centre must organise all the experience that comes flooding 
into the mind-bucket. To the extent that the centre holds, the self is functional, 
compos mentis, but this passive self risks being overwhelmed at any moment.  
To be True-to-Nature, then, requires the self to sift and synthesise experience, 
removing any ‘noise’ that might muddle perception.  In the eighteenth century, 
write Daston and Galison, ‘to register experience indiscriminately was to be at 
best confused and at worst indoctrinated.’ 75   
 Partly in response to the psychological effects of industrialisation, this 
notion of the self began to change during the nineteenth century resulting in a 
conception that was less passive, a self that could hold out, as it were, against 
the depersonalising impact of industrialized life.  William James characterised 
this modern self in 1890 as a certain portion of the ‘stream of consciousness’ 
that: 
 
… is felt by all men as a sort of innermost centre within the circle, of 
sanctuary within the citadel, constituted by the subjective life as a whole. 
… Now, what is this self of all the other selves?   Probably all men … 
would call it the active element in all consciousness; saying that 
whatever qualities a man’s feelings may possess, or whatever content his 
thought may include, there is a spiritual something in him which seems 
to go out to meet these qualities and contents, whilst they seem to come 
in to be received by it. It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the 
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perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent it 
influences the movements they tend to arouse.76 
 
‘This ‘self of all the other selves’’, write Daston and Galison, ‘is that part of the 
stream of consciousness that endures amid the flux, and it is robust, unified and, 
above all, ‘active’… like an energetic executive it ‘comes out’ to meet 
experience with outstretched hand … It is the assertive subject of subjectivity.’77  
As the aesthetician Willam Lycan describes it, the Jamesian mind is no bucket:   
 
[It] is not a passive receptacle in which sense-data are ‘deposited,’ 
‘processed,’ or ‘habitually correlated’; it is rather an active organ 
whereby pre-established concepts and perceptions interact.  The having 
of ‘sense data’ is not epistemologically prior to the perception of 
physical objects…if anything the priority is the other way around.78   
 
Here, for example, is Goethe in Experience and Science (1798), on the cusp of 
the nineteenth century, describing the activity of the scientific imagination: 
 
Phenomena, also called facts in lay language, are certain and definite in 
nature, but often indefinite and variable as they meet the eye.  The 
scientist attempts to grasp and hold fast what is definite in the 
phenomena; in individual cases he is concerned not only with their actual 
but also with their ideal appearance.  As I have occasion to notice in my 
present field of work, empirical breaks must often be disregarded in 
order to preserve a pure, constant phenomenon.  However, as soon as I 
permit myself to do this, I am establishing a kind of ideal.79 
 
To the psychoanalyst, Adam Phillips, one can view this active, idealising 
mind either as a source of disciplined invention (as Goethe did) or by the same 
token, an obstacle to objective observation and therefore to proper science:   
 
In one version the self is the instrument, in the other it is the obstacle.  In 
one version the so-called self is privileged, in the other version 
something beyond the self is revealed.  At one extreme of this strange 
dualistic vision there is the cult of personality…and at the other extreme 
there is a cult of the object, of a world whose virtue and substance 
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resides in the fact that it resists manipulation.  Creative experience is 
either self-promotion or self-surrender.80 
 
For the positivist of the received view, self-promotion is anathema.  The good 
scientist abjures such subjectivity and so scientific culture promotes a notion of 
mental self-discipline, of willed will-lessness that is expressed in the passive 
voice and the noun-phrases of scientific discourse. The development of this 
discourse of objectivity gives form to the positivist conviction that, as Alan 
Gross puts it, ‘we are at the causal center of our world; physical objects are at 
the causal centre of the world of science.’81   
In order to maintain this rhetoric of objectivity, the passive voice and 
nominalisation became conventions of good scientific writing and the structure 
of scientific papers also developed so as to marginalise human agency.   The 
modern paper is subdivided into a number of headings whose order, regardless 
of scientific discipline, rarely varies: Introduction, Methods, Results, 
Discussion.  This ordering represents science as an inductive process in which 
the good scientist waits, open-minded, for the data to be in before engaging in 
‘discussion’ and drawing conclusions.  This structure supports the idea of 
discovery as a ‘eureka moment’, a bolt from the blue, an idea sometimes 
expressed in popular accounts of science by the phrase ‘I was struck’.82   
 
Conclusion 
In ‘Narrative Form and Normative Force: Baconian Story-Telling in Popular 
Science’ Ron Curtis examines the magazine, Science 80-86, published by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).  The 
magazine’s writers, says Curtis, seem to accept the structure of the scientific 
paper as ‘natural’ and simply translate it into its literary counterpart: the 
detective story.  The detective trail thereby becomes a model of good scientific 
practice, serving to reinforce an intuition about the nature of science as a 
‘straightforward’ extension of commonsense.  The discourse of this received 
view is aimed at emphasising how the scientist is not part of that nature, not an 
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influence on it, but rather, in standing outside of it, is able to see it ‘objectively’.  
This rhetoric is embodied in the narrative structure of scientific discourse and 
thus influences the classic science documentary; for, as Roger Silverstone writes 
‘it is in the semi-popular journals like New Scientist and Scientific American, 
and…the public rather than the private talk of scientists that television embraces 
its views of science, and from them begins its own work of mediation.’83  
Gardner and Young confirm this view: 
 
The question of how programme topics get chosen leads us back to a 
startlingly complacent source. We are told by Horizon’s Editor that they 
select themselves: ‘There they are, staring up at you in the literature’ — 
Nature and New Scientist are the favourite sources of ideas. This puts 
them in close touch with a consensus and with the latest developments 
but can hardly be said to take them beneath established views.84 
 
My own experience gives me no reason to believe that things have changed.  
Later we shall have reason to re-examine the ‘detective-trail’ rhetoric of popular 
science writing but our current discussion has served the purpose of highlighting 
those features of scientific discourse that ‘stare up’ from the literature to become 
the ground of further mediations by the television documentary to which we 
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CHAPTER TWO 




In the New York Sun on February 8, 1926, John Grierson coined the term 
‘documentary’: ‘Of course Moana, being a visual account of events in the daily 
life of a Polynesian youth and his family, has documentary value’.  
Documentary value lies in the indexical relationship between the film and the 
reality that caused it.  As Edward Branigan writes, a document ‘testifies to 
something because it has been produced by the thing itself’.85   A documentary, 
then, may be taken as evidence or proof of what happened in front of a camera 
and microphone at some time in the past.  The viewer of such a document 
assumes, furthermore, that the causal relations between the events depicted on 
the screen are the same causal relations responsible for the order in which those 
events come to be placed there in the first place.   
Of course, indexicality is not all there is to the documentary film.  The 
indexical material must be selected from an infinite number of possibilities and 
here, as Grierson puts it in First Principles of Documentary (1932), ‘we pass 
from the plain (or fancy) descriptions of natural material, to arrangements, 
rearrangements, and creative shapings of it.’86  Some argue that the arrangement 
and rearrangement of the indexical material of the documentary means we 
should understand the documentary more as a kind of argument about the world 
than a kind of story.  As Bill Nichols writes:  
 
We expect to apply a distinct form of literalism (or realism) to 
documentary.  We are less engaged by fictional characters and their 
destiny than by social actors and destiny itself (or social praxis).  We 
prepare ourselves not to comprehend a story but to grasp an argument.87 
 
The key to this statement is ‘we prepare ourselves’, for although Nichols is not 
here explicit, the implication is that although we may prepare ourselves to grasp 
the documentary as an argument, we may, if we wish, take it as a story—it 
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depends how we prepare ourselves—and this is a matter of knowing how we 
ought to understand what we see and of meeting that expectation.   Of course, 
we are helped to get our preparation right not only by the Radio Times but by 
certain textual markers.   For example, the classical documentary, like Aldous 
Huxley’s view of scientific writing, seeks to present only the public aspects of 
events and so, because a mental experience is not intersubjective, it eschews 
certain devices common to the fiction film such as dream sequences and 
subjective flashbacks that represent ‘private’ experience.  But these rules of 
representation are, of course, cultural conventions and as such are time-bound 
and changeable.  Indeed, preparing ourselves to view a film as a fiction rather 
than a documentary is equally determined by discursive conventions.  
 Consider, for example Le Jardinier et le petit espiegle (or, L’Arroseur 
arrosé), a short movie included in the Lumière Brothers’ first public screening 
in the basement room of the Grand Café, Paris on December 28th, 1895.88  Like 
all the others in the programme, this film is one continuous shot lasting about 40 
seconds.  We open on a gardener watering a flower bed.  A naughty boy creeps 
up behind him and steps on the hose, cutting off the flow.  Puzzled, the gardener 
puts his eye to the nozzle.  The boy lifts his foot and water shoots into the 
gardener’s face, knocking off his hat.  The man catches the boy, spanks him 
perfunctorily and then, without further hesitation, resumes his watering.  In his 
book, For Documentary (1999) Dai Vaughan asks of this film: is it documentary 
or fiction?  And the answer is: both.89  It was obviously intended as a fiction, as 
a film version of the sorts of skits common in vaudeville shows of the period, 
and presumably this is how the nineteenth century viewer ‘prepared’ him or 
herself to see it, but to the modern filmgoer, the knowledge of when it was made 
and the gaucheness of the performances means that it comes across as a record 
of an attempt to make a fiction.  (‘No film,’ writes Stephen Heath, ‘is not a 
document of itself’.90)  The narrativity of the film has no bearing on whether the 
viewer takes it for a documentary or a fiction film.    
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 I belabour this, perhaps obvious point about conventions and the eye of 
the viewer because in this chapter I would like to clear a space for considering 
the science documentary not primarily as an argument but as a form of non-
fiction narrative.  While the science documentary may argue for a particular 
scientific theory it also tells a story about science and it is this, rather than the 
specific scientific argument, that is of relevance to this dissertation; for, as 
Roger Silverstone writes:   
 
The work which television science does in the mediation of science 
is…neither simple nor neutral, and the texts which emerge express and 
anticipate the conflicts that sustain both their production and reception.  
They are the products of, in the broadest of terms, social and cultural 
struggle.  Each text, in its own way attempts a resolution and, in the 
forms and structures through which that resolution is attempted, provides 
a model or an example for the everyday.91 
 
A model of where knowledge comes from is presented in the science 
documentary not so much by the film’s argument for or against a particular 
scientific explanation as by the narrative of scientific activity the film, perhaps 
only tangentially or implicitly, represents.  Because the received view would 
have us understand the science documentary as concerned primarily with re-
presenting the evidence and argument of a scientific paper or papers, it is 
important to insist that one may also legitimately explore the science 
documentary as a narrative form.  Indeed, I would suggest that although a 
documentary may obviously convey an argument it is not necessarily 
argumentative in its deeper structure.  This appears to run counter to Nichols’s 
view: 
 
Documentaries take shape around an informing logic. The economy of 
this logic requires a representation, case, or argument about the historical 
world….A paradigmatic structure for documentary would involve the 
establishment of an issue or problem, the presentation of the background 
to the problem, followed by an examination of its current extent or 
complexity, often including more than one perspective or point of view.  
This would lead to a concluding section where a solution or path toward 
a solution is introduced.92  
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There is surely an obvious problem with this notion of the documentary?  If, as 
Nichols would have us accept, it is argument and not narrative that distinguishes 
the documentary from other kinds of film then he requires we treat film as a 
language, for one can only argue persuasively in language.  I would not, 
however, be the first to point out that film cannot, at root, be such a linguistic 
system for without the human voice or written text, the ‘concreteness’ of the 
film image resists the necessary form of linear, propositional argument.  The 
documentary film may yet have a ‘grammar’ of sorts but it is not the codified, a 
priori grammar of spoken or written language.   
In Semiotics and the Analysis of Film, Jean Mitry addresses himself to 
this issue:   
 
In the cinema, where there is no such thing as image-verb, image-
subject, image-adjective, where the briefest shot incorporates all these 
designations, it is not possible for a signification to be distributed by the 
structure.  Which is another way of saying that the shot has nothing in 
common with the word.  It is a unit of construction, but one which 
includes a whole series of relationships; a signifying unit, not a unit of 
signification.93   
 
‘I defy anyone,’ challenges Jean Mitry, ‘to translate into audio-visual terms: 
‘Every day at the same time the marquise went for a spin in the woods’ for an 
image can never translate the indefinite article.  All I will ever see is that 
particular marquise, never the marquise or a marquise.  And always from a 
particular angle, in a particular context.’ 94  Few arguments, I submit, can 
dispense with the indefinite article for they must surely wish to make a case 
about a class, rarely a specific.  There are an infinite number of ways of trying to 
give audio-visual form to the sentence about the marquise and each different 
way will necessarily confer a specific and different meaning.  Visual evidence 
and argument are not the same things.  For this reason, Mitry concludes, ‘the 
shortest documentary, the smallest news item, whether good or bad, are already 
works of art, or are on the margins of a work of art.’95   
As lexical signs, words can be used over and over again in different 
arrangements to mean a multiplicity of things.  If this were not the case, if each 
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word, for example, were the sign only of an individual object then we should 
have to remember an infinite number of words in order to speak of an unlimited 
number of objects.   The image, the shot, on the other hand has a specific value 
but its semantic content depends on a whole network of circumstances.  As 
Barthes puts it, ‘all images are polysemous; they imply, underlying their 
signifiers, a ‘floating chain’ of signifieds.’ 96  The image is thus a gestalt-sign, a 
polysemous sign whose meaning emerges from a ‘floating chain’ of signifieds 
arrested, at different positions perhaps, by each individual spectator.   By 
‘argument’ then, Nichols refers to the verbal, signifiers that often accompany 
the documentary image and that are intended to fix this floating chain.  Without 
the linguistic element of narration (or on-screen titles) to anchor meaning, the 
polysemicity of the film image undermines its value as a statement in an 
argument.   
In Nichols’ 2001 book, Introduction to Documentary, he does in fact set 
aside the argument/narrative distinction in favour of a distinction between 
‘kinds’ of narrative.  Instead of defining the documentary in contradistinction to 
the fiction film he turns this familiar strategy on its head and instead defines the 
fiction in terms of the documentary: ‘Every film is a documentary’, he writes, 
but there are two ‘kinds’, the documentary of ‘wish-fulfilment’ and the 
documentary of ‘social representation’.97  The former is what we call the fiction 
film, the latter the non-fiction:  
 
Documentaries of wish-fulfilment…give tangible expression to our 
wishes and dreams, our nightmares and dreads.  They make the stuff of 
the imagination concrete—visible and audible.  They give a sense of 
what we wish, or fear, reality itself might be or become.  Such films 
convey truth if we decide they do…Documentaries of social 
representation…give tangible representation to aspects of the world we 
already inhabit and share.  They make the stuff of social reality visible 
and audible in a distinctive way, according to the acts of selection and 
arrangement carried out by a filmmaker.  They give a sense of what we 
understand reality itself to have been, or what it is now, or what it may 
become.98 
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I find little to distinguish between these two kinds of story.  In what sense are 
wishes or fears about what reality ‘might be’ different to ‘a sense’ of what 
reality ‘may become’?  To suggest, for example, that the British social 
documentaries of the 1930s are not expressions of fears or wishes about working 
class society is to misrepresent their all too evident purpose.  Nichols writes that 
fiction films ‘convey truth if we decide they do,’ but surely this is the case with 
non-fiction too.  One may join Nichols in saying that every film is a 
documentary—i.e., a record—but equally one may point out that every film is 
necessarily a construct, i.e., a sequence of images and sounds whose relation to 
reality is only indexically guaranteed in the trivial sense that its images are 
photographic and its sounds ‘in synch’.  Every film, as Stephen Heath remarks, 
is a documentary in this narrow sense but at the same time every film is a work 
of fiction.  As Terry Eagleton reminds us, Gibbon and the authors of Genesis no 
doubt thought they were writing historical truth, ‘but now they are read as ‘fact’ 
by some and ‘fiction’ by others.’99  What determines the matter is how we 
prepare ourselves. 
 Both documentary and fiction films may convey arguments in their 
soundtracks and they may tell stories with their pictures or they may do both at 
the same time but these options do not distinguish them from each other in any 
absolute sense.  It is no more the case that all films, as Nichols says, are 
documentaries (although one may say this) as that they are all narratives which 
the viewer interprets (guided by signifiers whose meaning is conventional and 
unstable) as fiction or non-fiction.  Indeed, it seems that whether we prepare 
ourselves for an argument or not, we almost certainly prepare ourselves for a 
story, for narrative may be found, writes Roland Barthes, ‘in myth, legend, 
fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting, ... 
stained glass windows, cinema, comics, news item, conversation ... it begins 
with the very history of mankind and there nowhere is nor has been a group of 
people without narrative.’100  Narrative is ubiquitous, suggests the 
historiographer Hayden White, because it ‘might well be considered a solution 
to a problem of general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate 
knowing into telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form 
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assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human rather than 
culture-specific.’101  Narrative, then, is certainly to be found in both scientific 
papers and the popular science of television documentaries.  The interesting 
question, from our point of view, is what idea of science does the narrative we 
call the science documentary convey and how does it do so persuasively? 
 
Narrative and myth 
To answer these questions we must understand the nature of this narrative 
langue of which we have so many distinct paroles.  What are the units and 
combinatory rules of narrative that we all seem to recognize instinctively and 
that transcend cultural difference? 
In Film Art (1993), Bordwell and Thompson define narrative as ‘a chain 
of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time and space.’102  This 
causal chain links the beginning to the ending in a transformative movement 
characterised by Tsvetan Todorov as having a number of discrete stages.  The 
first is the pre-story stage, a period of equilibrium whose disruption we expect 
imminently.  It is the disruption of this order that has the potential to set a 
narrative in motion (but only once that disruption is recognised by someone).  In 
narrative, recognition of disruption sets in train attempts to recover order and 
these efforts form the central action of the narrative which only comes to an end 
when equilibrium has been restored.  Almost certainly the restored state is not 
identical to the beginning but is a new, stable order.103   
Todorov’s analysis does not mean there may not be complicated 
temporal structures within a narrative framework.  Susan Sontag, for example, 
famously quotes the following conversation between Jean Luc Godard and 
George Franju:  ‘“But surely, Monsieur Godard...you do at least acknowledge 
the necessity of having a beginning, middle, and end in your films?”. 
“Certainly...but not necessarily in that order”’. 104  Godard is being playful about 
the possibilities of emplotment but however playful or perverse the story-teller 
wishes to be in this regard, for a narrative to be a narrative one must be able to 
discern a beginning and an ending for that is how narrative works.  This idea 
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makes meaningful Vivian Mercier’s famous quip by about Samuel Beckett’s 
play, Waiting for Godot (1953):  ‘Nothing happens, twice’. 105     It is not that 
nothing at all happens in Waiting for Godot but that there is a passage from one 
nothingness to a new nothingness.   
 But, of course, the world does not come to us in narrative form, speaking 
for itself; it is, as Christian Metz says, ‘uttered by no one’.106  The unconsidered 
past is at most a series of events—a chronicle—without beginning and without 
an ending (except in as much as the events terminate in the present).   It cannot 
be said to have any particular meaning. Speaking semiologically, the time-
signifier of chronicle floats above its signified, disconnected until we designate 
a beginning: ‘once upon a time…’  This is a signal that the recounted events are 
being presented as leading to an ending and this passage from opening to closing 
is narrative.  Narrative, then, is a specific sort of relationship between the 
beginning and the ending embodied in a real object that can be subjected to 
analysis.   
In his 1984 paper, ‘Narrative strategies in television science—a case 
study,’ Roger Silverstone analyses one such object, the BBC Horizon 
programme, The Death of the Dinosaurs.107  The film tells the story of how a 
number of palaeontologists came to favour what at the time was a new and 
controversial hypothesis, namely that the dinosaurs were wiped out by an 
asteroid impact and in dying off they vacated many ecological niches which 
were subsequently filled in a rapid radiation of new species based on a 
mammalian rather than reptilian body-plan and physiology.  The film concludes 
that without this chance event we humans could not have evolved.  Silverstone 
argues that The Death of the Dinosaurs tells its story simultaneously on two 
narrative levels: the ‘mythic’, which he analyses using ideas from the Russian 
formalist, Vladimir Propp and the structural anthropologist, Claude Lévi-
Strauss, and the ‘mimetic’ which he subjects to a rhetorical analysis appropriate 
to examining the structure of argument. 
The mythic narrative is a tale of heroic adventure such as found in the 
oral tradition of folk and fairy tales.  In The Death of the Dinosaurs, it is a story 
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of scientists on a quest to uncover the mystery of the dinosaur’s sudden 
extinction.  The progress of our scientists is threatened by villains with mistaken 
scientific ideas against which our heroes and their helpers struggle and 
eventually prevail.  By the mimetic narrative, Silverstone means a narrative 
dominated by an argument carried by the sound track that makes the logical case 
for the film’s asteroid impact thesis, abstracted from the actions and causal 
relations of the mythic dimension.     
These two dimensions, the mythic and the mimetic are in tension, writes 
Silverstone: ‘every programme…appears as the result of a negotiation between 
these two, as producers/directors in the management of their programmes must 
continually make decisions of inclusion, exclusion, stress and emphasis, which 
bear materially on one or other of these competing narrative frames.’108  The 
impact of this tension is perhaps most clearly seen in the film’s ending where 
the mythic narrative presses, as it were, for the closure we expect of a good story 
while the mimetic urges a degree of caution or doubt.  The mythic narrative 
invites the viewer to imagine themselves a hero; the mimetic invites them to be 
a judge.  Any science documentary, Silverstone concludes, ‘will define for itself 
a particular, though frail, compromise between myth and mimesis, between the 
heroic and the naturally historic forms of story telling.’109   
Although Silverstone speaks of the mimetic narrative having a ‘naturally 
historic form’, this seems to beg the question of what form history ‘naturally’ 
has.  I would argue, with Frederick Jameson, that there is nothing natural about 
history.  History, he writes, is an ‘absent cause’ on which our desire for story, 
for meaning, must come to grief.  ‘Yet it follows that this Real—this absent 
cause, which is fundamentally unrepresentable and non-narrative, and detectable 
only in its effects—can be disclosed by Desire itself, whose wish-fulfilling 
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mechanisms are the instruments through which this resistant surface must be 
scanned.’110  The filmmaker/historian is the desiring energy that makes a 
historical account accessible to us.  The filmmaker gives a particular form to a 
historical account and this form in itself communicates an ideology because ‘all 
discourse constitutes the objects it pretends only to describe realistically and to 
analyze objectively’—in short, as Hayden White puts it, form has content.111   
It is my aim in this dissertation, then, to explore what attitude to 
knowledge is expressed by the form of the science documentary.  Silverstone’s 
notion of the naturalness of the mimetic narrative may be helpful in 
distinguishing it from myth but we must nevertheless examine the ideology 
inherent in its structure rather than take its ‘naturalness’ for granted.   
 
Formalism  
In his analysis of the narrative strategies of a television science documentary, 
Roger Silverstone exploits both Proppian formalism and Lévi-Strauss’s 
structuralism but he does not explore the difference between them.  The two 
however are quite distinct analytical tools. The formalist approach (which we 
shall explore first) focuses on the general morphology of the tale in order to 
demonstrate the commonality of narratives and allow us to evaluate the extent to 
which an individual story, even a story of scientific discovery, may follow a 
conventional pattern involving the predictable actions of heroes and villains.  
The structuralist approach seeks to uncover the thematic tensions that the story 
acts to resolve and so reveal what it is ‘really’ about at a deeper level.  
In Morphology of the Folktale (1968), the most significant distinction 
Propp makes in his search for the commonality of all folktales is between the 
dramatis personae who vary from tale to tale and their actions whose function in 
each tale, he argues, is constant.  These constant functions, properly 
characterized and delineated give Propp his common morphology:  
 
Function is understood as an act of a character, defined from the point of 
view of its significance for the course of the action…Functions of 
characters serve as stable, constant elements in a tale, independent of 
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how and by whom they are fulfilled. They constitute the fundamental 
components of a tale.’112 
 
Propp finds there are thirty-one of these constant functional elements and 
he summarizes them into short headings like ‘absentation’ or ‘interdiction’.  He 
finds that not only is the number of functions finite but so is their order fixed, 
giving the general scheme of a fairy tale as follows:   
 
An ‘initial situation’ is established (‘once upon a time in a 
little village there lived…’).  Then one of the characters 
absents themselves.  As a result, through the violation of a 
prohibition, a misfortune befalls those left behind.  A villain 
enters the scene and does harm to his victim that results in a 
‘lack’.  This lack is then recognized and a hero assigned the 
task of remedying or ‘liquidating’ it.   
 
At this point the tale can go in one of two directions.  Either the victim becomes 
the hero or the victim is rescued by another character.  In the later case the hero 
is split but there is only one ‘hero-function’, supported by one or other character 
at any one time.    
 
The hero (‘seeker’ or ‘victim’) is dispatched and meets a 
‘donor’ who tests him.  The donor may be helpful or hostile 
and may even fight with the hero. The hero reacts and may 
acquire in this task supernatural help. (‘It often happens that 
various magical creatures, without any warning, suddenly 
appear or are met on the way and offer their services and are 
accepted as helpers.’113)  The experience with the donor 
prepares the hero for combat with the villain and it is during 
this struggle (which the hero ultimately wins) that the hero 
receives a mark of identification.  In defeating the villain the 
initial lack is liquidated and the hero then sets off home only 
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to be pursued by an enemy from whom he eventually escapes.  
Upon his return the hero is rewarded, often with the prize of 
marriage. 
 
Sometimes this series of functions is arrested just as it is about to terminate and 
another misfortune befalls the hero; the villain then reappears and the entire 
sequence runs through to its conclusion a second time in what  Propp calls a 
second ‘move’.114 
 
In Propp’s scheme, the thirty-one functions are supported by the dramatis 
personae.  The villain, for example, supports the functions of ‘villainy’, 
‘struggle’ and ‘pursuit’.  Propp therefore speaks not of characters as such but of 
‘spheres of action’ that, being thus tied to the thirty-one functions, are also 
limited in number.  Propp identifies seven: the hero, the donor, the magical 
agent, the dispatcher, the sought-for person, the villain and the false hero.  Each, 
no matter how it is constituted in a particular instance, plays the same role in the 
narrative.  ‘Reduced to its most abstract formula,’  writes  Lévi-Strauss, 
reflecting on  Propp’s morphology, ‘ the fairy tale can be defined as a 
development which starts with villainy and ends with a wedding, a reward, a 
liquidation of lack or harm, the transition being made by a series of intermediate 
functions.’115  That the sequence of functions is constant in the tale constitutes 
the major insight of Propp’s scheme.  But despite its syntagmatic linearity, there 
is also a paradigmatic axis implicit in many of Propp’s functions which can be 
grouped into pairs and organized into an unchanging system.  It is in these 
pairings that Propp prefigures the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss.   
In Propp’s morphology there are two pairs that are rarely found in the 
same move: ‘struggle with the villain’/ ‘hero’s victory’ and ‘assignation of a 
difficult task’/ ‘solution’.  ‘It results from this,’ writes Levi-Strauss, ‘that four 
classes of tales can be defined: those using the first pair, those using the second 
pair; those using them both; and those rejecting them both.’116  What Silverstone 
calls the mimetic or argumentative dimension of the classical science 
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documentary is commonly articulated by the second pair, ‘assignation of a 
difficult task’/’solution’ while the mythic dimension is given shape by the first, 
‘struggle with the villain’/’hero’s victory’.  The science documentary, as 
understood by Silverstone, is thereby simultaneously both didactic (problem—
solution) and dramatic (struggle—victory).    
  
Structuralism 
Propp’s scheme demonstrates the commonality of narratives but largely ignores 
content, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the specific ideological 
convictions expressed by a particular narrative work.  As Lévi-Strauss puts it:  
 
Unless content is … reintegrated into the form, the latter is condemned 
to remain at such a level of abstraction that it neither signifies anything 
any longer nor has heuristic meaning.  Formalism destroys its 
object….We know what the tale is, but as experience puts before us not 
an archetypal tale but a great number of concrete tales, we do not know 
how to classify them anymore… one can no longer come down from the 
abstract to the concrete.117   
 
 If Propp’s formalist focus is on langue, Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is 
concerned with parole.  Structuralism ‘refuses to set the concrete against the 
abstract and to recognize a privileged value in the latter. … Form is defined by 
opposition to material other than itself.  But structure has no distinct content; it 
is content itself, apprehended in a logical organization conceived as property of 
the real.’118  By structure, then, Lévi-Strauss means what Hayden White calls 
‘the content of the form’.  It is only by studying concrete instances of narratives 
that we are able to define the universe of a particular tale.  This is achieved by 
identifying the pairs of opposing ideas that are embodied by the characters and 
actions of the tale.    
A myth or narrative is conceived by Lévi-Strauss, then, not so much as a 
story than as a ‘logical model capable of overcoming a [fundamental] 
contradiction’ in life and thought’.119  Myths are linguistic vehicles for resolving 
                                                 
117
 Ibid., p.132-133 
118
 Lévi-Strauss, C. (1976) p. 115 
119
 Lévi-Strauss, C. (1963) p. 229 
 50 
the contradictions that matter for a particular culture in particular 
circumstances.120   
In ‘Beyond Morphology: Lévi-Strauss and the Analysis of Folktales’ 
(1988), David Pace illustrates the methodological distinction between Propp’s 
formalism and Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism.  We all know the tale of Cinderella.  
Beautiful and sweet-natured, she lives with her father, wicked stepmother and 
ugly step-sisters but her father dies and Cinderella is forced by her step-mother 
to become a servant.  A royal ball is held at the castle but Cinderella is forbidden 
to attend.  However, after the others have left, a fairy godmother appears and 
magically transforms Cinderella’s clothes and surroundings into a beautiful 
dress, coach and coachmen.  She goes to the royal palace where she captures 
The Prince’s heart.  But at midnight the magic wears off and Cinderella flees, 
leaving behind one of her glass slippers.  The besotted prince travels the length 
and breadth of the kingdom searching for the foot that fits the slipper.  Finally 
he enters Cinderella’s house.  The ugly sisters fight each other for the slipper but 
it only fits Cinderella.  And so The Prince and Cinderella are married and the 
wicked step-mother and her children are humiliated.  
A Proppian approach seeks to identify the elements of the Cinderella plot 
with the 31 functions common to this sort of narrative.  For example, the death 
of Cinderella’s father might be identified with Absentation; Cinderella’s desire 
to go to the ball could be identified with the function of Lack and the receipt of 
beautiful clothes with Receipt of Agent: hero acquires use of magical agent.  
The whole tale would be ordered in this fashion and something could be 
concluded about the formal patterns that underlie this type of story.  However, to 
reconstitute the semiotic codes at work in Cinderella and so understand the 
underlying ideology of the story, a structural analysis is called for. 
Unlike Propp’s formal analysis, a structural analysis is not necessarily 
concerned with the chronology of the story or a simple list of individual 
characters who appear in it but instead might begin, as David Pace does in his 
essay, by characterizing the relationships between characters in the ‘initial 
situation’.  Initially the stepmother and her biological children have a positive 
relationship to each other and a negative one to Cinderella.  The father has a 
                                                 
120
 Ibid., p. 130 
 51 
positive relationship to Cinderella but an uncertain one with the stepmother.  
The step-sisters are characterized as evil, vain, ugly, clean and of high status 
while Cinderella is good, humble, industrious, beautiful, dirty and of low status. 
Immediately we can see, as Pace puts it, that ‘the external, social signs of 
virtue have not been assigned to the right persons.  This contradiction provides 
the dramatic core of the story and is resolved at the end of the tale.’121  The 
tale’s meaning is articulated by the antinomies of evil/good, vain/humble, 
ugly/beautiful, clean/dirty, high status/low status.  Through the transformation 
of one into the other the contradiction is corrected and justice prevails.   
An examination of the relationships at the start reveals the ideology 
implicit in the story: Pace points out, for example, that the story can be 
understood as an economy of males: the father’s death removes a male and 
causes the imbalance that the Prince’s marriage to Cinderella then corrects.  
Psychologically, the tale also delivers a deep message embodied in the binary 
opposition between the qualities of the fairy godmother and those of the 
stepmother.  Together these two characters represent the attributes of a whole 
mother.  Splitting the mother into two opposing spheres of action enables the 
tale to articulate the emotional landscape of the child.  The stepmother (i.e., the 
wife of Cinderella’s dead father) is selfish and favours her biological children 
while the godmother is kind and generous and has no sexual connection to the 
father.  Thus the story precipitates out the child’s Oedipal emotions which 
become focused on the person of the evil stepmother (who has sex with the 
father and may be hated without guilt) while the child’s loving feelings towards 
her mother may become attached to the fairy godmother without reservation.     
The story is set in a society where only ties of blood are considered 
strong enough to hold a family together but at the same time it also expresses the 
social ambivalence of mothers: the stepmother is concerned only with 
Cinderella’s economic value while the fairy godmother expends her own 
resources to prepare Cinderella for marriage.  The fairy godmother, as a 
supernatural being, recognizes Cinderella’s true value beneath her signs of low 
status and as a force for social justice she transforms the very symbols of 
Cinderella’s degradation (rags, mice etc.) into the outward signs befitting her 
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inner virtues.  In this transformation she thus reveals to society the girl’s true 
value.122  
 Pace’s analysis demonstrates how a formalist approach may be used to 
discover the abstract shape of a particular tale while a structuralist analysis 
opens the story out to the world:  ‘With the formalist we have a method which is 
automatically apolitical (i.e., conservative), while the structuralist offers an 
approach which can be used to reveal the origin and nature of ideology.’123  As 
it is my concern, above all, to explore the ideology of the science documentary, 
this form of analysis is invaluable.  I apply it here to an example of a classic 
science documentary, The Ghost in Your Genes (2005), a film that in a number 
of ways explores similarly ‘heretical’ views on inheritance to my own film.  In a 
later chapter I will make a similar analysis of Hopeful Monsters: An Experiment 
and thereby compare it to The Ghost in Your Genes. 
 
Analysis of The Ghost in Your Genes 
The Ghost in Your Genes was produced and directed by Nigel Paterson of Clear 
Cut Pictures and transmitted as a BBC Horizon programme in November 
2005.124  As with most Horizon programmes of recent years it runs for about 50 
minutes.  The film opens with a montage of children upon whose naked bodies 
are projected black and white ‘archive’ or newsreel images of past world 
events—a World War II anti-aircraft gun firing into the sky, the dockyards 
ablaze during the London blitz, a line of migrants on the deck of a ship; and 
images of everyday life at that time—a child being cradled, a man smoking.   
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On the soundtrack we hear a low, menacing note.  About four seconds from the 
start, the BBC logo appears and we hear a woman’s voice with an RP English 
accent, the recognizable voice of BBC Horizon: ‘We are on the brink of 
uncovering a hidden world, a world that connects past and future generations in 
ways we never imagined possible.’  The montage continues as a man’s voice 




‘…an environmental exposure that your grandmother had could cause a disease 
in you, even though you’ve never been exposed to the toxin…’ The image 
reverts to the montage but the voice continues ‘…and you are going to pass it 
onto your great-grandkids.’  We see an extreme close-up of a child’s eyes and 




‘These extraordinary discoveries have the potential to affect every aspect of our 
lives.’  Again we see images projected on children’s bodies: women picking 





A new male voice: ‘It’s not just the genes but also the environment in the early 
life of your ancestors.’  We see the speaker’s face (again, a ‘talking head’ 
against an abstract background): ‘It’s not so much you are what you eat…’ (Cut 
to the shots of children again on which are superimposed faces of adults 
smoking and eating)  ‘…it’s that you are what your mother ate, and maybe you 
are what your grandmother ate…’ We see the speaker’s face again: ‘…and if 
you take our data, you are what stress your grandmother or grandfather had.’  
Montage of archive images: children in a playground, a baby lowered into a 
crib.  The narrator: ‘It will change the way we think about our relationship with 
every generation.’  Children playing old fashioned school-yard games.  A new 
male voice: ‘It makes me feel closer to my children.  What I experience in terms 
of environment…’ (we see the man’s face) ‘…will have some type of legacy in 
my children and my grandchildren.’  Back to images of naked children on which 
are projected women harvesting a field.  The narrator: ‘The science of 
inheritance is being turned on its head.’  We see yet another man who says: ‘We 
are changing the view of what inheritance is.’  The screen goes black and we 
hear the swell of the familiar Horizon theme music as animated streaks of light 
curve and snake across a deep blue background until they hit a point on a 









This then cuts abruptly to a second title: ‘The Ghost in Your Genes’ against 
bright moving hexagonal ‘circles’ that seem to dance—an image of the run-out 
of a spool of home movie footage.  Music mimics the sound of a projector.  The 
screen fades to black and the sound dissolves into bird song and a distant church 
bell tolling.  The screen lightens again revealing a village far off…  
 
This two-minute pre-title sequence is characteristic of modern Horizon 
programmes.  It features a voice-over narration linking brief snippets of 
‘common’ interviews that we expect to hear again more fully and contextualised 
as the film unfolds.  These talking heads are placeless, set against an abstract 
background while the other images we see (i.e., the montage) appear to illustrate 
what these voices say.  The images of children and their mothers bring to mind 
the idea of ‘inheritance’ while the images of war and smoking clearly stand for 
the ‘experiences’ that have had an impact on subsequent generations—the 
mystery the film promises to explain.   
The whole is ‘pre-title’ so that, separated from the film proper, it acts as 
a prologue, an extra-narrative presentation of theme and characters delivered, as 
in classical Greek drama, by a deity, the unseen narrator of great authority.  The 
narrator speaks the final words of the prologue in the passive voice, summing up 
the claim the film will now support: ‘The science of inheritance is being turned 
on its head’.  This is emphasised, ‘proved’ if you will, by the face and voice of 
the next contributor who we will soon learn is the seeker-hero of the piece, 
Marcus Pembrey: ‘We are changing the view of what inheritance is’.  All 
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contributors so far (note, Pembrey says, ‘We’) seem to support the narrator’s 
claim.  The prologue promises, in breathless tones, that we shall be let into ‘a 
hidden world’ and discover a science ‘we never imagined possible’.  We will 
redefine how we think about ‘our relationship with every generation’.  By 
implication this new science will solve an important problem or ‘liquidate a 
lack’, in Propp’s terms.  The problem is not yet clearly stated but it involves 
inheritance and the well-being of vulnerable (naked) children.   
 Immediately after the introduction, as we look down on a distant village 
menaced by dark clouds, the narrator, speaking with the authority not only of the 
BBC but of Science—a true Demiurge—inaugurates the story that promises to 




‘This small Swedish town may hold the evidence to launch a medical revolution.  
Overkalix lies huddled on the edge of the Arctic Circle, inaccessible and remote.  
It was cut off from the rest of the world for most of its history.’  The town is 
‘inaccessible and remote’ but, the narration implies, we will be impressed by 
how the hero of this story nonetheless does whatever it takes to bring to light the 
important evidence the town holds.  At this point the mythic and argumentative 
dimensions of the film’s narrative may be clearly discerned.  On the one hand a 
dramatic narrative is being set in motion—we see two men walking through 
some woods and into a graveyard outside Overkalix (our heroes stepping onto 
the stage): ‘Marcus Pembrey has travelled here to meet his colleague, Olov 
Bygren...’  On the other hand, an argument with evidence and proof is also 





‘This small Swedish town may hold the evidence…They believe that the story 
lying buried in these graveyards may hold the proof to their radical ideas.’  A 
voice (Pembrey’s) agrees: ‘This group of people could contribute to a sea 
change in the way we think about inheritance.’   
The narrator continues: ‘They have come to this churchyard to find 
grandmothers and granddaughters, grandfathers and grandsons, connecting 
people who lived almost a hundred years apart in entirely new ways, uncovering 
links that confound scientific thinking.’  Dramatic music underscores the phrase 
‘confound scientific thinking’ and then Marcus Pembrey, facing the camera, 
speaks to an unseen interlocutor while a caption identifies him as a credentialed 




 ‘Up till now inheritance is just the genes, the DNA sequence.  I suspect that 
we’re going to demonstrate that inheritance was more than that.’   Pembrey 
walks among the headstones with Bygren, and the female demiurge continues to 
explain:  
 
“It is the culmination of more than twenty years’ work.  And for the first 
time, Pembrey is confronting the magnitude of their discovery … 
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Marcus Pembrey is one of a select band of scientists, a band of scientists 
who are daring to challenge an orthodoxy.  They believe the lives of our 
parents, grandparents and even our great-grandparents can directly affect 
our well-being, despite never experiencing any of these things ourselves. 
To many, these ideas are regarded as scientific heresy.” (00:03:21)   
 
The co-existence, simultaneously, of what Silverstone identifies as two distinct 
narrative dimensions is evident from the temporal ambiguity of this graveyard 
scene.  First we are told that the science about to be presented by the film is the 
‘culmination of more than twenty years’ work;’ this means that the scene in the 
Overkalix graveyard postdates all the events of the upcoming film.  The scene 
appears to be the terminus, the end of a story, and yet it is placed here, at the 
start, because it makes sense in the structure of the film’s argument.  But at the 
same time the scene is the temporal origin of a mythic story because Pembrey’s 
speech to camera cues us to understand this moment as the beginning of a 
diachronic tale, a journey of discovery that will unfold during the rest of the 
film.  He is one of a select band of detective-scientists who are (present tense) 
daring to challenge an orthodoxy.  ‘I suspect that we’re going [i.e. from now on 
in this film] to demonstrate that inheritance was more than that.’   
 Narratologists of course distinguish between plot time and fabula time 
and it is surely correct that the viewer reconstructs the fabula in the course of 
viewing the plot.  What is interesting about this scene is that there appear to be 
two different fabulae to construct from the same plot.  In one (the mythic 
narrative) the scene is positioned chronologically (at the start), in the other (the 
mimetic narrative) the scene is understood as the conclusion of an argument, 
placed here as an introductory summary to whet our appetites.  The ambiguous 
temporality of this scene, then, neatly illustrates Silverstone’s contention that 
there are, as he puts it, two narratives running through the science documentary.  
On the one hand the scene can be understood as part of the exordium of an 
argument while on the other it represents the first meeting of the Proppian hero, 
Pembrey with the donor, Bygren.   
A further distinction between the argumentative and mythic dimensions 
of the film is apparent in the way each treats or adapts its source materials.  The 
Ghost in Your Genes adapts a series of scientific papers to build its argument 
while other textual sources are adapted in the construction of the mythic 
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narrative.  Dudley Andrews argues that there are two possible modes of relation 
between film and such source materials.  The film adaptation can either borrow 
or intersect with the source texts and it can be more or less faithful to the ‘letter’ 
or ‘spirit’ of those texts.125  In the fiction film at least, borrowing is the most 
frequent mode.  One need only think of the numerous film versions of 
Shakespeare or of Dickens or of Agatha Christie.  An audience views such films 
with a pre-conceived notion of what they will experience and looks forward to 
it.  Whereas in Dickens or Christie the filmgoer perhaps hopes for fidelity (of 
one sort or another), in more ‘mythic’ tales such as Shakespeare’s the viewer is 
excited also by the richness of  archetypes that reach back into myth.   
By contrast, the mode of ‘intersecting’ approaches the source text in the 
opposite way, as Dudley Andrews explains: ‘Here the original text is preserved 
to such an extent that it is intentionally left unassimilated in adaptation.  The 
cinema, as a separate mechanism, records its confrontation with an ultimately 
intransigent text.’126  The film comes up against or illuminates a portion of the 
text in question but whatever is revealed, like the corner of a darkened room by 
flashlight, is seen by the film not transformed.  Referring to Pasolini’s 
confrontations with St. Matthew’s Gospel (1964), and his Medea (1969), 
Decameron (1971) and Canterbury Tales (1972), Andrews writes, ‘All such 
works refuse to adapt.  Instead they present the otherness and distinctiveness of 
the original text, initiating a dialectical interplay between the aesthetic forms of 
one period with the cinematic forms of our own period.’127  The analyst of 
adaptations in the intersecting mode is concerned with how the original lives on, 
has its own specific life within the cinema.   
In The Ghost in Your Genes, the narrator tells the viewer that Pembrey 
“published his ideas in an obscure journal and largely forgot about it.  After all, 
there was no evidence for any of this.  It was pure speculation. Then four years 
later Marcus received an e-mail from a doctor in Sweden.” (00:25:36)  We never 
see the paper published in the obscure journal but its contents are paraphrased 
by the narrator.  By contrast, it is Pembrey who describes the e-mail which we 
see on screen: 
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“It really came as a bolt out of the blue.  I just got an e-mail in May 2000 
saying my paper was the only thing he could find in the literature that in 
any way sort of tied in with his basic observations.” (00:26:02) 
 
Similarly, we are also afforded a representation of the parish records that Bygren 




The mythic narrative ‘intersects’ with its sources but the film never shows us 
any of the scientific papers that inform the film’s argument.  These sources are 
‘borrowed’.  The mode of borrowing supports a realist aesthetic whereas the 
intersecting mode of adaptation draws attention to the film text as a signifying 
system distinct from that of its sources.  The mythic narrative distinguishes itself 
from argument in this regard, treating the sources of the myth as elements in a 
drama with their own form, while the sources of the argument are represented as 
pure content—knowledge.   
Thus in two clear ways the argument and the mythic narrative are 
distinguished one from the other.  Let us first trace the course of the film’s 
argument before returning to examine its mythic dimension.    
 
The Argument 
The argument of The Ghost in Your Genes follows the structure known since 
classical times: exordium and narratio where the problem is introduced, divisio 
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where it is divided into manageable parts, confirmatio and refutatio where the 
proffered solution is confirmed and alternatives refuted and lastly a peroratio 
that sums up the argument.   
As in Silverstone’s analysis of The Death of the Dinosaurs, we may 
locate in The Ghost in Your Genes arguments for and against the thesis the film 
presents, a thesis that, we are told, ‘to many’ is ‘regarded as scientific heresy’ 
(00:04:10).  But, unlike The Death of the Dinosaurs, in The Ghost in Your 
Genes no one person represents the ‘many’ who adhere to the ‘conventional 
biology’ and whose short-comings this film will demonstrate and resolve.  
Instead, the demiurgic narrator takes full responsibility for presenting the 
orthodox, conventional perspective and of orchestrating the material that will 
form a convincing and, as we’ve been told, ‘revolutionary’ response to it.  This 
strategy, then, takes for granted that there is a clear consensus that the orthodox 
view is inadequate and in addition it leaves no space for disagreement, implying 
that the ‘many’, if they are rational, must immediately accept the truth of the 
radical solution about to be presented by the film.  It only remains for the 
narrator to lay out this argument for it to meet with universal agreement. 
Although the mythic narrative, as we will see, presents a story of 
scientific discovery, the argument has an explicitly didactic purpose which is to 
demonstrate post facto, the reasons for believing what the narrator is already 
convinced of, i.e., the correctness of a radical new theory of inheritance.  The 
aims of the mythic narrative and the argument are therefore at cross-purposes.  
The argument seeks to explicate a scientific idea that is implicitly already 
acceptable to scientists while the mythic narrative tries to tell a story of ‘science 
in the making’.  I say ‘tries’ because we approach a mythic narrative of this sort 
with the understanding that the hero will succeed in his or her task and so, this 
‘science in the making’ is actually already made.  The mythic narrative tells a 
story of science in the making by telling it in the present tense, making it an 
ongoing investigation, while the argument is a timeless structure, like a 
textbook.  As a textbook, it is unconcerned with relating the history of a 
scientific idea (a history that, to be complete, must contain failed experiments, 
for example) but simply of laying out the reasons for believing the new theory, 
reasons that have already compelled assent by all fair-minded scientists.  
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In The Ghost in Your Genes, the argument begins with an animated sequence 
explaining the orthodox theory of inheritance.  It is notable that this sequence is 
set outside of the temporal structure of the film’s narratives.  Narrative is a 
metaphor of time, inventing one sort of temporality in terms of another.  The 
chronicle level refers to events that exist ‘within time’ but the narrative level 
refers to another sort of temporality—metaphorical or, as the philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur calls it, ‘historical time’—in which endings are linked to beginnings.  
Narrative then creates time within time.  This contrasts with description which 
creates space within time or the image which creates space within another space. 
In narrative, then, the signified is temporalized (‘this happened then this 
happened’) but in description it is spatialized (‘there it is’).  To move from a 
narrative mode to a descriptive moment is to ‘pass through a change of 
intelligibility, in the sense in which one speaks of a change of gears in 
automobiles.’128  This change of intelligibility cues the viewer to relate to this 
animated sequence as outside of the narrative structure of the film proper.  
Effectively it is a passage of description: “In classic genetics, your parents and 
grandparents simply pass on their genes.  The experiences they accumulate in a 
lifetime are never inherited, lost forever as the genes pass untouched through 




“After conception, it was assumed that our genes are 
locked away inside every cell of the body, protected 
and untouched by the way we live.” (00:04:52) 
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The style of the animated sequence is itself a rhetorical device: we understand 
that this cartoon reflects a view that such a story is overly simplistic.   
Next the voice-over informs us that the human genome project was 
instituted on the (implicitly foolish) assumption that if we could learn the entire 
sequence of the genetic code we would be in a position to understand all of 
human biology.  But knowing the code, we are told, has proved less useful than 
we thought.  There remain problems that it cannot solve.  One is the case of 
Angelman’s syndrome and Prader-Willi syndrome, two very different diseases 
caused by the same deletion of a gene from chromosome 15.  If the genetic code 
is all there is to biology then how can the same gene (or its absence) cause two 
very different diseases?   
In fact, we are told, there is reason to believe that the complete code is 
far from the final key to human biology simply because the human genome turns 
out to be much smaller than expected.  It contains only about 30,000 genes, 
fewer than some plants.  As Mike Skinner puts it, ‘If the genome has less genes 
in this species versus this species and we’re more complex potentially, what’s 
going on here?’ (00:10:40)  This is the problem the film seeks to answer: how 
can such a small genome give rise to the complexity of the human body and its 
variety of diseases? 
  
Having laid out the problem and its background, the argument now subdivides it 
into smaller parts (divisio).  First, exploring the mystery posed by Angelman’s 
and Prader-Willi syndromes we learn from Marcus Pembrey that the origin of 
the damaged chromosome 15 determines which syndrome a child inherits (if the 
damaged chromosome is from the father this causes Prader-Willi, if from the 
mother, Angelman’s).  Conclusion: if the chromosome can remember where it 
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comes from then some kind of marking or ‘imprinting’ must be taking place 
when it is still in the egg or sperm. 
Now Wolf Reik and then Mike Skinner develop the idea.  Reik: “You 
can think of it as a light switch. Switch on the gene, the light is shining, the gene 
is active ... makes the cell do a certain thing.  Or the light switch is off, 
everything is dark. That gene is off.  The switches remain on or remain off, and 
that gives the cells their identity.”  Skinner: “Whether those genes are turned on 
or off is called epigenetics.”  Pembrey reinforces the word: “Epigenetics, you 
know ‘upon the, the genes’” and finally Jonathan Seckl: “So clearly we have 
additional levels of complexity that we now need to understand, that are well 
beyond the DNA.”  Reik sums up this section: “The next huge challenge for 
modern biology is to now decipher the epigenetic code, to understand all the 
combinations of switches that exist.” (00:15:52) 
The argument now interjects a confirming case study.  Baby Ciaran was 
conceived by IVF and he suffers from the very rare Beckwith Wiedemann 
syndrome.  Reik has discovered that simply placing a mouse embryo in a culture 
dish can trigger genes to switch off.  Noting that during IVF the human egg 
spends a short time in a culture dish, the narrator asks, “Could IVF be switching 
genes on or off as in the mouse example?  Could IVF itself cause the 
syndrome?” And Reik answers immediately, (confirmatio), “What we found 
was an increased occurrence of this epigenetic syndrome in the IVF population.”  
Note the noun-phrase: the syndrome is now defined as ‘epigenetic’, reified or 
‘black-boxed’ as Bruno Latour puts it—a process that acts.129 
 
I think it should be clear that the argument is nearly entirely comprehensible just 
from the words we hear.  The images that accompany those words, whether of 
the faces of the speakers or other elements (images of mice, culture dishes etc.) 
mostly serve as the familiar signifiers of ‘scientificity’.  That the talking heads 
of the scientists are set against abstract backgrounds indicates their words are of 
primary interest but while these words may appear to be driving the argument 
they are of course orchestrated by the narrator.  Furthermore, the abstract nature 
of these talking head images indicates we are to consider the heads’ statements 
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about the nature of nature as beyond doubt for although notionally these 
statements are made by fallible individuals, these scientists are not presented as 
such, rather they are ‘scientists’ in inverted commas, signifiers of certainty who 
contribute their bodies and white coats as rhetorical resources.  Their evidence is 
incontestable.  As Nichols writes of this approach to the documentary: 
 
The voices of others are woven into a textual logic that subsumes and 
orchestrates them.  They retain little responsibility for making the 
argument, but are used to support it or provide evidence or substantiation 
for what the commentary addresses.130      
 
The narrating voice can make sense of what we see (these talking heads etc.) 
precisely because it is not of the same order as these images. The theologian, 
Frederick Ruf terms this form of narration, ‘magisterial’ in that the relationship 
of the narrating voice to the persons, events, objects that are narrated is 
external.’ 131  The magisterial voice is what Nichols terms the Griersonian voice, 
‘in which the corporeal I who speaks dissolves into a disembodied, 
depersonalized, institutional discourse of power and knowledge.’132 
In Ruf’s terms, in the classic (Griersonian) documentary, ‘The narrator 
sees actions, events and objects from without … The narrator is master of the 
events, persons, objects and their meaning.’133  The narration is magisterial 
precisely because it is disembodied.  It comes from a place ‘removed from the 
fallibility of the human sphere.’134  Here we may note the debt that the classic 
science documentary has to the rhetoric of the received view.  Like the passive 
voice of the technical paper, the magisterial voice of the classic science 
programme eliminates the human element and by thus objectifying, eliminates 
ambiguity and eliminates society.   And as we noted above, along with the 
magisterial voice that renders the scientist a mere cipher, we also have, in this 
documentary, examples of the nominalistion we find in written scientific 
discourse.  One occurs when Wolf Reik handles the electrophoresis gel that he 
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believes bears signs that demonstrate the heritable epigenetic effect of placing a 
mouse embryo in a culture dish: 
 
 
“You had dots that you were looking at and every dot means a 
gene is on, and all of a sudden you know somebody said, wow 
look at that. The epigenetic switch thrown in one generation 
was clearly also present in this second generation” (00:22:21) 
 
These dots become not just signs of switches but the switches themselves.  And 
so, the voice-over concludes:  
 
“This meant that the genes were not locked away.  A simple 
environmental event could affect the way genes worked and that could 
be inherited. As if a memory of an event was being passed down through 
generations.  It was something many scientists regarded as impossible.  
If this effect could be observed in humans the implications would be 
profound. It would mean that what we experience could affect not just us 
but our children and our grandchildren.” (00:23:15)   
 
The narrator thus speaks of nature as the self-evident cause of the phenomenon 
witnessed.  Those dots are switched-on genes.  
Having demonstrated the reality of epigenetic switches, the argument 
moves on to consider the evolutionary significance of epigenetic effects in 
conferring some kind of transgenerational adaptation.  Pembrey explains that he 
has been puzzled by the problem of how a mother born in one generation could 
pass on important information to her child growing in the next.  For instance, if 
the mother had been undernourished as a child and had matured with a small 
pelvis, how would the baby know not to grow so big as to jam the mother’s birth 
canal?  There must be a mechanism, says Pembrey, which would allow the 
mother to pass on information about her life experience to the growing embryo.  
The answer must be that the mother’s genome becomes epigenetically altered in 
a way that, passed to her unborn child, ensures the baby’s genes limit its 
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prenatal growth.  Note that the film takes this idea not as speculation but as the 
only and obvious answer to a puzzle.  It is taken for granted that (a) babies could 
potentially grow so big as to jam the birth canal and (b) but for an epigenetic 
effect that prevents it, they would do so. 
 
Refutatio: In New York, a psychologist, Rachel Yehuda studies the 
transgenerational effects of the holocaust.  She presumes the children of 
survivors experience symptoms of trauma because they have been constantly 
exposed to their parents’ shocking stories.  But in Edinburgh, Jonathan Seckl 
studies the effects of stress in rats.  He finds that stress applied to pregnant rats 
alters the stress response of their offspring. This, we are told, is a refutation of 
Yehuda’s purely psychological explanation for the emotional problems suffered 
by the children of holocaust survivors.  The children are stressed, Seckl argues, 
because, like the rats he studies, their mothers were stressed when their babies 
were in the womb and this stress response is passed on by means of an 
epigenetic imprint on the genes coding for the ‘stress hormone’, cortisol.  
Yehuda then, in a ‘crucial test’ of this suggestion, expands her study to include 
women who were pregnant when caught up in the attack on the Twin Towers.  
For example, a woman called Ailsa Gilliam.  Yehuda finds that both Gilliam and 
her baby have abnormal cortisol levels in their saliva.   
 
Narrator: “It appeared that epigenetics might be responsible, that an 
event had altered the stress response in the children.” 
 
Yehuda: “What these findings did was suggest to us that we need to be 
looking where we hadn’t even considered looking before.”   
 
Narrator: “To know for certain that this was an epigenetic effect, they’ll 
need to be sure that their observations weren’t simply due to high levels 
of stress hormones in the womb.” 
 
Here it is noteworthy that the narrator reframes Yehuda’s conclusion (in which 
she is careful not to conclusively invoke epigenetics) as clear evidence for the 
epigenetic hypothesis: “The work of Yehuda and Seckl offers tantalising 
evidence of proof of inherited epigenetic effects in humans.” (00:35:19)  (No 
mention is made of whether, as seems unlikely, the holocaust-surviving mothers 
were pregnant during their traumatic experiences.)  What is significant from our 
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perspective is the epistemic authority of the film—its certainty.  The magisterial 
voice-over speaks, as the sociologist David Bloor writes, “as if experience can 
deliver a series of decisive judgments on the applicability of a concept to 
reality.”135   
 The voice-over concedes that Yehuda’s work, while almost certainly 
‘evidence of proof’ cannot act as a conclusive crucial experiment because it 
deals with only one generation.  We are then neatly brought back to the Swedish 
work with which the argument began: 
 
“The only way forward was to look back to the past.  In Sweden 
Pembrey and Bygren had data that provided the chance to study the 
effects of famine through many generations.  Olov Bygren was looking 
to see if poor nutrition had an effect on health when he stumbled on 
something curious.  It appeared that a famine could affect people almost 
a hundred years later even if they never suffered a famine themselves.  
He wanted to know how this might be possible, so he asked Marcus 
Pembrey.” (00:35:19) 
 
Pembrey finds the incidence of diabetes in the Overkalix grandchildren is 
correlated with their grandparents’ experience of famine.  He then finds that the 
effect only occurs if there is a famine during certain ‘sensitive’ periods which 
for the men is during adolescence and for the women when they are still in the 
womb.  Pembrey argues therefore that the epigenetic switch is thrown when the 
germ cells of the grandparents are being laid down.   
 
Narrator:  “Pembrey and Bygren have the first conclusive proof of an 
environmental effect being inherited in humans. The impact of a famine 
being captured by the genes in the eggs and sperm and the memory of 
this event was being carried forward to affect the grandchildren 
generations later.” (00:42:14) 
 
This concludes the argument.   
 
Summary 
The argumentative structure of The Ghost in Your Genes (Silverstone’s mimetic 
narrative) is entirely consistent with those Ron Curtis finds in the popular 
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science magazine of the AAAS.136  Such structures present a picture of linear 
development via crucial experiments to ‘conclusive proof’.  As Silverstone 
writes: ‘like so much on television this framing logic is both remarkably simple 
and remarkably effective.  It mirrors the…view of how science itself is 
undertaken.’ 137  This means, for example, that the mimetic narrative gives 
almost no space to disagreement, presenting its argument as if there were a 
shared algorithm that all scientists employ.  The narration itself says that “to 
many, these ideas are regarded as scientific heresy” (00:04:11) but does not 
acknowledge the reasons why it is heretical, i.e., that there may be good reasons 
to think it wrong.  Indeed, the narrator implies that these ‘many’ who think it 
heresy nonetheless cannot fail to recognize the truth once it is explained to 
them—as it now has been.  (Not much of a heresy, then.)  The process of theory 
choice is reduced, by the rhetoric of the classic science documentary, to a series 
of crucial experiments that guide the supposed scientist-detective to certain truth 
through a garden of forking paths.  The argument of the classic science 
documentary, at least as exemplified by The Ghost in Your Genes focuses 
entirely on how scientists map the external relations between a theory and the 
‘nature’ it purportedly describes.  We shall see in the next chapter how this 
picture of theory choice in science is seriously undermined by the work of 
Thomas Kuhn, but before re-examining the assumptions displayed by the 
argument of The Ghost in Your Genes let us examine the story of scientists and 
scientific practice that it tells—its mythic narrative. 
  
The mythic narrative 
Applying Propp’s rubric, the morphology of the film’s mythic narrative may be 
summarized as follows: 
 
Initial situation: There lives in London a doctor called Marcus Pembrey.   
Pembrey works in a children’s hospital and is a good clinician and a kind, 
sensitive man.   
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Absentation: He is very successful in his narrow field of clinical genetics but is 
an outsider (i.e., professionally absent) in the field of evolutionary studies in 
which he also takes an interest.   
 
Interdiction: Through obedience to the injunction against dabbling in areas 
outside of his clinical expertise, a misfortune is befalling many of the children in 
his care.   
 
Villainy: These children suffer from congenital diseases that afflict them 
strangely and orthodox medicine and science (represented by The Human 
Genome Project) cannot help them.  
 
Lack: A lack of explanation persists, exacerbated by the rigidity of the scientific 
establishment and the stranglehold of classical genetics.   
 
Mediation: Marcus Pembrey is identified as the man to liquidate this lack:   
 
 
(The seeker-hero strides towards us in slow motion,  
scattering pigeons and people before him) 
 
Pembrey publishes some speculations in an obscure journal which is read by 
Olov Bygren in Sweden.  Bygren has been looking at births, deaths, and records 
of famine in the parish archives of Overkalix.  He notices what looks like 
transgenerational genetic effects similar to those that Pembrey has speculated 
on.  Bygren writes to Pembrey to ask his opinion.   
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Departure: Pembrey is dispatched to Overkalix, a village that ‘lies huddled on 
the edge of the Arctic Circle, inaccessible and remote, cut off from the rest of 
the world for most of its history.’  
 
1st Donor function: Bygren alerts Pembrey to the data he has gathered from 
parish records, data that defies classical explanation. 
 
The other scientists that are now introduced to the story function, in Proppian 
terms, as helpers to our hero, Pembrey.  Although they are separated spatially 
and temporally (no one scientist even mentions any of the others), all these other 
scientists are presented as co-workers in a sort of virtual laboratory.  In this way 
the film constructs a picture of a ‘scientific community’ in which data and ideas 
(the magical agents in Propp’s terms) are openly shared:  
 
Receipt of magical agent: Pembrey receives help and support from the work of 
these other scientists. 
 
Victory, Liquidation, Return:  
The final crucial piece of data on diabetes and famine is sent as a rough diagram 
by Bygren to Pembrey (in terms of Propp’s spheres of action this diagram is the 
‘sought for person’).  This causes a liquidation of the lack: 
  
     
 
Pembrey:  “Hand drawn, this is what Olly sent me; you know he was too 
excited to wait for the thing to be drawn out properly.  You know he sent 
me the data and in fact I was recovering from having something done on 
my heart so he sent it saying you know I hope this helps you get better 
quickly you know because it was so exciting.” 
 
Narrator:  “When Pembrey plotted out the diagram he was immediately 
struck by its significance.”  (00:40:29) 
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Note that this phrase, ‘immediately struck’, as described in the previous chapter, 
is an expression of inductivism.  The blank slate of the scientist’s open mind is 
struck and the truth impressed upon it like a coin struck from a metal blank: 
 
Narrator: “The more they looked, the more patterns started to appear.” 
 
Pembrey:  “Once I had plotted out the full extent of those results, it was 
so beautiful and such a clear pattern I knew then quite definitely that we 
were dealing with a trans-generational response.  It was so coherent and 
that’s important in science, that the effect was coherent, in some way 
was tying in when eggs and sperm were being formed.” 
 
Narrator:  “The diagram showed a significant link between generations, 
between the diet in one and the life expectancy of another.” 
 
Recognition, exposure, transfiguration, punishment (of the villain), wedding: 
Pembrey: “This is going to become a famous diagram, I’m convinced 
about that.  I get so excited every time I see it.  It’s just amazing. Every 
time I look at it, I find it really exciting.  It’s fantastic.” 
 
Narrator: “Pembrey and Bygren have the first conclusive proof of an 
environmental effect being inherited in humans.” (00:42:00) 
 
Structuralist analysis 















In this diagram we can discern how the contradiction between the qualities 
associated with the hero and with the villain provides the dramatic core of the 
story.  Classical genetics, ‘personified’ by The Human Genome Project, is 
assigned the virtues of professionalism while the hero, Marcus Pembrey, is a 
self-confessed amateur and speculator.  He is obscure and his ideas are without 
corroborative evidence while the orthodox view is solidly supported and 
commonly accepted.  The tale of The Ghost in your Genes, then, effects a 
transformation such that the virtues attributed to the Human Genome Project are 
transferred to Pembrey.  It is noteworthy that whereas in Cinderella, the scullery 
maid’s inappropriately assigned attributes are reassigned to the step-sisters, in 
The Ghost in your Genes, those inappropriately assigned to Pembrey are not 
transferred to the Human Genome Project.  Such a mutual switch would run 
counter to the idea of science as progressive, the idea that epigenetics is a 
refinement, not a replacement for classical genetics.  Despite the voice-over’s 
talk of ‘revolution’, epigenetics is here represented as an evolution of classical 
ideas.   
The sense, then, of moral closure is weakened in this narrative of what 
Thomas Kuhn calls ‘normal’ science.  Weakened but not entirely absent.  Just as 
Cinderella divides the role of mother between the evil step-mother and the fairy 
godmother, The Ghost in Your Genes divides the role of ‘causal factors in 
inheritance’ between epigenetic markers and classical genes.  The effect of 
splitting one from the other is to precipitate out Pembrey’s emotional attachment 
to orthodox genetics which may then be criticized (with good reason) while his 
guilty pleasure in speculation may become attached to the epigenetic thesis.  
I say ‘guilty’ because although speculation is, as we shall see later, an 
essential first step in more recent views of the scientific method, it is not 
publicly encouraged per se.  ‘As business speculation may seem to the hard-
working artisan to be playing around with other people’s money,’ writes the 
rhetorician, Greg Myers, ‘scientific speculation may seem to the hard-working 
experimentalist to be playing around with other people’s evidence…scientific 
speculation may seem to run ahead of the facts, … an affront to those doing the 
hard work…’138  The guilty pleasure arises from Pembrey’s position as an 
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outsider to the world of orthodox genetics: Pembrey “published his ideas in an 
obscure journal and largely forgot about it.  After all, there was no evidence for 
any of this.  It was pure speculation.” (00:35:37) but Bygren, like the fairy 
godmother, is able to see Pembrey’s true value beneath his signs of low 
scientific status and as a force for scientific justice, helps transform the symbols 
of Pembrey’s obscurity into the outward signs befitting his inner virtues.  In this 
transformation Bygren thus reveals to scientific society Pembrey’s true value.  
To some extent, the status of The Human Genome Project is undermined by 
Pembrey’s accession to the throne but it is not banished entirely from the 
Kingdom of Genetics.  
Although the narration speaks of heresy and medical revolution and 
Pembrey says he likes “to stir things up a bit” (00:24:04), the overriding sense 
given by the narrative is of cooperation between scientists.  The stories of the 
helpers create an impression of a world-wide effort by particularly insightful and 
open-minded scientists (recall they are dubbed a “select band of scientists”).  No 
hint is given, for example, that these different scientists might be motivated by 
individualist or aggressive instincts; there is none of the secrecy or 
competitiveness James Watson writes about in his account of the race to 
discover the structure of DNA.139  This is a world governed by Robert Merton’s 
norms.  The narrative of The Ghost in Your Genes ‘reaffirms,’ as Ron Curtis 
writes, ‘the Baconian myth that the scientist who labours with his colleagues in 
the proper spirit of cooperation is the one who will succeed in his endeavours to 
reveal Nature’s secrets.’140  This classic science documentary presents a picture 
of scientific method consonant with Francis Bacon’s.  As Curtis writes, the 
film’s narrative creates a ‘cognitive space’ in which this view of science as an 
inductive, detective trail is tacitly expressed: 
 
The scientific detective story is a modern version of the story Bacon 
himself told…where he interpreted the classical myth of the Sphinx as an 
allegory about science.  It was a warning against premature speculation, 
said Bacon, for the Sphinx (that is Nature) was in the end subdued by a 
lame man with club feet, a slow-moving interpreter, not anticipator.  The 
hard-working scientific ‘gumshoe’ is his modern counterpart.141  
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The viewer’s experience is further coloured by the use of self-consciously 
constructed visual metaphors that serve to anchor meaning.  Many of these 
images are expressions of the film’s central thesis.  For example, right from the 
start we see colour images of children onto whose bodies are projected black 
and white ‘archive’ images of other bodies.  This visual trope is reprised 
elsewhere in the film by a series of images of faces hidden behind developing 
Polaroid images of the same: 
 
     
 
The clear meaning of both these visual tropes is that our bodies are in some 
sense inhabited or impressed upon by the environment and by the histories of 
our immediate ancestors.  Both the superimpositions of the pre-title images and 
these Polaroid moments thereby express the central binary opposition of the film 
between the genetic and the epigenetic.  We are haunted either by the ghosts of 
ancestors or the ghosts of our younger selves who experienced physiological 
challenges like smoking or drinking or exposure to toxic chemicals.  This same 
idea is expressed by another recurring visual motif: an image of people crossing 
a busy bridge.  The image is made with a long lens so the perspective is 
foreshortened and people seem to bob up and down on the spot as if their lives 
are on hold for us to contemplate.  Superimposed on this image of ‘humanity’ is 
another: the same image shot from the same spot but at a slightly different time.  
This second image is fainter than the first and the effect of the superimposition 




                       (00:11:00) 
There are also over a dozen shots of families posing for the camera on the streets 








These images contrast with the crowd on the bridge, articulating an opposition 
between the generic and the specific, a meaning heavily underscored by the 
image below of the letters of the decoded human genome superimposed and 
streaming down the screen over an image of the crowd on the bridge.  
 
 
                (00:09:47) 
The Human Genome Project, this image says, is insensitive to the facts of 




The overriding effect of the formal and structural features of the film is to 
persuade the viewer to accept a representation of scientific practice as a 
detective trail that leads the gumshoe scientist unerringly to whodunit—to 
nature.  Furthermore, the behaviour of the detective and his helpers is governed 
by open-mindedness and a generous sharing just as Robert Merton says it 
should.  However, we witness almost no scientific process in the film at all.  
Although the film presents a few images of experimental ‘work’ they are largely 
generic images of white mice, petri dishes and microscopes, all very shiny and 
glossy—‘science’.  The actual processes of investigation are not depicted. 
Consequently The Ghost in Your Genes presents a history of science in which 
scientific behaviour is governed by Mertonian norms and rational decisions are 
made based on philosophically secure evidence.   
It is interesting to note how the argument and the mythic narrative 
combine in the closing moments of the film.  Recall that the mythic narrative 
begins by setting out an initial situation in which, because of adherence to the 
orthodox view of genetics, children were suffering.  By the end of the narrative, 
children are still suffering only now Pembrey knows why—epigenetics.  In a 
sense then, the mythic narrative is only partly closed.  The villainous Human 
Genome Project has been vanquished but the suffering children have not yet 
been saved.  Knowing there is more to genetics than the genetic code is not in 
itself a cure for genetic disease.  Society—which has been largely absent from 
the diegesis of the film—has to act on that knowledge: 
 
Pembrey: “It may get to a point where they realise that you live your life 
as a sort of - I don’t know - as a sort of guardian of your genome.  It 
seems to me you’ve got to be careful of it because it’s not just you.  You 
can’t be selfish because you can’t say well I’ll smoke or I’ll do whatever 
it is because I’m prepared to die early.  You’re also looking after it for 
your children and grandchildren.” (00:48:00)    
 
The individual victims with which the mythic narrative began have been 
largely forgotten by the end; they have become “your children and 
grandchildren”.  The mythic narrative with its ‘spheres of action’ has simply 
acted as a vehicle for the film’s argument, persuading the viewer to accept its 
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scientific conclusions because they are supported by the activities and 
statements of persuasively authoritative individuals—scientific experts.  At the 
same time, the film’s argument has coloured our reading of the motivations of 
the heroic scientists, all of whom seem to be working together against the 
orthodox view for the benefit of us all.  The mimetic and mythic narratives are 
in this way mutually reinforcing.  They paint a familiar, ‘received’ view of 
scientific activity as the application of a shared algorithm of discovery (the 
‘scientific method’) by cooperating scientists who thereby succeed in inserting 
another piece into the Great Jigsaw Puzzle of our ever-expanding picture of the 
natural world. 
Carl Gardner and Robert M. Young come to much the same conclusion 
in their critique of TV science: 
 
As things now stand, the eyes of programme-makers are firmly fixed on 
the content of knowledge and the process of discovery. There is, in 
addition, another topic which tends to be considered separately from the 
substance of knowledge (in itself regarded as ‘neutral’): its social impact. 
The result is that discovery and substance are presented as internal to 
science, while social impact is seen as an interacting variable. Science is 
one thing, context another.142  
 
‘Science is one thing, context another.’  Thus does the classic science 
documentary reinforce the received view’s distinction between the contexts of 
discovery and of justification.  Gardner and Young go on to point out that this 
treatment of science is unlike the way academics, historians and filmmakers 
treat other areas of culture: 
 
Literature, drama, plastic and graphic arts, cinema, and television itself 
are currently studied according to models which attempt to relate the 
context, presentation, content and impact into a single coherent account 
of meanings. This is also a commonplace in the treatment of science 
from periods other than our own. Historians of ancient, medieval, Arab, 
Renaissance, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth-century science go 
to considerable lengths to show how the science is constituted by the 
historical forces of the period, including frames of reference, major 
theoretical concepts and even specific research topics. All bear the stamp 
of their times and places.143  
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But not the classic science documentary.  And so, as Ron Curtis asks of the 
popular science article, I would wish to ask (with Hopeful Monsters in mind): 
might other forms of the science documentary ‘reflect more accurately and 
critically alternative interpretations of scientific practice?’144  Might another 
form of the science documentary register the stamp of time and place on 
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 
 
The following chapter outlines a history of developments in ideas about the 
nature of science that have resulted in the view of science I have called 
‘constructivism’, a view that acknowledges the influences of time and place on 
what comes to be designated scientific discovery.  In tracing this history we will 
identify those features of the constructivist epistemology that we may expect to 
find reflected in any ‘alternative’ to the classic science documentary.  In 
subsequent chapters I will analyse my experimental film, Hopeful Monsters and 
consider its effectiveness in representing a constructivist view of science, but 
my aim in this chapter is first to sketch out the grounds for this alternative view.   
 Let me begin by inviting you into the laboratory of French physicist, 
Pierre Duhem, around the year 1900: 
 
…approach the table crowded with an assortment of apparatus, an 
electric cell, a silk-covered copper wire, small cups of mercury, spools of 
wire, a mirror mounted on an iron bar; the experimenter is inserting into 
small openings the metal ends of ebony-headed pins; the iron oscillates, 
and the mirror attached to it throws a luminous band upon a celluloid 
scale; the forward-backward motion of this luminous spot enables the 
physicist to observe the minute oscillations of the iron bar.  But ask him 
what he is doing.  Will he answer “I am studying the oscillations of an 
iron bar which carries a mirror”?  No, he will answer that he is 
measuring the electric resistance of the spools.  If you are astonished, if 
you ask him what his words mean, what relation they have with the 
phenomena he has been observing and which you have noted at the same 
time as he, he will answer that your question requires a long explanation 
and that you should take a course in electricity.145 
 
Quoted by N. Russell Hanson in his book Perception and Discovery (1969), this 
passage illustrates the important idea that to show the visitor what he sees, the 
physicist must first explain what he knows.   The same, argues Hanson, goes for 
all our perception.  To make his point clearer, Hanson invites us to consider the 
following famously ambiguous image: 
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Hanson uses the duck-rabbit figure to explore the difference between what it is 
to see and what it is to interpret.  His aim is to question a central tenet of the 
received view, namely that observing and theorising (seeing and interpreting) 
are distinct operations.  In the received view, to ‘see’ is taken to mean the 
apprehension of sense-data while everything additional to that basic 
apprehension is considered interpretation.  But this, argues Hanson is surely not 
what we mean when we speak of seeing the figure above as either a duck or a 
rabbit.  One does not have to interpret—to think—in order to switch the figure 
from duck to rabbit one simply sees it as a rabbit or as a duck.  We see either a 
duck or a rabbit due to how we organise the lines of the figure but that 
organisation is not an act of interpretation separable from the seeing, it is what it 
means to see the figure in the first place.  
 If the figure were surrounded by other less ambiguous images of ducks 
or of rabbits we would ‘get’ the figure immediately as one or the other and it 
would remain that way.  What we see depends on what we expect to see or 
believe we ought to be seeing—interpretation is built-in, if you like, to the very 
experience we call seeing:   
 
The conceptual organization of one’s visual field is the all-important 
factor here.  It is not something visually apprehended in the way that 
lines and shapes and colours are visually apprehended.  It is rather the 
way in which lines, shapes and colours are visually apprehended. … No 
case of seeing…is wholly independent of the knowledge of the 
percipient.146 
 
To grasp the significance of this idea for an understanding of the nature of 
science we shall have to ignore for a time what many scientists seem to believe 
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they are doing when they do science.  This is not to suggest that scientists don’t 
know how to do science, only that what they describe in public and that is 
subsequently ‘fed on’ by TV programmes need not be taken entirely at face 
value.   As Gardner and Young write: 
 
It is our impression, backed up by discussions and interviews with 
people taking part in the making of science programmes, that belief in 
the relative autonomy of knowledge is being uncritically propagated on 
television. … As far as we can tell, this is principally a matter of public 
relations, since it certainly isn’t a view propagated by scientists at 
work.147  
 
Alan Chalmers puts the philosophical position:  
 
Modern developments in the philosophy of science have pinpointed and 
stressed deep-seated difficulties associated with the idea that science 
rests on a sure foundation acquired through observation and experiment 
and with the idea that there is some kind of inference procedure that 
enables us to derive scientific theories from such a base in a reliable 
way.  There is just no method that enables scientific theories to be 
proven true or even probably true…there is no method that enables 
scientific theories to be conclusively disproved either. 148 
 
There are many surveys and commentaries on this analysis, for example, 
Chalmers (1982), Losee (1972), Gillies (1992), Harré (1972), Gower (1997) and 
Suppe (1977).  All these authors agree that at the heart of the matter, as 
exemplified by our experience of making sense of the duck-rabbit figure, lies 
debate over the nature of theories and their relation to observation.  To explore 
more fully the issues at stake in this relationship it is necessary to revisit some 
well-known epistemological problems that date back to Ancient Greece.   
 
Deduction and Induction 
In Plato’s dialogue, The Meno, Socrates invites the soldier, Meno, to distinguish 
between knowing and guessing the correct route from Athens to Larissa.   By his 
arguments he leads Meno to agree that provided a man guesses the correct way 
then ‘true opinion is as good a guide to rightness of action as knowledge.’  
Meno is troubled by this conclusion and responds, ‘…I wonder, Socrates, this 
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being the case, that knowledge should ever be more prized than right opinion, 
and why they should be two distinct and separate things.’  The difference 
between guessing correctly and knowing, replies Socrates, is that:  
 
True opinions…do not care to stay for long, and run away out of the 
human soul, and thus are of no great value until one makes them fast 
with causal reasoning. … But when once they are fastened, in the first 
place they turn into knowledge, and in the second, are abiding.  And this 
is why knowledge is more prized than right opinion: the one transcends 
the other by its trammels.149   
 
By ‘trammels’, Socrates means an argument with reasons as premises 
and the statement in question as the conclusion.  But he means more than this: if 
the premises are to constitute a good reason for the conclusion then, in the first 
place, the premises must be true and, in the second place, the argument from 
these premises to that conclusion must be a sound one.  In a sound argument the 
premises provide a good, because conclusive, reason for the truth of the 
conclusion.  Such a deductively valid argument is bound to lead to certain 
knowledge.  Note, however, that deduction (as in mathematics or logic) 
generates no new knowledge; nothing emerges from the conclusion of a 
deductive argument that was not already implicit in its premises.    
 In making scientific arguments, by contrast, we are interested in 
generating new knowledge but this means that many if not most of the 
statements we accept as true in science are accepted on the basis of reasons 
which are not conclusive.  For example, that ‘the sun will rise tomorrow’, that 
‘sugar is sweet’, that ‘global warming is caused by human activity’, are all 
statements whose truth is supported by evidence that is less than conclusive.  In 
other words, an argument which reports in its premises the evidence of relevant 
experience, and has as its conclusion one or more of the statements mentioned, 
will not be a deductively valid argument.  When we need to argue for the truth 
of a prediction like the sun will rise tomorrow or that industrial activity causes 
global warming we make use of inductive arguments.  The facts we appeal to in 
the premises of our argument constitute inductive reasons for the prediction.  
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The question is, then, whether any inductive arguments are sound; whether 
inductive reasons are ever good reasons. 
 A deductive argument counts as sound because if its premises are true 
then its conclusion must also be true. To deny the truth of the conclusion of a 
valid deductive argument is to assert a contradiction.  The same does not hold 
for an inductive argument.  Even if the premises of an inductive argument are 
true I need not accept its conclusions. You may shout at me that the sun has 
risen every day ‘since records began’ but it is no contradiction to deny the sun 
will rise tomorrow.  Clearly the strength of an inductive argument, unlike 
deductive validity, is open to dispute.  People are not compelled, logically, to 
accept the same evidence as constituting good reasons for the conclusion of an 
inductive argument.  The philosopher W. Kneale puts the distinction this way:  
 
The situation which I have been trying to describe can be made more 
intelligible by a comparison between the way in which we talk of 
probability and the way in which we talk of necessity.  If I know a fact A 
and also know that A is conclusive evidence for B, I may say ‘Because 
A, therefore necessarily B’.  But if there is no special reason to mention 
the evidence for my conclusion I may content myself with the remark 
‘Necessarily B’.  This shows that I put B forward as the conclusion of an 
inference, but does not specify the evidence for it.  If I do not know A, or 
am not concerned for the moment at least to claim knowledge of it, but 
wish to point out that A would be conclusive evidence for B, I use the 
hypothetical form and say ‘If A then necessarily B’.  For the case in 
which A is inconclusive evidence for B all these phrases can be adapted 
by the substitution of ‘probably’ for ‘necessarily’; and as in the first case 
we can say that A necessitates (or would necessitate) B, so in the second 
case we can say that A probabilifies (or would probabilify) B.  There is, 
however, an important difference.  Whereas, if A necessitates B, any 
conjunction of propositions which includes A must also necessitate B, it 
is possible for A to probabilify B to some degree although some 
conjunctions containing A would not probabilify B to the same degree or 
even at all.150 
 
It would appear that the soundness of an inductive argument depends on its 
being inductively strong, i.e., on it having premises which make its conclusion 
probably true.  Should I continue to doubt that the evidence of the sun rising 
every day does constitute good, although admittedly inconclusive, evidence for 
the prediction that it will rise tomorrow, you can simply point out that since the 
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evidence makes this prediction probably true, it follows by definition, that the 
argument from evidence to prediction is inductively strong and, consequently, 
sound.  But this way of showing that inductive arguments can be sound is 
altogether too easy.  The statement we are trying to establish is: 
 
Inductive arguments are sometimes sound 
  (or, inductive evidence can be good evidence) 
 
The statement being offered as a reason for believing this is: 
 
  Some inductive arguments report in their premises evidence  
which makes their conclusions probable 
(i.e., some inductive arguments are inductively strong) 
 
If the second statement were true then the first would follow but is the second 
statement true?  The problem of induction arises once we recognise that the only 
way in which we could reply to this doubt is by appealing to the truth of what 
we are trying to establish, namely the first statement.  For, in order to decide 
whether the premises of some particular inductive argument do make its 
conclusion probably true, we would have to ask and answer the question: is this 
inductive argument sound?  We cannot use the truth of the second statement as a 
reason for believing the first because the truth of the second relies on believing 
the truth of the first in the first place.  In other words, such a justification would 
beg the question, the question being ‘are any inductive arguments sound?’ 
 
Causality 
In philosophy, discussions of induction have often been interwoven with 
discussions of causality.  This is because many of the inferences we call 
inductive could also be described as causal.  We often conclude that an event 
will happen on the grounds that another event, taken to be its cause, has 
happened.  For example we predict that our coffee will taste sweet because a 
spoon of sugar has been added to it.  Or we argue from effects back to causes 
such as when people outside are holding umbrellas we conclude it must be 
raining.  (This is the form of much reasoning both for and against climate 
 87 
change.)  If we can show that the connection between a putative ‘cause’ and its 
‘effect’ is strong enough then we might diffuse scepticism about the legitimacy 
of such inductive inferences.  But although we speak as if adding sugar to coffee 
must make it sweet or that because people are holding umbrellas, therefore it 
must be raining, these inferences cannot be logically necessary.  No 
contradiction arises if we deny that an event of a certain kind will have the same 
kind of effect, or the same kind of a cause, as it has always been found to have 
in the past. 
 In his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume argues 
that our connection of cause with effect is not based on a rational foundation.  
We are forced, he points out, when faced with the challenge of justifying our 
belief in causality, to appeal to past experience and so are confronted with the 
problem of induction once again, for conclusions based on past experiences are 
inductive conclusions:   
 
It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay 
even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of 
natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a 
child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, 
he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle, but will expect a 
similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and 
appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is 
led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I 
may justly require you to produce that argument, nor have you any 
pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the 
argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you 
confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, 
therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or 
profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess 
that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling 
the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to 
appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce 
in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any 
mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be 
indeed a very backward scholar, since I cannot now discover an 
argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was 
out of my cradle.151 
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Inductive conclusions ‘are not founded on reasoning or any process of the 
understanding’ but rather ‘proceed upon the supposition that the future will be 
conformable to the past’ and the ‘proof of this…supposition by probable 
arguments [i.e., induction] … must be evidently going in a circle and taking that 
for granted which is the very point in question.’152  But if causal inferences 
apparently lack a rational foundation it does not follow that they lack any 
foundation whatsoever.  Hume suggests that causal inferences are founded on a 
psychological habit.  We are psychologically conditioned, he argues, to make 
inferences from cause to effect and vice versa.  Such inferences, therefore ‘are 
effects of custom, not of reasoning.’  But just because we are psychologically 
conditioned to place our confidence in inductive inference does not solve the 
problem of induction which is, after all, to provide a logically defensible reason 
to rely on it. 
 It is hard to overestimate the scope of the problem of induction.  If Hume 
is right, our capacity to learn from experience has no adequate rational basis and 
much practical and useful knowledge lacks what Plato argued distinguishes 
knowledge from correct guesswork.  In addition, all of what passes for scientific 
knowledge such as that plants photosynthesise, plutonium disintegrates, light 
travels and the earth moves is similarly suspect; it does not count as knowledge 
in Plato’s sense.  
 ‘It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to 
Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical,’ 
writes the philosopher, Bertrand Russell:  
 
If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity.  
The lunatic who believes he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely 
on the grounds that he is a minority, or rather—since we must not 
assume democracy—on the ground that the government does not agree 
with him.  This is a desperate point of view, and it must be hoped that 
there is some way of escaping from it.153 
 
It was Karl Popper who broke with the received view by proposing a radical 
escape from ‘Hume’s problem’.   
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Popper’s epistemology 
Karl Popper (1902-1994) was born in Austria.  During his PhD in philosophy at 
the University of Vienna, Popper also trained as a cabinet-maker but on 
graduation became a school teacher.  He was intensely interested in how 
children learn and his model of science derives as much from his own 
observations of children and from studies of animal behaviour as from strictly 
‘logical’ considerations.   
  In 1934 he published his first book, Logik der Forchung proposing a 
radical solution to ‘Hume’s problem’.  The book was translated into English 
only in 1959 as The Logic of Scientific Discovery.  By this time, Popper was 
living in London and teaching at The London School of Economics.  He had 
fled Vienna in 1937 when the Anschluss seemed inevitable and spent the war 
years in Christchurch, New Zealand at Canterbury University College.  There he 
developed his critique of historicism and a profound defence of liberal 
democracy.154    
In his autobiography, Unended Quest (1993) Popper tells of the master 
cabinet-maker to whom he was apprenticed in the early 1920s.  The master 
loved to ask his apprentice historical questions and then to answer them himself 
when Popper could not.  ‘It was my master who taught me not only how very 
little I knew but also that any wisdom to which I might ever aspire could consist 
only in realizing more fully the infinity of my ignorance.’155  The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery (1959) is inspired by this insight.  It can be understood as a 
response to the positivistic views of his contemporaries in the so-called Vienna 
Circle.   
According to positivism, there are only two sorts of meaningful 
statements: a priori analytical statements like mathematical ones and a 
posteriori synthetic statements like scientific ones based upon ‘sense data’.  To 
the positivists, as Popper puts it, science ‘is not a system of concepts but rather a 
system of statements…that are reducible to elementary (or ‘atomic’) statements 
of experience.’156  But this is not a view of science that Popper finds tenable.  
Scientific laws, he argues, cannot be reduced to elementary statements of 
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experience because all scientific statements necessarily go beyond the particular 
experiences that inspired them:  
 
Every statement has the character of a theory, of a hypothesis.  The 
statement, ‘Here is a glass of water’ cannot be verified by any 
observational experience.  The reason is that the universals which appear 
in it cannot be correlated with any specific sense-experience.  (An 
immediate experience is only once ‘immediately given’; it is unique.)  
By the word ‘glass’, for example, we denote physical bodies which 
exhibit a certain law-like behaviour, and the same holds for the word 
‘water’.  Universals cannot be reduced to classes of experiences; they 
cannot be ‘constituted’.157 
 
Popper agrees with the positivists that only observation can give us (non-
tautological) knowledge concerning facts but, he argues, this knowledge cannot 
justify the truth of any universal statement because of the problem of induction.  
Positivists, says Popper, ask the wrong question about the nature of science 
when they ask ‘…on what does our knowledge rest? … or more exactly, how 
can I, having had the experience S. justify my description of it, and defend it 
against doubt?’158  Such a question implies that the statements of science are 
arrived at and then defended inductively but this is simply not possible he says: 
‘The belief in inductive logic is largely due to a confusion of psychological 
problems with epistemological ones.’ 159   
Popper argues that a scientific theory such as Newton’s laws of motion 
cannot be verified by any observations or experimental result because, logically, 
such results do not rule out different results next time the test is carried out.  
Verification by observation (i.e., positivism) must founder on the problem of 
induction.  Popper’s solution to this problem is the recognition that science is 
not, in the end, concerned with questions of fact but with questions of 
justification and validity.  ‘Accordingly’, writes Popper, ‘I shall distinguish 
between the process of conceiving an idea, and the methods and results of 
examining it logically.’160  Deriving a hypothesis is one aspect of science but the 
all-important part of science concerns the testing of that hypothesis.  This testing 
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requires not the accumulation of confirming data (induction) but a logical 
argument of deduction.    
 Popper’s ‘hypothetico-deductive’ model may be summarised as follows: 
(1) a new idea, theory, hypothesis is arrived at (it matters not how) and is in the 
beginning not yet justified in any way.  (2) From this theory a number of 
conclusions is deductively derived and then each is compared to the others to 
check if they are logically compatible with each other. (3) Then the form of the 
whole theory may be examined to determine if it truly has the form of a 
scientific theory (one that may in principle be false) or if it is, for example, 
tautological.  (4) From the theory are extracted a number of singular predictive 
statements which are then tested by observation of the world.  If these tests are 
positive the theory stands—for the time being—if the conclusions are falsified 
then the theory falls.   
A theory that is not yet falsified is said to be corroborated not verified.  
This distinction evades the problem of induction for, while in verification, a 
singular statement derived from an empirical observation cannot attest to the 
truth of a hypothesis (one more white swan does not verify the hypothesis that 
‘all swans are white’), a singular observation statement attesting to the existence 
of a black swan completely and absolutely falsifies the hypothesis.  There is an 
asymmetry between verification and falsification.  Scientific verification runs up 
against Hume’s problem while falsification is entirely a matter of observation 
and deductive logic.  The price paid, however, for letting go of the ambition of 
verification is that all theories persist, logically, on sufferance, never proven, 
simply not yet falsified and the scientist remains, in the same logical sense, 
infinitely ignorant.   
The Popperian view of science, then, is of a body of conjectures and a 
set of practices that may be divided between ‘hypothesising’ and ‘refuting’.  
Framing hypotheses is a matter of imagination, insight etc., refutation a matter 
of deductive logic.  Science, according to Popper is not, as I write in chapter 
one, a body of validated knowledge but a body of conjectures; it is a ‘set of 
practices’ but these are not positivistic, inductive practices.   
The distinction between verification and falsification is perhaps Popper’s 
chief contribution to the philosophy of science.  He himself wrote that ‘within 
the framework of this analysis, all the problems can be dealt with that are 
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usually called ‘epistemological’.  Those problems, more especially, to which 
inductive logic gives rise, can be eliminated without creating new ones in their 
place.’161  
  
The Problem of Demarcation 
Positivism had argued that any non-tautological statement that cannot be 
reduced to statements of experience is meaningless but according to Popper such 
statements of experience, gathered together for example as scientific laws, are at 
best corroborated, not verified.  The distinction, then, between meaningful 
statements of fact and meaningless metaphysical statements cannot be upheld in 
Popper’s philosophy.  His epistemology cannot apparently keep scientific 
statements apart from other sorts of statements.  Popper calls this the problem of 
demarcation and it was a particularly pressing problem for him in a world he 
saw endangered by totalitarian (and unfalsifiable) notions of historical destiny.   
To solve the problem, Popper invites us to ‘renounce this [positivist] 
requirement and admit as empirical … statements which are decidable in one 
sense only … which may be tested by systematic attempts to falsify them.’ This 
is the only safe way to do science because ‘the method of falsification 
presupposes no inductive inference, but only tautological transformations of 
deductive logic whose validity is not in dispute’.162  No theory that cannot in 
principle be falsified by evidence may be admitted as scientific.  Freud’s theory 
that actions may be the effects of unconscious thoughts for example is, in 
Popper’s view, not science because it is not clear how it could ever be falsified, 
but this does not make it meaningless.  Ideas that lie outside of science may be 
meaningful and may form the basis of scientific theories in the future.  Indeed it 
is assumed that science grows, in the first place, from non-science:  
 
…historically speaking all—or very nearly all—scientific theories 
originate from myths, and…a myth may contain important anticipations 
of scientific theories.  Examples are Empedocles’ theory of evolution by 
trial and error, or Parmenides’ myth of the unchanging block universe in 
which nothing ever happens and which, if we add another dimension, 
becomes Einstein’s block universe (in which, too, nothing ever happens, 
since everything is, four dimensionally speaking, determined and laid 
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down from the beginning).  I thus felt that if a theory is found to be non-
scientific, or ‘metaphysical’ (as we might say), it is not thereby found to 
be unimportant, or insignificant or ‘meaningless’, or ‘nonsensical’.  But 
it cannot claim to be backed by empirical evidence in the scientific 
sense—although it may easily be, in some genetic sense, the result of 
‘observation’.163 
 
Although induction is evaded, the hypothetico-deductive model does not 
entirely dispense with the issues facing the philosopher of science.  Is it really 
the case that Freudianism is non-scientific because non-falsifiable while 
Newtonian physics is falsifiable and therefore to be welcomed into the fold?  
There remain serious problems with falsification, the most troublesome being 
what Popper calls ‘the problem of the empirical basis’ or the theory-dependence 
of observation. 
 
Observation is theory-dependent   
Frederick Suppe considers the theory-dependence or value-ladenness of 
observation one of the key issues undermining the received view.164  The issue 
here is not so much whether one can observe the world (which one clearly can) 
as the relationship between such ‘perceptual experiences’ and ‘basic statements’ 
about those experiences.  ‘Basic statements’ or ‘observation statements’ (i.e., 
statements of singular facts) are required to serve as the premises in deductive 
arguments of falsification.  Such observation statements cannot, then, be 
themselves dependent on the theory they are testing, or indeed any theory—they 
should be ‘pure’ observation statements—but it is hard to understand how any 
statement can be pure in this sense.  Andrew Norman puts it this way: 
 
All seeing—or at least all seeing that is in any way epistemically 
significant—is interpretive. The point of adding ‘epistemically 
significant’ is that observations must be articulated into statements of 
some kind for them to carry any justificatory burden. In such cases 
something must be predicated of whatever it is that one sees. And this 
means that one must see the thing in some aspect, or take the thing in 
some way or other. But to do this is just to interpret. Thus interpretation 
must happen for an observation to have epistemic significance.165    
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As Popper himself argues in his analysis of the phrase ‘a glass of water’ all 
observation statements involve interpretation in light of theoretical knowledge: 
‘by the word “glass”…we denote physical bodies which exhibit certain law-like 
behaviour, and the same holds for the word “water”’.166  Popper’s colleague, 
Imre Lakatos, argues that it is not only observation statements that are 
necessarily interpretive but, as illustrated by our perception of the duck-rabbit 
figure, observation itself: ‘There can be no sensations unimpregnated by 
expectations and therefore there is no natural (i.e. psychological) demarcation 
between observational and theoretical propositions’.167  No sharp distinction 
can be made between an ‘empirical language’ and a ‘theoretical language’—we 
are theorizing all the time. 
 The anthropologist, Edmund Leach asks how we can be confident that 
our perception of the world is independent of our social environment and the 
concepts we have absorbed from it.  He notes that the conventions for artistic 
representation of common objects vary widely between different cultures. This 
seems significant, he writes: 
 
It is perfectly possible that every individual perceives his world to be 
what his or her cultural background suggests.  Today most of the world 
is dominated by the ‘realistic’ images provided by our use of cameras.  
But it is self-deception if you imagine—as you probably do—that your 
eye “naturally” perceives the world as it might appear in a photograph.168  
 
In Doubt and Certainty in Science—a Biologist’s Reflections on the Brain, the 
zoologist, J. Z. Young speaks of the ‘creative’ activity of the brain that 
necessarily precedes seeing in the first place: 
 
The visual receiving system in its untrained state has only very limited 
powers.  We are perhaps deceived by the fact that the eye is a sort of 
camera.  Contrary to what we might suppose, the eyes and brain do not 
simply record in a sort of photographic manner the pictures that pass in 
front of us.  The brain is not by any means a simple recording system 
like a film….Many of our affairs are conducted on the assumption that 
our sense organs provide us with an accurate record, independent of 
ourselves.  What we are now beginning to realize is that much of this is 
an illusion, that we have to learn to see the world as we do.  
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And he goes on: 
 
….The point to grasp is that we cannot speak simply as if there is a 
world around us of which our senses give true information.  In trying to 
speak about what the world is like we must remember all the time that 
what we see and what we say depends on what we have learned; we 
ourselves come into the process.169 
 
According to J. Z. Young, to perceive is to conceive; facts are necessarily 
dependent on the conceptual frame within which they are identified and the 
empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it.  After 
all, as Hanson points out, although the lens and cornea are developments of our 
skin, the retina and optic nerve are outgrowths of the brain.  ‘It could not alarm 
anyone, except a person with a theory to the contrary, to hear that alterations in 
the general state of the brain, alterations like learning…could affect the whole 
character of seeing, particularly in its conceptual organization…’170   
It is worth recalling how Williamson speaks of the putatively hybrid 
larva he has made, reporting his visual sensations in as flat and ‘phenomenal’ a 
way as possible: 
 
 
“Ah.  That’s different.  It’s not completely spherical.  But we can’t make 
out any internal structure…” (01:12:45) 
 
Such observational situations contrast with the more usual way of seeing, as 
Hanson writes:   
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The language of shapes, colour patches, oscillations, and pointer-
readings is the language appropriate to the unsettled experimental 
situation, where confusion and perhaps even conceptual muddlement 
dominate.  And the seeing that figures in such situations is of the sort 
where the observer does not know what he is seeing.  He will not be 
satisfied until he does know, until his observations cohere and are 
intelligible as against the general background of his already accepted and 
established knowledge.  And it is this latter kind of seeing that is the goal 
of observation.  For it is largely in terms of it, and seldom in terms of 
merely phenomenal seeing, that new inquiry will proceed.171  
 
While conventionally we distinguish two levels in accounts of reality: the 
phenomenal ‘facts’ (data) and the interpretation (explanation), this distinction 
obscures the difficulty of distinguishing these two levels within any given 
discourse, as the historiographer Hayden White argues:   
 
It is not the case that a fact is one thing and its interpretation another.  
The fact is presented where and how it is in the discourse in order to 
sanction the interpretation to which it is meant to contribute.  And the 
interpretation derives its force of plausibility from the arrangement of the 
facts in the order and manner in which they are presented in the 
discourse.172 
 
To see, then, in a way appropriate to testing a theory is to see as, to already have 
assumed that very theory as an organising context.   ‘Perception is conceptually 
articulated, and must be to be epistemically significant,’ writes Andrew 
Norman.173  Popper therefore proposes that all statements, even the ‘basic 
statements’ reporting an observation have therefore to be seen as incorrigibly 
conjectural: 
 
Systems of theories are tested by deducing from them statements of a 
lesser level of universality.  These statements in their turn, since they are 
to be inter-subjectively testable, must be testable in like manner—and so 
ad infinitum. 174   
 
No statement, no matter how lowly, is ‘basic’ or ‘pure’.  And so, as Norman 
writes: 
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Past experience, background knowledge, linguistic training and the like 
serve to structure visual experience—not before our eyes, as it were, but 
behind our backs. The perceptual and conceptual elements of seeing, it 





A further problem with the received view arises when we consider another 
dimension of the testing of theories.  Even were there a clear distinction between 
observation statements and theoretical statements and if observation statements 
could be established by appeal to sensory experience alone, still it is always 
possible to evade the force of a falsifying observation.  There are two parts to 
this idea.  First, empirical statements do not exist in isolation, they are all 
interconnected and so may not be singly disconfirmed; second, we may hold a 
statement true, despite evidence to the contrary, by adjusting others on which it 
depends.  Popper acknowledges this:   
 
Even if the asymmetry [between verification and falsification] is 
admitted, it is still impossible … that any theoretical system should ever 
be conclusively falsified.  For it is always possible to find some way of 
evading falsification, for example by introducing ad hoc an auxiliary 
hypothesis, or by changing ad hoc a definition.  It is even possible 
without logical inconsistency to adopt the position of simply refusing to 
acknowledge any falsifying experience whatsoever.  Admittedly, 
scientists do not usually proceed this way, but logically the procedure is 
possible.176   
 
This is sometimes known as the Quine-Duhem thesis of underdetermination.  
The thesis is that in order to rule that a particular observation should entail the 
rejection of a theory, the scientist must make an inferential decision but nature 
does not force that decision upon the scientist.  Indeed, if the scientist is willing 
to change enough of his or her assumptions and background beliefs then any 
observation may be consistent with the theory under test.  Imre Lakatos provides 
a story to illustrate the point: 
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The story is about an imaginary case of planetary misbehaviour.  A 
physicist of the pre-Einsteinian era takes Newton’s mechanics and his 
law of gravitation (N), the accepted conditions, I, and calculates, with 
their help, the path of a newly discovered small planet, p.  But the planet 
deviates from the calculated path.  Does our Newtonian physicist 
consider that the deviation was forbidden by Newton’s theory and 
therefore that, once established, it refutes the theory, N?  No.  He 
suggests that there must be a hitherto unknown planet p′ which perturbs 
the path of p.  He calculates the mass, orbit etc., of this hypothetical 
planet and then asks an experimental astronomer to test his hypothesis.  
The planet p′ is so small that even the biggest available telescopes cannot 
possibly observe it: the experimental astronomer applies for a research 
grant to build yet a bigger one.177   
 
Three years later the new telescope is ready.  If p′ is discovered, ‘it will be 
hailed as a new victory of Newtonian science’.  But it is not.  Rather than 
abandon Newton, Lakatos’ scientist proposes that a cloud of cosmic dust hides 
the planet.  He calculates the properties of the cloud, obtains a grant to design a 
satellite, and launches it into orbit.   If the cloud is discovered (possibly using 
new instruments based on a little-tested theory) then we can celebrate a new 
victory for Newtonian science.  But the cloud is not discovered, nor the 
magnetic field that must therefore be disturbing the instruments in the satellite.  
Nor is this taken as a refutation.  
 
Either yet another ingenious auxiliary hypothesis is proposed or … the 
whole story is buried in the dusty volumes of periodicals and the story 
never mentioned again.178  
 
‘Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough 
adjustments elsewhere in the system,’ writes the philosopher, W. V. O. Quine.179   
In summary, Popper’s attempt to place science on a sound logical 
footing by developing a hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inference 
exposes the necessarily speculative, conjectural nature of scientific knowledge: 
 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock.  The bold structure of its 
theories rises, as it were, above a swamp.  It is like a building erected on 
piles.  The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not 
down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop driving the piles 
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deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground.  We simply stop 
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the 
structure, at least for the time being.180 
 
How scientists decide that the pile-driving, test period of a theory (which could 
be carried on ad infinitum) is over (‘at least for the time being’) and that the 
theory is sufficiently corroborated is not therefore a matter of logical necessity 
but rather a question for historians and sociologists to answer.  As Imre 
Lakatos’s anecdote of the mystery planet suggests, when a theory is deemed 
falsified is not in the end a logical matter, but a social one.   
 This is no doubt a conclusion that would have dismayed Popper (and 
many of his scientist fans) but it does seem that Popper’s destructive analysis of 
positivism ends up undermining his own idea of a logic of scientific discovery 
and with it any easy notion of progress in science.  Put simply, Popper’s analysis 
renders mistaken the notion that scientists learn from their mistakes, as Thomas 
Kuhn explains: 
 
…it appeals to the residual inductivist in us all.  Believing that valid 
theories are the product of correct inductions from facts, the inductivist 
must hold that a false theory is the result of a mistake in induction.  In 
principle, at least, he is prepared to answer the questions: what mistake 
was made, what rule broken, when and by whom, in arriving at, say, the 
Ptolemaic system? ... But neither Sir Karl nor I is an inductivist.  We do 
not believe there are rules for inducing correct theories from facts … 
Instead we view them as imaginative posits, invented in one piece for 
application to nature…In our view, then, no mistake was made in 
arriving at the Ptolemaic system, and it is therefore difficult for me to 
understand what [it means to] call that system, or any other out-of-date 
theory, a mistake. 181 
 
In the hands of Thomas Kuhn, Popper’s analysis of the logical difficulties of the 
scientific project focuses our minds onto the role that scientific society must 
play in establishing certain ideas as ‘true’ and in promoting, discouraging or 
inspiring further lines of research.   
 David Hume and Thomas Kuhn (whom we shall consider in due course) 
both argue that a proper account of science demands a cognitive or 
psychological approach rather than a strictly rational or philosophical one.  The 
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key idea common to both thinkers is that knowledge has its origin in the human 
mind and that human minds do not exist in a vacuum.  What constitutes 
scientific knowledge is agreed upon collectively by the human minds that 
comprise scientific society.  This is very far from Robert Merton’s sociology of 
science in which his norms were imagined as prophylactic, a means to ensure 
social forces are kept out of scientific inference.  Popper’s work, perhaps 
unwittingly, opens the door to the opposite view, namely that scientific 
knowledge is not so much discovered as invented, justified not logically but 
necessarily socially by scientists who may choose either to endorse or ignore 
such inventions.   
 
Radical Constructivism 
In the following quotation, Albert Einstein articulates in graphic terms the 
conclusion that Popper seems to lead us to and that is spur to Thomas Kuhn’s 
notion of scientific knowledge, namely that fundamental principles in science 
have a ‘fictional character’: 
 
Newton, the first creator of a comprehensive, workable system of 
theoretical physics, still believed that the basic concepts and laws of his 
system could be derived from experience. This is no doubt the meaning 
of his saying, hypotheses non fingo….the tremendous practical success 
of his doctrines may well have prevented him and the physicists of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from recognising the fictitious 
character of the foundations of his system.  The natural philosophers of 
those days were, on the contrary, most of them possessed with the idea 
that the fundamental concepts and postulates of physics were not in the 
logical sense free inventions of the human mind but could be deduced 
from experience by ‘abstraction’—that is to say by logical means.  A 
clear recognition of the erroneousness of this notion really only came 
with the general theory of relativity, which showed that one could take 
account of a wider range of empirical facts, and that too in a more 
complete manner, on a foundation quite different from the Newtonian.  
But quite apart from the question of the superiority of one or the other, 
the fictitious character of fundamental principles is perfectly evident 
from the fact that we can point to two essentially different principles, 
both of which correspond with experience to a large extent; this proves 
at the same time that every attempt at a logical deduction of the basic 
concepts and postulates of mechanics from elementary experiences is 
doomed to failure.182 
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And yet, Einstein also writes a few pages earlier that ‘pure logical thinking 
cannot yield us any knowledge of the empirical world; all knowledge of reality 
starts from experience and ends in it.’183 This is the conundrum that Popper 
wrestles with—how to make true (i.e., objective) statements about the empirical 
world when access to that world is unavailable except at one remove, through 
necessarily subjective experience:  
 
The theory of knowledge, whose task is the analysis of the method or 
procedure peculiar to empirical science, may accordingly be described as 
a theory of the empirical method—a theory of what is usually called 
‘experience’.184  
 
‘Constructivism’ is one such theory of experience that seems to be implicit in 
Popper’s work.  It holds, as Ernst von Glasersfeld puts it, that ‘knowledge, no 
matter how it be defined, is in the heads of persons, and that the thinking subject 
has no alternative but to construct what he or she knows on the basis of his or 
her own experience.’185  The purview of reason is limited by constructivism to 
the realm of experience; thus it is agnostic about representing reality, knowledge 
of which is necessarily unavailable to experience and reason.  von Glasersfeld 
again: 
 
Unless you claim some form of direct mystical revelation, whatever you call 
knowledge—your ideas or concepts, the relations that connect them, your 
images of yourself and the world—will be human, because the way you have 
produced them was yours, and you, whether you like it or not, are bound by the 
human ways.186   
 
The constructivist approach is underpinned by the view expressed by Socrates’s 
rival, the sceptic, Protagoras in Plato’s Theaetetus:  ‘Man is the measure of all 
things.’ We cannot stand outside of our own ways of knowing and therefore can 
have no access to a reality independent of those ways of knowing.187   But what 
are those human ways of knowing?   
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Locke, Berkeley and Hume, the so-called British empiricists, were 
among those who, prior to Popper, tried to answer this question.  None of them 
was empiricist in the positivist way the word is often used today.  The so-called 
‘hard-nosed’ empiricist of today is hard-nosed because he believes that 
experimental evidence reflects the character of an observer-independent real 
world but neither Locke, Berkeley nor Hume is realist in that sense.  Here, at 
some length, is Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding where he 
tackles the question:   
  
All ideas come from sensation or reflection.  Let us suppose the mind to 
be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas.  
How does it come to be furnished? ... To this I answer, in one word, 
from experience; our knowledge is founded in all that, and from that it 
ultimately derives itself.  Our observation employed either about 
external sensible objects or about the internal operations of our minds, 
perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our 
understandings with all the materials of thinking.  These two are the 
fountains of knowledge from which all the ideas we have, or can 
naturally have, do spring. 
 
There are, then, two sources of ideas, argues Locke.  One is ‘the objects of 
sensation’: ‘our senses do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of 
things, according to those various ways in which those objects do affect them.  
And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat…’  The second 
is ‘the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed 
about the ideas it has gotten—which operations, when the soul comes to reflect 
on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which 
could not be had from things without.’ 
 He continues to elaborate on what he means by these operations of the 
mind: 
 
This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it is 
not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very 
like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense.  But as I call 
the other [i.e., the first source of ideas] sensation, so I call this 
REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by 
reflecting on its own operations within itself.  By reflection then, in the 
following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean that 
notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of 
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them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of those operations in 
the understanding. 188 
 
The important idea here is that ‘reflection’ is an essential component of 
understanding.  In reasoning about sensations the mind generates ideas that 
could not be found elsewhere.  For example, relational notions like causality.  
Locke writes of wood and of ashes, for example, as ‘complex ideas’ each 
consisting of a collection of ‘simple ideas’ (i.e., sensations).  ‘We consider fire,’ 
he says, ‘in relation to ashes as cause, and the ashes as effect.  So that whatever 
is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular simple 
idea, or collection of simple ideas,…which did not before exist, hath thereby in 
our minds the relation of a cause, and so is denominated by us.’189 
 Locke, then, saw that certain characters of things exist in the mind as 
ideas—colours for example—and that relational ideas are also constructed in the 
mind.  George Berkeley read Locke and wondered why Locke had stopped 
there.  Where, he asked, does one find qualities like extension in space and 
motion and time if not also in the mind?  He argued that these so-called 
‘primary’ qualities were ‘mathematical’ and all mathematical thinking is the 
result of abstraction and reflection.  von Glasersfeld draws the lesson:  
 
The important point in this is the realization that the features that were 
considered primary (in the sense that they reflect properties of real 
objects) depend on concepts that are formed from a succession of at least 
two experiential frames and an act of relating them.  The succession then 
merely provides the experiencing subject with an opportunity to establish 
a relation; it does not require it.  Nor does the succession itself determine 
what kind of relation should be established.190 
 
If our basic relational ideas like extension, motion, time and causation are 
constructed by the reflective subject then, writes von Glasersfeld, ‘one cannot 
describe in human terms what “reality” would be like before it is 
experienced’.191 
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This distinction between certain knowledge (certum) and the truth 
constructed by human minds (verum) is at the heart of Giambattista Vico’s 
epistemology.  This division between the knower and knowledge is there also in 
the Cartesian split at the beginning of the Enlightenment but while Descartes’ 
solution lay in mysticism, in the characterisation of mathematics, for example, 
as God-given reality, Vico in the early eighteenth-century argued that 
mathematics was a human invention which can be logically guaranteed precisely 
for that reason.  ‘It is not,’ writes Isaiah Berlin, ‘as Descartes supposed, 
discovery of an objective structure, the eternal and most general characteristics 
of the real world, but rather invention: invention of a symbolic system which 
men can logically guarantee only because men have made it themselves, 
irrefutable only because it is a figment of man’s creative intellect…the criterion 
and rule of truth is to have made it...if it is not factum by us it is not verum for 
us.’192  Vico’s verum-factum principle is an early expression of constructivism: 
knowing and making are two sides of the same coin.193   
Saussure developed this insight when he rejected the common-sense idea 
that language, as he put it, is ‘a naming process only—a list of words, each 
corresponding to the thing that it names. … [that] assumes that ready-made 
ideas exist before words.’194  Consider his schematic illustrating the ‘social 




Suppose that the opening of the circuit is in A’s brain, where mental 
facts (concepts) are associated with representations of the linguistic 
sounds (sound-images) that are used for expression.  A given concept 
unlocks a corresponding sound-image in the brain; this purely 
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psychological phenomenon is followed in turn by a physiological 
process: the brain transmits an impulse corresponding to the image to the 
organs used in producing sounds.  Then the sound waves travel from the 
mouth of A to the ear of B: a purely physical process.  Next, the circuit 
continues in B, but the order is reversed: from the ear to the brain, the 
physiological transmission of the sound-image; in the brain, the 
psychological association of the image with the concept.  If B then 
speaks, the new act will follow—from his brain to A’s—exactly the 
same course as the first act and pass through the same successive 
phases.196 
 
The diagram distinguishes speaking (parole) from language (langue).  ‘In 
separating langue from parole’, writes Saussure, ‘we are separating what is 
social from what is individual and what is essential from what is ancillary or 
accidental’.197  Each person makes meaning of the sound-images they hear by 
associating them with concepts.  These associations are based on subjective 
experience.  But, argues Saussure, ‘language is not complete in any speaker; it 
exists perfectly only within a collectivity’198  No one person has had all the 
experience of the group of individuals sharing a language, experiences that 
contribute to the associations between sound-image and concept, and so the 
language (langue) is unavailable to the individual.  Thus learning a language 
‘will be seen as a never ending process of adaptation of one’s own concepts, 
governed by the need and the wish to establish mutually compatible associations 
to the speech sounds one is hearing and producing.’199  The speaker does not 
learn to fit her words to the world as such (the realist position) but learns to fit 
her words to the world as experienced and that experience includes listening to 
other people’s speech; as Roland Barthes writes: ‘to listen is not only to perceive 
a language, it is also to construct it.’200  This accords with Wittgenstein’s 
argument against the possibility of private language: language, to be language, is 
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Tradition 
Like Vico, Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) recognises the importance of tradition in 
our understanding.  Kuhn was an undergraduate physicist at Harvard in 1940 
when Popper was already living in New Zealand.  When the Japanese attacked 
Pearl Harbour he joined other students on the editorial board of the Harvard 
Crimson in speaking out in support of Harvard president, James Conant’s plan 
to militarize the nation’s colleges.  Harvard’s physics department quickly 
adapted, as an exemplar for the country, and Kuhn was trained in electronics and 
radar research.  After the war he began a PhD in Physics at Harvard and, with 
Conant’s encouragement, assisted in the development of a general education 
course in science for undergraduates.  The approach was to be historical and the 
assignment was decisive for Kuhn’s intellectual development.   
To develop his course, Kuhn set out to give an account of Aristotelian 
mechanics but he found he could make no sense of it.  Aristotle’s views on 
many other topics were clear and intelligent so how, Kuhn wondered, was it 
possible for such a brilliant thinker to be so stupid about motion?  It was only 
when Kuhn realised that ‘the permanent ingredients of Aristotle’s universe, its 
ontologically primary and indestructible elements, were not material bodies but 
rather...qualities...’ (an idea quite alien to his modern mind-set) that he was able 
to grasp Aristotle’s mechanics.  Kuhn came to understand that for Aristotle 
position itself was a quality and so a body which moves from one place to 
another transforms in the process and is only the same body in the sense that a 
child is the same as the adult it becomes: ‘motion was necessarily a change-of-
state rather than a state.’201  After this realisation, this shift in his mental 
categories, Kuhn was able to read Aristotle with relative ease and found that 
‘much apparent absurdity vanished’.    
 In Kuhn’s constructivism, truths are inseparable from the language that 
expresses them and, as Saussure argued, language is socially determined and 
bound-up with tradition.  This means that when scientists attach symbolic 
expressions to nature (i.e., say things about nature in formal, scientific language) 
they are modelling one problem solution onto another, older one.  Thomas Kuhn 
gives an example of this ‘use theory’ of meaning (echoing Wittgenstein’s 
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thought experiment of defining the word ‘game’202) by imagining a boy walking 
with his father by a lake.  Johnny has previously learned to recognize birds and 
to discriminate robin redbreasts.  The primary teaching method in this situation 
is ‘ostension’—Father points and names.  ‘Phrases like ‘all swans are white’ 
may play a role, but they need not.’203   Father points: ‘Look, Johnny, there’s a 
swan.’  
 
A short time later Johnny himself points to a bird, saying, ‘Daddy, 
another swan.’  He has not yet, however, learned what swans are and 
must be corrected: ‘No, Johnny, that’s a goose.’  Johnny’s next 
identification of a swan proves correct, but his next ‘goose’ is, in fact, a 
duck, and he is again set straight.  After a few more such 
encounters…Johnny’s ability to identify these waterfowl is as great as 
his father’s. 
 
Johnny has been programmed to recognise what his community already knows.  
It is not that he has learned the meaning of words by learning the things that 
each word stand for, the point is rather that ostensive definitions presuppose an 
understanding of the way each word is used.  But, then, does Johnny know what 
‘geese’, ‘ducks’ and ‘swans’ mean?  ‘In any useful sense, yes, for he can apply 
these labels unequivocally and without effort, drawing behavioural conclusions 
from their application.’204  Johnny has learned to apply symbolic labels to nature 
but without needing criteria, definitions or correspondence rules.  He has learned 
a primitive conception of similarity and difference that is now embedded in the 
similarity relationship itself, not in a generalisation or rule.  Grasping this 
cognitive process, suggests Kuhn, is essential to an adequate reconstruction of 
what he calls ‘normal’ scientific understanding.  Johnny has been inducted into a 
world view but… 
 
…the world that the student then enters is not … fixed once and for all by the 
nature of the environment, on the one hand, and of science, on the other.  
Rather, it is determined jointly by the environment and the particular normal-
scientific tradition that the student has been trained to pursue.205 
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This picture of the historically situated nature of knowledge leads Kuhn 
to propose, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), what, from a 
‘received’ point-of-view, looks like a very peculiar idea of scientific progress:   
 
The more carefully [historians] study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, 
phlogistic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain they 
feel that these once current views of nature were, as a whole, neither less 
scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those current 
today.  If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths can 
be produced by the same sort of methods and held for the same sort or 
reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge.  If, on the other hand, they 
are to be called science, then science has included bodies of belief quite 
incompatible with the ones we hold today.  Given these alternatives, the 
historian must choose the latter.206 
 
The idea that in the course of history perfectly respectable scientific theories 
have been discarding makes it impossible to understand the history of science as 
simply the progressive accretion of knowledge.  While Kuhn, like Popper, is 
concerned to explain how ideas are accepted or rejected, he does not, like 
Popper, expect to find the answer in an ahistorical logic of discovery but rather 
in a historically-situated study of the beliefs and behaviour of scientific 
communities.  Such a study will produce a profoundly different understanding 
of science to one based on the received view: 
 
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, 
could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by 
which we are now possessed.  That image has previously been drawn, 
even by scientists themselves, mainly from the study of finished 
scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics and, more 
recently, in textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns 
to practice its trade.  Inevitably the aim of such books is persuasive and 
pedagogic; a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit 
the enterprise that produces them than an image of a national culture 
drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text.207 
 
Conventional histories of science present scientific practice as if it 
consists of a series of ‘crucial experiments’ that lead the scientist from 
ignorance to enlightenment.  New ideas are thus arrived at by a series of logical, 
                                                 
206
 Kuhn, (1996) p. 2 
207
 Ibid., p. 1 
 109 
self-evidently true steps.  This picture, Kuhn argues, is mistaken and it cannot 
account for the history of science.  In fact, Kuhn argues, really new ideas in 
science come along only rarely.  Most of science comprises long stretches of 
time during which scientists are engaged in ‘normal science’.  Normal scientific 
ideas were once unprecedented but have now become the orthodoxy.  Normal 
science is science done against the background of past achievements, science 
founded on ideas one finds in the textbooks that form the basis of a scientist’s 
education.  These books contain answers to questions such as what are the 
fundamental entities of which the universe is composed and what may the 
scientist legitimately enquire into and by what techniques?  In forming the 
ground of a scientist’s education and training, these ideas, argues Kuhn, ‘come 
to exert a deep hold on the scientific mind.’208  This deep hold steers scientists in 
certain directions which in turn results in the efficiency of scientific work—
everyone pulls together.  
 Scientists work within these traditions because they are inculcated into 
them and because such traditions offer many opportunities for continuing 
investigation.  Kuhn uses the word ‘paradigm’ to describe such scientific 
traditions.  Examples of paradigms include ‘Ptolemaic astronomy’, ‘Newtonian 
mechanics’ and ‘neo-Darwinism’.  The aim, then, of normal science is to solve 
puzzles, thus demonstrating that nothing is novel, that nothing lies outside of the 
exemplars of the paradigm or what Kuhn sometimes calls the ‘disciplinary 
matrix’.  Indeed, claims Kuhn, ‘Normal science…often suppresses fundamental 
novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic commitments.’209   
The Austrian philosopher of science, Otto Neurath, therefore compares 
scientists to sailors ‘who must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to 
dismantle it in dry-dock and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials.’210  
The boat stays afloat, continues Quine, ‘because at each alteration we keep the 
bulk of it intact as a going concern.  Our words continue to make sense because 
of continuity of change of theory: we warp usage gradually enough to avoid 
rupture.’ 211    
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A paradigm in science, argues Kuhn, is, therefore, always to an extent 
arbitrary, a product of historical circumstance.  Scientists will try to 
accommodate all phenomena to the current paradigm, warping usage gradually, 
as Quine puts it, but some problems may yet resist such accommodation.  As in 
Lakatos’s story of the mystery planet, despite attempts to expand the scope of 
the disciplinary matrix by postulating new planets or clouds of gas some 
phenomena cannot be accommodated to any exemplar.  If all efforts fail then a 
crisis may ensue.  This sets the stage for a Kuhnian ‘revolution’ but does not 
immediately bring it about.   
Such anomalies can only be spotted against the background of a 
precisely characterised discipline and so a scientist must be very well versed in 
the exemplars of the paradigm to notice that a phenomenon cannot be 
accommodated.212  Furthermore, as Popper acknowledges, and Lakatos 
demonstrates, anomalies need not be allowed to kill a theory if scientists are 
determined to protect it.  The accumulation of anomalies does not force an 
abandonment of the paradigm; they are not taken as falsifying counter-instances:   
 
Anomalous experiences may not be identified with falsifying ones.  
Indeed, I doubt that the latter exist.  As has repeatedly been emphasised 
before, no theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is confronted 
at any given time; nor are the solutions already achieved often perfect.  
On the contrary, it is just the incompleteness and imperfection of the 
existing data-theory fit that, at any time, define many of the puzzles that 
characterize normal science.  If any and every failure to fit were ground 
for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times.213 
 
Instead, increasingly ad hoc attempts are made by different scientists to alter the 
matrix of ideas that comprise the scientific discipline in question and so improve 
the ‘data-theory fit’.  These efforts are met with decreasing unanimity as to their 
legitimacy within the community.  But here is the important point Kuhn wants 
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to make about scientific revolutions: this process can go on and on and a 
discipline can simply degenerate unless and until a new, alternative theory is 
proposed.  ‘The decision to reject one theory is always simultaneously the 
decision to accept another.’214   
This new theory cannot be a result of communal, ‘normal’ science but is 
the fruit of what Kuhn calls ‘extraordinary’ research.  Such work is generally 
carried out by an individual who, at those moments at least, is unconstrained by 
the disciplinary matrix.  Extraordinary research is more random research:  
 
Confronted with crisis, scientists take a different attitude towards 
existing disciplinary matrices and their exemplars, and the nature of their 
research changes accordingly.  The proliferation of competing 
articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit 
discontent, the recourse to philosophy and the debate over fundamentals, 
all these are symptoms of a transition from normal to extraordinary 
research.215  
 
 If the problem is resolved by the adoption of a new theory and its 
ensuing paradigm (i.e., if it can render the crisis-provoking anomalies lawful) 
then it must be a theory that leads one to predictions that could not have been 
derived from its predecessor.  If this is the case, Kuhn argues, then the new 
theory and the old one are incompatible.  In taking on a new theory one also 
takes on new exemplars and a new set of oughts and interpretations—a new 
vocabulary.  If the new theory uses some of the terms of the old theory it will 
use them meaning something different and so the two disciplinary matrices are 
‘incommensurable’, two quite different paradigms or worldviews. 
 If the two world views are incommensurable then there can be little 
meaningful communication between them.   
 
This is not to say that such arguments need be irrational, for there are 
rational means of persuasion.  In particular, one reason why the 
arguments are at cross-purposes is that the same terminology is being 
used with different empirical meanings by the two camps…there is not 
even a neutral observation language since the exemplars, inter alia, 
involve interpreting and classifying the phenomena to which the 
symbolic generalisations are applied differently.216  
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There is therefore nothing irrational in refusing to jump ship.  For one thing, 
accepting the new theory brings in its train an acceptance of it as a new 
archetype for future science and one may doubt that, despite its solution to the 
present anomalies, it will be a fruitful direction to go in (that it will provide 
enough new puzzles for future normal scientific work for instance).  So, only if 
and when most of the community has switched allegiance can the revolution be 
said to be complete and a new paradigm established. The Copernican revolution, 
for example, took a hundred years.    
 
Summary 
Scientific discourse is commonly understood as language describing a universe 
independent of any observer.  Sceptics of this received view have argued that 
what we take for nature speaking to us is in fact ourselves speaking to each other 
about our experiences and our reflections on the workings of our own minds.  
Locke argued that it is through reflecting on our own mental operations that we 
create certain ideas; Berkeley extended this idea to embrace the ‘primary 
qualities’ of succession, extension and time.  All of these ideas are mental 
constructs; Hume explained that we create relational ideas like causation by 
associating ideas in our minds.  These various related ideas also form the core of 
Vico’s New Science, in which he articulates a constructivist doctrine, separating 
knowledge (verum) from certainty (certum).  Human knowledge, he argued, is 
only possible of that which is made by man.  
This is not an argument ‘against reality’ (whatever that might mean).  
The constructivist does not wish to argue that reality is ‘all in the mind’ but 
rather to point out that it is not the immediate cause of our understanding—it 
cannot speak to us directly.  We are, of course, part of reality and a 
constructivist includes this fact in how they conceive the nature of science.  The 
world we understand and live in appears to have one particular form rather than 
another (a form in which, for example, objects fall under the influence of gravity 
as Newton saw, rather than moving to their ‘proper’ place as Aristotle 
suggested) because, argues Ernst von Glasersfeld, ‘we complete the picture by 
means of rational heuristic fictions’. 
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Saussure describes the social process by which we develop these 
fictions, this shared language (the Kuhnuian paradigm) through a process of 
matching concepts to sound-images in our minds, a process that is carried out by 
each individual within a network of social relations so that each member of the 
community negotiates meanings that are compatible with others. 
 Taken together, these considerations lead to the principles of 
constructivism: 
 
1 Knowledge is not passively received either through the 
senses or by way of communication; knowledge is 
actively built up by the cognizing subject. 
2 The function of cognition is adaptive, in the biological 
sense of the term, tending towards fit or viability; 
cognition serves the subject’s organization of the 
experiential world, not the discovery of an objective 
ontological reality.217 
 
One might say that constructivism conceives its mode of operation as 
declarative rather than descriptive; it denies the positivist illusion of simple 
referentiality.  Based implicitly on such a constructivist epistemology, Kuhn’s 
historical account of scientific revolutions seems to commit him to saying that, 
in the absence of a logic of scientific discovery, theory choice and scientific 
knowledge have no factual base. However, Kuhn himself would be dismayed at 
such a bald conclusion.  The constructivist view does not deny that there is such 
a thing as material reality and understands that of course this is what scientists 
run up against in doing their work.  It is not the case that anything goes.  
However, the constructivist, in distinction to the positivist, holds that what the 
scientist has to make sense of is his or her experience of the world which is not 
the same as the world itself, as von Glasersfeld puts it, ‘cognition serves the 
subject’s organization of the experiential world, not the discovery of an 
objective ontological reality.’218  Furthermore, this organisation is achieved in a 
social context and so it is not that man is the measure of all things so much as 
his community is (there is no private language).  It is a scientific group that 
determines when a theory has been tested enough or when it is dead.  Meaning 
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is grounded in consensus.  ‘Knowledge, therefore,’ as Hans Reichenbach 
acknowledges, ‘is a very concrete thing; and the examination into its properties 
means studying the features of a sociological phenomenon.’219 
Positivists will argue that consensus is only possible because there is a 
readily available common external reality about which people agree but 
constructivists see it the other way around—scientists (indeed all of us) come to 
agree (or not) about what is real.  What is real is decided in the same way that 
we learn our mother tongue: by practical consensus.  Knowledge is 
fundamentally a sociological phenomenon and the objective reality of the 
received view is simply not available for arbitration.  This, then, is the 
constructivist view of science that the film, Hopeful Monsters, brings to mind. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
 
In this short chapter, I want to explore how a constructivist view of scientific 
knowledge alters our analysis of what principles govern scientific practice.  This 
is important if we are to evaluate the extent to which Hopeful Monsters does 
indeed represent an alternative to the received view.   
 When I was making Hopeful Monsters, I wrote to Professor Eric 
Davidson, at the California Institute of Technology explaining that I was making 
a film about Don Williamson and I asked him for an interview.  Davidson is an 
expert on the developmental biology of echinoderms and also a significant 
pioneer of molecular biology and I acknowledged in my letter that I had heard 
he was critical of Williamson’s ideas.  I explained that I wished in my film to 
explore the social dynamics of how controversial ideas make their way into 
mainstream scientific thought (or, indeed, fail to).  He replied as follows:  
 
I cannot IMAGINE a more trivial and non-exemplary example of 
scientific theory making than Williamson's productions, and why 
someone serious would waste their time with it is beyond me.  I would 
most certainly not!  He represents no aspect of ‘scientific practice’, and 
in a world well stocked with superb scientists he is a quasi-scientific bit 
player at best. I would advise you to have some concern for your own 
reputation in this!   
 
When I suggested that Williamson was a serious scientist with many years’ 
experience, Davidson responded: 
 
To me it would be like discussing creationism, something I will never 
have the time for.  History of REAL science is another thing: that I will 
always have the time for. 
 
I asked him to reconsider but, in a third and final e-mail, Davidson wrote: 
 
If you were historically inclined and actually interested in the history of 
real science you would be investigating the conditions and precursors 
and the pathway toward real discoveries, instead of investigating the 
alleged affronts suffered by a well meaning non-contributor to any 
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serious science, applying the illegitimate idea that this illuminates the 
history of science. No scientist would make that mistake...220 
  
In chapter one, we noted Robert Merton’s norms of good scientific practice, 
among them the norm of ‘organised scepticism’ by which scientists ought to be 
sceptical of all new ideas in the sense of being critically open-minded.  There is 
no doubt that Davidson would characterise himself as a defender of such a norm  
and Williamson of flouting it but this illuminates a difficulty with interpreting 
scientific behaviour for what looks to Davidson like Williamson’s betrayal of 
Merton’s norms looks to Williamson like conforming to them.  The problem lies 
with Merton’s analysis of scientific behaviour.  ‘Scientists themselves are 
naturally quite impressed by this set of ideals,’ writes Nick Russell in 
Communicating Science (2010) ‘but the extent to which scientific behaviour is 
actually constrained by them is open to debate.’221   
In exploring the extent to which Merton’s norms might be said to 
operate, the sociologist Michael Mulkay notes that Merton presumed a rather 
flat playing field on which all scientists and scientific ideas are treated with 
equal respect.  However, when sociologists began to look in greater detail at the 
conditions in which science is done they found that the playing field was far 
from level.  Mulkay, for example, suggests that today’s ‘Big Science’ (i.e., 
Davidson’s area of recombinant DNA technologies ) has created unreasonable 
expectations on other domains of biological enquiry (such as Williamson’s) that 
may not yet be ripe for similar exploitation.  Such emerging or less prestigious 
fields must compete with biotechnology not only for grants and support but for 
space in prestigious publications.  This means that in these more marginal fields, 
pressure builds up to cheat.222  Indeed, Williamson has been accused of 
cheating, albeit indirectly, not by Davidson but by an erstwhile collaborator, the 
biologist Michael Hart: 
 
I’ve probably never said to you what I’ve suggested to a few others who 
have asked about this ‘controversy’: 
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I strongly suspect that in 1989 and 1990 someone at Port Erin Marine 
Laboratory played a very cruel hoax on you by carefully substituting 
known numbers of sea urchin embryos into your cultures of known 
numbers of ‘tunicate’ eggs. I suspect that the reason you were never   
again able to get ‘larval transfer'’ in a laboratory hybridization—that is, 
the paternal larval phenotype developing from eggs that  should have had 
a very different maternal larval form—is because  the hoaxster never 
struck again after 1990.   I'm fully aware of possible objections to this 
suggestion, including the personal integrity of the PEML staff as well as 
your ability to distinguish tunicate eggs and embryos from sea urchin 
eggs and embryos. But…a skeptical mind is led inevitably to such 
thoughts.223   
 
Williamson replied two days later:  
 
Utterly ridiculous and completely impossible, but it does show the 
farcical lengths you are prepared to go to rather than admit that I crossed 
a sea squirt with a sea urchin.  Your hypothetical prankster, who, at an 
exact time and date in March 1989 and again in February 1990, had a 
culture of exactly the right number of Echinus eggs at exactly the right 
degree of development, must have been invisible.  I worked alone in a 
small lab, and I certainly did not leave the room while I was waiting for 
the first cleavage.224   
 
Of course, Hart was being disingenuous.  By hoaxster he means to suggest, 
indirectly, that Williamson cheated. 
But pressure to cheat is also felt, perhaps more so, not only by those 
engaged in controversial science but also by those toiling at the rich seams of 
‘normal’ science, i.e., science that is well-funded, prestigious and developing 
rapidly.  Organised scepticism even among molecular biologists may go out the 
window when there is pressure to be first to discover something in a highly 
competitive field.  Indeed, replication of experiments (the supposed ‘supreme 
court’ and ‘safety mechanism’ of the scientific system) is far from standard 
practice because replicating another’s experiment wins you no kudos and costs 
money.  Merton’s functionalist picture of science is, in its initial formulation at 
least, too idealistic.  As Nick Russell puts it,    
 
There is little reward in science for coming second. … and many 
scientists exist in a competitive snake-pit, constantly applying for short-
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term grants to survive. … As the late veteran science watcher John 
Ziman remarked in a commentary in Nature in 1999, ‘What price now 
those noble (Mertonian) norms?  Tied without budgets into a system of 
projects and proposals, budgets and assessments, how open, how 
disinterested, how self-critical, how riskily original can one afford to 
be?’225    
 
It seems obvious that the institutions of science benefit greatly in power and 
prestige by at least paying lip-service to the moral norms that Merton identifies, 
(norms whose origins may be traced to the Puritan culture of seventeenth 
century England226)  but if or how this ethos guides scientists’ daily activities is 
less clear.  Indeed, some sociologists report evidence of widespread deviation 
from it.227    
 Ian Mitroff, for example, studied the working practices of scientists in 
the Apollo programme.  He concluded that, among these scientists at least, the 
Mertonian norm of ‘emotional neutrality’ (organised scepticism) is countered by 
a norm of ‘emotional commitment’.  This commitment, argues Mitroff, is 
essential if scientists are to bring lengthy and laborious projects to fruition and 
tolerate setbacks along the way.  Furthermore, being dogmatic and stubbornly 
holding to one’s beliefs allows others to build on one’s work without worrying 
about foundational matters.  Mitroff suggests that in scientific culture there are 
actually two sets of norms functioning together in a dynamic way.  
Universalism, for instance, may be countered by a norm of ‘particularism’ in 
which claims are, contrary to Merton’s ethos, judged by who makes them. 
Similarly the norm of Communism may be countered by one of ‘secrecy’ 
because secrecy allows scientists to work without the fear of others doing the 
same work and perhaps getting the credit for it first.228   
Not only may scientists operate counter norms as Mittroff describes but, 
provided it proves useful to the scientific community, they may even lie about 
their findings without facing censure.  The physicist and historian, Gerald 
Holton, for example, finds that the physicist Robert Millikan claimed to have 
used all his data set in establishing the ‘charge on the electron’ when he actually 
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selected only those data points that fitted his theory.229  Holton explains that 
selecting data allows ‘the experimenter to assert that he believes the discordant 
observations do not go to the heart of the matter, that is to say, are not grounded 
in a serious way in the phenomenon being studied. ... [This allows] him to avoid 
the interruptions, delays, and detailed research that might be necessary to pin 
down the exact disturbing causes behind the discrepant observations.’ 230   
Here we are back with the theory-ladenness of observation for of course 
this is always a problem in scientific research.  Everyday in laboratories around 
the world, experimental scientists face this so-called ‘experimenter’s regress’, 
the circle of dependence between experiment and theory.  As Holton argues:  
 
It is generally true that prior to the absorption of research results into 
canonical knowledge, the selection of the relevant portion of a range of 
experience ... is guided by a hypothesis. That hypothesis in turn is 
stabilized chiefly by its success in handling that ‘relevant’ portion [of 
experience].231   
 
Put simply, theory takes priority over observation or, as the philosopher of 
science, Alexander Koyré puts it, ‘good physics is made a priori’.232 
For Merton, rationality and validity are natural goals for people and no 
further explanation of them is needed.  In other words, nothing makes people do 
or believe things that are correct and only error and bad science are open to 
sociological explanation.  But the theory-dependence of observation mandates 
serious objection to any claim that tidying up data represents a crime against 
science.  A scientific mind should not be, indeed cannot be, a blank slate, a 
virgin receptacle.  It is the expectations and understanding of the laws of nature 
that tell the observer what is a good experiment and what is a failed experiment, 
what are good data and what are bad or insignificant data that can be ignored 
and kept unpublished.  And so it must be recognised that ‘error’, and especially 
cheating or ‘fraud’ are the result of controversy, not its cause.  There is no 
unique, timeless and efficacious scientific method.  Evidence is amassed, post 
hoc, to support a hypothesis, a guess, a hunch and Merton’s organised 
scepticism is scarcely to be found.   
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  Kuhn recognises that this picture of scientific practice is quite unlike the 
Mertonian one predicated on a positivist epistemology.  To discuss the nature of 
scientific practice, he writes, is ‘to talk about techniques of persuasion, or about 
argument and counterargument in a situation in which there can be no proof,’ 
and so, ‘in the absence of criteria able to dictate the choice of each 
individual…we do well to trust the collective judgment of scientists…the 
decision of the scientific group’.233   The social historian of science, Derek 
Phillips concurs: ‘truth-claims are settled in the scientific or intellectual 
community…by meeting various public criteria which satisfy other scientists or 
thinkers that truth is established.’234    
If science is at heart a social process then understanding how it functions 
requires that we investigate the influence of social dynamics not only when 
science goes wrong or ‘bad’ but when it ‘works’ too.  ‘Good’ science should be 
explained by the same mechanisms we use to explain ‘bad’ science.  Such an 
agnostic and ‘open’ approach is vanishingly rare in television science, as 
Gardner and Young explain: 
 
Significantly, the Horizon team are very preoccupied with retaining the 
good will of the scientific community and don’t often go in for hard 
hitting analyses unless the topic is already an established scandal. Even 
there, in the case of the IQ controversy, they are preoccupied with 
whether or not it’s ‘good science’, where the real point at issue in this 
case is the ideological power of a particularly influential form of 
scientism which legitimates social and racial hierarchies by ‘scientific’ 
means. We asked a Horizon researcher about their relations with the 
growing community of people who think, do research and make critical 
stands on the history, philosophy and social relations of science as well 
as the new disciplines such as science policy, ‘science, technology and 
society’, bioethics, technology assessment. He replied, ‘We have no 
regard for that community.’ When taxed about this, he made it very clear 
that it was the scientific community, not the people who think about 
science, to which Horizon directs its attention.235  
 
The sociologist, David Bloor is one of those who thinks about science.  He calls 
his approach the strong programme in the sociology of science to contrast it with 
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the ‘weak programme’ exemplified by the work of ‘externalist’ sociologists like 
Robert Merton.   
 
The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
Instead of Plato’s ‘justified true belief’ the strong programme defines 
knowledge, as Vico does, as that which people take to be knowledge.  The 
strong programme acknowledges that people, some of them scientists, take a 
variety of sometimes contradictory ideas to be knowledge.  What then, asks 
Bloor, accounts for this variance?  He requires of any answer that it explain both 
true and false belief and that this explanation be reflexive, applicable that is to 
the strong programme itself.236  Methodologically this means the strong 
programme sociologist is agnostic about scientific truths and, taking less for 
granted, looks further in attempts to explain the development of scientific 
knowledge.  The strong programme, then, is predicated on a constructivist view 
of knowledge, as explained by the anthropologist of science, Karin Knorr-
Cetina:  
 
Rather than view empirical observation as questions put to nature in a 
language she understands, we will take all references to the ‘constitutive’ 
role of science seriously, and regard scientific enquiry as a process of 
production.  Rather than considering scientific products as somehow 
capturing what is, we will consider them as selectively carved out, 
transformed and constructed from whatever is.  And rather than examine 
the external relations between science and the ‘nature’ we are told it 
describes, we will look at those internal affairs of scientific enterprise 
which we take to be constructive.237  
 
The strong programme, then, teases out three dimensions for study that comprise 
the constructivist view: (1) science’s social dimension; (2) science as a practical 
activity (a thought reinforced by the etymology of the word ‘fact’ with its Latin 
root facere, to make); and (3) the non-naturalness of the products of science—
that is, there is no direct route from nature to ideas about nature.  The 
constructivist approach has evolved from the 1970s to the present day, 
becoming less and less concerned with the foundational matters of traditional 
epistemology such as the nature of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and more with enquiring 
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where in the scientist’s laboratory or in their discourse we find these things that 
the traditional positivist values: ‘nature’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’?  The question for 
this dissertation is whether the film, Hopeful Monsters, represents science as 
Knorr-Cetina suggests, i.e., as a social and practical activity, as factum.   
 In a documentary that attempts to represent science in a post-positivist 
manner as Hopeful Monsters appears to do, we should expect to find a shift in 
emphasis from the concerns of positivism (is the theory true?) to those of 
constructivism (how is the theory being made?).  We have something of a model 
for this in the work of Bruno Latour who seeks, within a constructivist 
paradigm, to locate ‘nature’, ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ in scientific practice.  In doing 
this, Latour attempts to reveal the interconnectedness of the substance of 
knowledge and the process of its origination so as to uncover the values 
involved in that process.  As Gardner and Young write, this is decidedly not 
what the narrative of the classic science documentary (like The Ghost in Your 
Genes) is concerned to do; for in those films representation of the values 
involved in scientific culture and practice are ‘precluded by the breathless form 
of presentation which operates at an expository pace and conveys a sense of 
inevitability rather than one of social choice.’238   
In Science in Action (1987), Bruno Latour tries to understand what 
determines the choices scientists make by beginning with the endpoint of 
scientific research—a sentence in a college textbook.  He then jumps back in 
time to the laboratory bench where this sentence is uttered among only a few 
people and then moves forwards in time, noting the transformative ‘journey’ the 
sentence makes from being shared between colleagues to being a fact in a 
textbook where it is used to educate the next generation of scientists:  
 
We start with a textbook sentence which is devoid of any trace of 
fabrication, construction or ownership; we then put it in quotation marks, 
surround it with a bubble, place it in the mouth of someone who speaks; 
then we add to this speaking character another character to whom it is 
speaking; then we place all of them in a specific situation, somewhere in 
time and space, surrounded by equipment, machines, colleagues; then, 
when the controversy heats up a bit we look at where the disputing 
people go and what sort of new elements they fetch, recruit or seduce in 
order to convince their colleagues; then we see how the people being 
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convinced stop discussing with one another; situations, localisations, 
even people start being slowly erased; on the last picture we see a new 
sentence, without any quotation marks, written in a text book similar to 
the one we started with in the first picture.239 
 
Textbook science is what Latour calls Ready Made Science and he distinguishes 
it from Science in the Making.  Ready made science is like the black box 
cyberneticians use in their circuit diagrammes: ‘whenever a piece of machinery 
or a set of commands is too complex…in its place they draw a little box about 
which they need to know nothing but its input and output.’240  The black box 
‘contains’ knowledge that is considered established and that may be used, as it 
were, without doubt, that is without looking inside the box to check how the fact 
came to be a fact in the first place.  The word ‘gene’ is an example of a black 
box used again and again in today’s molecular biology labs.  It was once a 
controversial idea that a gene is a section of a piece of DNA and that it takes the 
form of a double helix comprising a certain arrangement of bases (C, T, G, A) 
but this notion is now so well established that scientists refer to it as a fact and 
no longer feel it is necessary even to cite the source of the original idea (e.g., the 
papers published by Watson and Crick in Nature in 1953).241   
 
Controversy and Fact 
The question for Latour is how these black boxes are created, in other words 
how controversies are settled and facts established. He seeks to persuade us that, 
contrary to the received view, it is not facts that settle a controversy; rather, facts 
are the outcome of that settlement.  Only once a controversy is closed, argues 
Latour, do the facts take on the appearance of having caused this closure.   
Latour develops a metaphor to dramatise this dynamic process: ‘Science 
has two faces,’ he writes, ‘one that knows, the other that does not know yet.’242  
The Janus-headed science speaks like a positivist from one mouth, saying, 
‘when things are true they hold’ and as a constructivist from the other, saying 
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‘when things hold they start becoming true’.243  Science in the Making is 
articulated by the constructivist side of the face while Ready Made Science is 
heard from the positivist side.  Science then is a process of transformation.  
Controversial ideas described by the constructivist side are transformed through 
a social process of persuasion into facts in the mouth of the positivist side.  This 
dynamic may be seen in action by examining, for example, the history of 
citations in scientific papers.  
When a controversy flares up scientists will recruit allies by citing in 
their papers what other scientists have written; the more footnotes and 
quotations the more serious the paper:  
 
It is a question of numbers.  A paper that does not have references is like 
a child without an escort walking at night in a big city it does not know: 
isolated, lost, anything may happen to it.  On the contrary, attacking a 
paper heavy with footnotes means the dissenter has to weaken each of 
the other papers, or will at least be threatened with having to do so…The 
difference at this point between technical and non-technical literature is 
not that one is about fact and the other about fiction, but that the latter 
gathers only a few resources at hand, and the former a lot of resources, 
even from far away in time and space.244 
 
This, of course, runs counter to Robert Merton’s notion that the purpose of 
citation is to acknowledge intellectual property rights and provide an ‘income’ 
to the owner of the property.  In ‘Referencing as Persuasion’ Nigel Gilbert 
points out that such ideas cannot account for those references that are included 
by an author in order to challenge or contradict them, or those ‘perfunctory’ 
references ‘which cite, almost as an aside, work which is not apparently strictly 
relevant to an author’s immediate concerns.’245 Gilbert also argues that the 
metaphor of  ‘property’ is not useful because the ‘findings’ reported in a paper 
and later cited by another are not property that can be exploited as we 
commonly understand that word.  They cannot yield a rent for example nor be 
sold.  Indeed, the cited author may not even be aware that he or she has been 
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cited.246  Gilbert concludes that the purpose of citation, as Latour suggests, is not 
to acknowledge rights but to enhance persuasion: 
 
[The] referencing of earlier research achieves more than the mere 
incorporation of the referenced work into the new paper; inasmuch as 
this work has already been accepted as ‘valid science’, it also provides a 
measure of persuasive support for the newly announced findings.  
 It follows that it may be more effective to cite an authoritative 
paper, thus trading on its acknowledged adequacy, than to redescribe the 
research without reference to the original paper.  One can therefore argue 
that the scientific ‘norm’ that one should cite the research on which 
one’s work depends, may not be a product of a pervasive concern to 
acknowledge ‘property rights’, but rather may arise from scientists’ 
interest in persuading their colleagues by using all the resources 
available to them, including those respected papers which can be cited to 
bolster their own arguments.247    
 
For Latour, then, a fact is ‘a rare event’ that can be said to have taken place 
when, within the scientific community and over a period of time, one generation 
of authors after the next makes reference in their papers to the same new idea, 
all of which are positively reinforcing: 
 
This rare event is what people usually have in mind when they talk of a 
‘fact’.  I hope it is clear by now that this event does not make it 
qualitatively different from fiction; a fact is what is collectively 
stabilised from the midst of controversies when the activity of later 
papers does not consist only of criticism or deformation but also of 
confirmation.  The strength of the original statement does not lie in itself, 
but is derived from any of the papers that incorporate it.248 
 
Whether reality fits a concept is always a collective matter for those operating 
within the same paradigm.  The meaning or content of a scientific theory then 
has the character of an institution in that it relies for its existence on scientists’ 
moment-by-moment continuing belief in it.  Kuhn’s normal science is defined 
by this on-going activity.  ‘Nature’ only appears to be the adjudicator in 
retrospect, once an idea is no longer controversial, that is, once the idea has 
been accepted through a process of argument, publication and counter 
publication.  Reality is not decisive and neither are an individual’s claims.  ‘It is 
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not, after all, the individual who decides whether his discoveries or theoretical 
inventions shall become part of the body of established science,’ writes Thomas 
Kuhn, ‘rather it is his professional community, a community which has and 
sometimes exercises the privilege of declaring him a deviant.’249   
If Latour’s Janus-headed science speaks from one mouth as a positivist 
and from the other as a constructivist then the establishment of a scientific fact 
effects an acoustic shift.   The constructivist voice is drowned out by the 
positivist one and two-faced science goes from speaking in stereo to mono or 
what Frederick Ruf terms the magisterial voice.  And so the key, as Latour sees 
it, to a more adequate representation of science than the received view is to 
show that, despite the monophonic voice of science found in textbooks and 
classic science documentaries, the voice of science is properly understood as 
stereophonic.   
 
Conclusion 
It seems, then, that scholars of science studies are suggesting that scientists fail 
to properly appreciate the nature of what they do.  Not that there is anything 
sinister about the persistence of the received view among scientists, just that its 
persistence is in itself a phenomenon worthy of investigation.  This dissertation 
is not a work of sociology or psychology but it does seem that, for whatever 
reason, one can say the received view is a deeply ingrained and perhaps 
necessary habit among scientists.  Indeed, the psychoanalyst Adam Phillips 
argues it is how all of us choose to deal with our experience.  Our beliefs, as he 
puts it, are vehicles for experience and people choose beliefs that afford them 
the experiences they desire.250  Peter Medawar won the Nobel Prize in 
Physiology / Medicine in 1960 and has written a great deal about the nature of 
science.  He writes that scientists are wedded to the idea that they work 
inductively, that they bring nothing of their subjective selves to their 
apprehension of the world: ‘if scientists sometimes like to think—as Darwin 
certainly did—that they proceed by induction it can only be because the myth of 
induction is that which accords best with the self-image a scientist may have 
formed of himself: as a regular, straightforward, plain-thinking man of facts and 
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calculations—someone very different from a philosopher, a poet fellow or an 
imaginative writer.’251   
The rhetorician, Alan Gross sums this up, arguing that scientists, as 
David Hume suggested, are ‘motivational realists’: ‘It is not that scientists 
intend to create realist theories, rather, the possibility of such theories is the 
psychological anchor that makes a life in science meaningful.’252  However, it is 
important to note that motivational realism is not an epistemology; it does not 
tell us what makes a scientific theory true.  Popper, Kuhn, Latour, Gross and 
others show us, on the contrary, that the picture of scientists as plain-thinking 
men of facts and calculations is a rhetorical invention.  As Terry Eagleton 
reminds us: 
 
All of our descriptive statements move within an often invisible network 
of value-categories, and indeed without such categories we would have 
nothing to say to each other at all.  It is not just as though we have 
something called factual knowledge which may then be distorted by 
particular interests and judgements, although this is certainly possible; it 
is also that without particular interests we would have no knowledge at 
all, because we would not see the point of bothering to get to know 
anything.  Interests are constitutive of our knowledge, not merely 
prejudices which imperil it.  The claim that knowledge should be ‘value-
free’ is itself a value-judgement.253 
 
Scientists employ logic and dialectic as rhetorical strategies to achieve a value-
free, i.e., realistic-sounding, monophonic voice that is, as Alan Gross says, ‘so 
persuasive as to seem unrhetorical—to seem, simply, the way the world is’254  
But scientific descriptions of the world are not logically entailed and true for all 
time, they are conjectural and their truth is determined and maintained by the 
scientific institution that values them.  It is this self-denying value-system of 
science that is reproduced by the rhetoric of the classic science documentary. 
In the next chapter I will briefly return to our analysis of scientific 
discourse in order to see more clearly the ways that that discourse denies its 
implicit interests and draw from this analysis the features we may reasonably 
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expect to find in any science documentary representing, by contrast, a 




SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE REVISITED 
 
In our earlier analysis, scientific discourse was understood as ‘rhetorical’ only 
up to a point, designed to communicate a received view about the nature of 
science and scientific knowledge but without undermining its own ability to 
accurately reflect how science indeed discovers facts about nature.  I have, I 
hope, undermined the rationality of this view, arguing that contrary to received 
notions of science, the facts do not speak for themselves and science is about 
invention not discovery: in short, knowledge is socially constructed.  The 
philosophical and sociological considerations that lead to this conclusion 
suggest we ought also to reconsider our analysis of scientific discourse.   Might 
there be, as Ron Curtis asks in ‘Narrative Form and Normative Force,’ other 
forms of representation than the classic scientific paper (or, in our case, the 
classic science documentary) that ‘reflect more accurately and critically 
alternative interpretations of scientific practice’ such as we have developed over 
the last two chapters?255  Curtis argues, for example, that the Socratic dialogue is 
an appropriate alternative to classical scientific writing, and in this thesis I have 
essayed a filmic alternative: the documentary, Hopeful Monsters. 256  In this 
section, then, I attempt to look a little more closely at the rhetoric of scientific 
discourse so as to be in a position, in later chapters, to evaluate the success of 
Hopeful Monsters as an alternative representation of science.  
 
Ideology: The Old Tune 
Although Huxley’s distinction between literary discourse and scientific 
discourse (the one a report of private experience, the other of public) seemed 
borne out by Bloomfield’s description of the ‘technical dialect’ of science, one 
need not reflect long on this view to recognise its short-comings.257  First, such 
an idea entirely ignores the problem of the theory-dependence of observation, 
(an unavoidable ‘intrusion’ of the private into the public) and, second, it ignores 
                                                 
255
 Curtis, R. (1994) p. 445 
256
 Ibid., p. 446 
257
 Huxley, A. (1963); Bloomfield, L. (1935) 
 130 
the contents of most modern scientific statements that are often highly abstruse 
and very far from everyday (i.e., ‘public’) experience.  The notion, then, that 
scientists work toward a series of plain statements, each reflecting demonstrable 
experience is far from a fair representation of what occurs in practice.  This is 
not of course to invalidate modern science but merely to reiterate, as the chemist 
turned professor of English, David Locke puts it, that: 
 
The subject matter of modern science is meaningful only in terms of its 
own conceptual schemes, not by direct appeal to ordinary experience. ... 
There is no real world that scientists know independently of the 
linguistic, graphic and mathematical formulations by which they 
conceive it. ... One cannot conceive that the complex world of modern 
science could be directly accessible to the mind unmediated by language 
and mathematics.  Ultimately, to claim that the scientist somehow 
explores the real world directly, without the mediation of language, and 
then represents, reflects or transcribes this world picture is 
unthinkable.258 
 
Roger Silverstone writes that ‘science comes to television fully clothed’, but 
from what we have argued thus far we must conclude that his metaphor is not 
quite right—science cannot, even in principle, remove those clothes for it has no 
existence outside of them, outside, that is, of discourse.259   What looks to the 
positivist like more or less shape-distorting garments are, to the constructivist, 
science’s skin, indeed its muscle, sinew, organs and bones.  To the 
constructivist, science is always and unavoidably a discourse to begin with.    
We notice this less when we read contemporary scientific accounts because we 
are so familiar with the language but Kuhn’s experience of reading Aristotle 
indicates the extent to which learning science and learning the language of 
science necessarily go hand in hand.  The universe that scientific texts bring to 
us is in an important sense constituted by the language used to describe it.   
  Scientific discourse, then, whether technical or popular both embodies an 
idea of nature and an idea of science and they are necessarily bound up with 
each other.  Getting the words of scientific discourse right, as Charles Bazerman 
writes, ‘is more than a fine tuning of grace and clarity; it is defining the whole 
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enterprise,’ for how can we know, as the poet asks, ‘the dancer from the 
dance?’260    
From a constructivist perspective, the scientific paper is not a record but 
a presentation, writes David Locke:   
 
When scientists come to compose their papers (and the verb must be an 
active one), they proceed not from the scientific activity itself but from a 
model, a model of what a scientific paper should be…One leafs through 
the pages of a scientific journal, and the pattern sanctioned by the 
traditions of the discipline at once becomes apparent: often the internal 
heads from paper to paper are precisely the same: Introduction, Methods, 
Results, Discussion.  Each scientist merely rings a set of changes on the 
old tune…the scientific paper fulfils in its own way the pattern that 
shapes it.  It is in this sense that the scientific paper must be considered a 
construct.261  
 
So too, then, must the science documentary be considered a construct.  The 
question becomes what idea of science does it construct?  In a 1963 radio talk 
titled, ‘Is the Scientific Paper a Fraud?’, Peter Medawar explored the nature of 
Locke’s ‘old tune’ and concluded it was far from what he understood the 
scientific process to be.  On the contrary, he said, ‘the scientific paper in its 
orthodox form does embody a totally mistaken conception, even a travesty, of 
the nature of scientific thought.’262   Its structure—Introduction, Methods, 
Results, Discussion—is, he complained, entirely inductive, seeming to imply 
that the scientific mind is ‘a virgin receptacle, an empty vessel. …you 
[apparently] reserve all appraisal of the scientific evidence until the ‘discussion’ 
section at the end, and in the discussion you adopt the ludicrous pretence of 
asking yourself if the information you have collected actually means 
anything.’263   The actual activity of science, claims Medawar (consciously 
following Popper) is of hypothesising (i.e., ‘discussion’) before experiment, and 
this non-inductive process is obscured by the rhetoric of the scientific paper.  
In Laboratory Life (1979), Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar characterize 
the experimental paper as an a posteriori rationalisation of the real process.  
‘Not only do scientists’ statements create problems for historical elucidation,’ 
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they write, ‘they also systematically conceal the nature of the activity which 
typically gives rise to their research reports.’264  There is, then, a serious 
problem for the would-be filmmaker interested in representing science by 
adapting the idea of science he or she finds expressed by the structure of the 
scientific paper.  In an essay published a few years after his radio broadcast, 
Medawar reinforced this view: ‘It is no use looking to scientific ‘papers’ for 
they not merely conceal, but actively distort the reasoning that goes into the 
work they describe.’ 265  ‘The truth,’ he writes in a later essay, ‘is that there is no 
such thing as “scientific inference”’: 
 
A scientist commands a dozen different stratagems of inquiry in his 
approximation to the truth, and of course he has his way of going about 
things and more or less of the quality often described as 
‘professionalism’—an address that includes an ability to get on with 
things, abetted by a sanguine expectation of success and that ability to 
imagine what the truth might be which Shelley believed to be cognate 
with a poet’s imagination.266 
 
That the scientist’s approach might be ‘cognate with a poet’s imagination’ is 
precisely what the scientific paper (and the classic science documentary) is 
designed to deny.  This denial serves a social and political function, writes Ron 
Curtis: ‘by giving the impression that the results presented were not mere 
opinion or hypothesis but were somehow instilled in the author by nature, the 
inductive style was intended to silence potential critics and prevent 
controversy.’267    
The arrangement of the scientific paper is thus an enactment of an 
ideological norm by which the results of a laboratory experiment may progress 
implicitly from the artificial to the natural.  ‘It is of no consequence that such 
progress is far from problematic,’ writes Alan Gross, ‘or that the philosophical 
bases of this version of the scientific method have been undermined.  In 
experimental reports, arrangement is regarded as a sacred given.’268    
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The view that scientific writing is ideological is supported by studies of 
historical texts whose form is alien to us and therefore easier to see for the 
rhetoric it is.  For example, in their book Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), 
Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaffer compare Robert Boyle’s usage of the 
dialogue form in Sceptical Chymist (1661) to Hobbes’s literary practices in the 
natural philosophical dialogues of Dialogus physicus (1661), Problemata 
physica (1662) and the Decameron physiologicum (1678).269  In Boyle’s work 
the reader is presented with four knowledgeable participants who freely 
exchange facts until they reach a consensus.  Hobbes’s dialogues, however, are 
distinctly different.  In Hobbes there are only two voices, one represents the 
author and the other his interlocutor.  In these Socratic dialogues the truth does 
not emerge from an exchange of views but is already fully contained in 
Hobbes’s philosophy; the interlocutor does not offer ideas or information as in 
Boyle’s dialogues but simply receives ideas from the master.  The dialogues 
consist of Hobbes correcting the interlocutor’s mistakes or answering those 
questions that perplex the interlocutor.  Sometimes Hobbes probes the 
interlocutor’s terms, demanding clear definitions which the interlocutor admits 
he lacks.  Hobbes then supplies these.  The interlocutor may argue a point but 
only for Hobbes to expose the logical flaw in the argument or the interlocutor 
may demand that Hobbes support a point with more detail and this Hobbes then 
supplies.  As the dialogues proceed, the interlocutor is gradually persuaded to 
Hobbes’s views; he ceases to represent the adversary and becomes a possible 
convert.  Eventually the conversion is complete but there remains a final step: at 
the very end of the dialogue, the interlocutor himself has the confidence to 
correct Hobbes and Hobbes acknowledges his mistake.  Thus Hobbes’s 
dialogues demonstrate by their very form that truth arrived at by the correct 
method always commands assent.270    
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 The Hobbesian dialogue posits a particular relationship between the 
method for arriving at knowledge and the method for demonstrating it.  In short, 
one teaches or demonstrates by guiding the student along the same track that one 
followed oneself in inventing (Hobbes’s word) the knowledge in the first place.  
Hobbes’s dialogues are designed to demonstrate that method alone commands 
assent and thereby mobilizes consensus.  Boyle’s view by contrast represents the 
scientific method as a process of cooperative fact sharing.  ‘Thus,’ conclude 
Shapin and Schaffer, ‘in both Boyle’s and Hobbes’s writings, literary structure 
and process dramatize the social relations and practices deemed appropriate to 
the production of knowledge.  Differences in theories of knowledge-production 
and evaluation are displayed in different literary technologies.’271 
 Ron Curtis’s analysis of the writing in the popular journal put out by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science reveals that such 
discourse promotes a received view about knowledge production and evaluation.  
Taking a lead from the implicitly inductive structure of technical scientific 
papers, many journalists and authors of popular science writing, writes Curtis, 
‘affect a naïve realism, and pretend that their subject already exists in the form 
of a story … which they simply stumble upon and report to the reader’.  The 
narratives of popular scientific discourse, thereby ‘moralize surreptitiously about 
events in science while purporting, in accordance with a positivist ethic and a 
naïve realism, merely to describe them.’ 272  The reader (or viewer) of such 
discourse is interpellated into a normative view of science as a detective-trail 
that is immune to criticism because it is never explicit.   
  As Roland Barthes writes, rhetoric is the signifying aspect of ideology 
and this detective-trail rhetoric signifies the familiar, received view of 
science.273  It satisfies a deep-seated psychological need to believe in the realism 
of theories and a logic of theory choice that, in their turn, underpin confidence in 
the unity of science and its institutional structures.   The historian of science, 
Frederick Holmes summarizes this view:  (1) ‘[Scientific papers] are 
retrospective formulations of work previously completed’; (2) ‘They do not 
accurately represent the work they make public’; (3) ‘They are stereotyped 
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according to canons of form dictated by the authority structure of scientific 
disciplines’; (4) ‘They purvey an image of scientific activity that fits an ideology 
rather than actual practice’.274 
This does not mean that ‘non-received’ narratives of science like the one 
I am trying to develop in this thesis are any less ideological.  Holmes’s point is 
that all narratives of science are necessarily imaginative constructions guided by 
certain principles or themata.   Holmes’s own work on scientific records, for 
example, is guided by the spatial metaphors of ‘investigative pathways’ or 
‘research trails’ and the ‘fine structure of scientific activity’ and he writes: ‘the 
historical narratives that I, or others with other guiding ideas, can produce from 
such records are imaginative constructions, just as are the scientific writings that 
the scientists who kept the records produce from them.’275  All scientific 
discourse is figural or ‘rhetorical’ but this does not invalidate it as a record of 
scientific activity, it merely confirms that scientific discourse is, whatever 
Huxley says, necessarily a species of literature.  As Hayden White writes in 
Figural Realism (1999), ‘the very distinction between literal and figurative 
speech is a purely conventional(ist) distinction and is to be understood by its 
relevance to the sociopolitical context in which it arises.’276  
 
Figuration in written discourse 
It would seem, then, that scientific discourse is always something more than 
‘plain’ speaking and we may expect this characteristic to extend to the 
representations of science found in the science documentary.  It is not such a 
surprising idea, for the only way to describe something unfamiliar is by 
reference to the familiar.  The use of metaphor in science communication, then, 
is unavoidable.  ‘Science cannot do without these ‘semantically bizarre 
sentences’’, writes Gross; ‘it is universally recognized that metaphor is 
indispensible.’277  (This is the ‘warping’ of scientific language that Quine speaks 
of.)  The scientist should therefore expect new research to be replete with 
metaphors; indeed, many metaphors remain embedded in scientific knowledge 
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even as it develops away from the research front.  David Locke gives the 
following example: 
 
When scientists appropriate terms like force, energy and power, like 
inertia and momentum, and invest them with their own specific meaning, 
they are simply inserting the old signifiers into new systems of 
signification. … When subatomic physicists wish to distinguish a family 
of entities by a variable property that has no counterpart in the world of 
ordinary dimension, they designate the various state of the property as 
‘flavors,’ just as Baskin-Robbins does the varying states of its product.  
One can never signify the new, the unfamiliar, without reference to the 
old, the familiar, the comfortable. … There is always in scientific change 
a reassemblage, a bricolage, a repackaging of always old ingredients.278   
 
Saussure demonstrates that language is not a simple naming of pre-
existent things and scientific language is no different.  Science does not have, as 
Scott Montgomery writes, ‘the power to change language into a form of 
technology, i.e., a device able to transfer knowledge without ever touching it in 
any way. … Language is indelibly a cultural phenomenon, and science, in its 
major portion, is no less so.’279  Metaphor is not simply a means for scientists to 
distinguish new objects; such language also suggests new ideas.  Pasteur and 
Koch’s recommendation of the germ theory of disease—‘contagium vivum’—
fostered militaristic metaphors so directing research towards, among other 
things, mechanisms of ‘invasion’ and ‘resistance’.280   This lead to the notion of 
self-non-self recognition by an adaptive immune system (in a battle, opposing 
forces must wear distinct uniforms) and, a century later, Peter Medawar would 
receive a Nobel Prize for his work on this idea.281  At the same time, these 
metaphors of warfare stifled research into symbiosis, an area of investigation 
that identified bacteria not as contagium vivum but as organisms with a natural 
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history of their own and relations that might be other than pathogenic.282   In this 
way the metaphor directs future research as well as characterising the immediate 
phenomenon. 
Figures of speech exert a profound influence on science, indeed the 
figure known as metonymy is at the heart of statements of causality.  While 
metaphor means ‘transfer’ and makes the contents of experience intelligible by 
characterizing phenomena on the basis of their similarity, metonymy literally 
means ‘name change’.  In this trope a thing may be renamed by reference to an 
essential part of it; for example the entire person and apparatus of the ruler may 
be renamed ‘the throne’.  In metonymy ‘the throne’ is not transferred, it does not 
stand in a relation of similarity to the ruler but rather it is a part, a contiguous 
element of the ruler that it stands in for.  One calls psychiatrists the ‘white coats’ 
for example.  Metaphor is representational—two objects are related by being 
figuratively identified—but if we think about phenomena metonymically, we 
distinguish those parts that are representative of the whole from those that are 
merely aspects of it.   
Thus, for example, ‘the cold of ice’ is a metonymical expression.  In this 
phrase the feeling of, say, an ice cube in our mouth is divided into two 
phenomena, the cause (the ice) and the effect (the cold).  Having made this 
division one then relates the two phenomena in a cause-effect relationship: the 
ice causes the cold.  Now this relationship may in fact be expressed in one of 
two ways: the effect’s cause (‘the cold of ice’) and in an agent-act relationship 
(‘the ice cools’).  As Hayden White writes:   
 
By such reductions…the phenomenal world can be populated with a host 
of agents and agencies that are presumed to exist behind it.  Once the 
world of phenomena is separated into two orders of being (agents and 
causes on the one hand, acts and effects on the other) the primitive 
consciousness is endowed, by purely linguistic means alone, with the 
conceptual categories (agents, causes, spirits, essences) necessary for the 
theology, science, and philosophy of civilized reflection.283   
 
In creating agents and causes, metonymy is the trope of mechanistic discourse. 
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Figuration in the Science Documentary   
Felicity Mellor analyses the distinction between metaphor and metonym in her 
paper, ‘The Politics of Accuracy in Judging Global Warming Films’ (2009).  In 
this paper, she argues that the figural status of the image in science 
documentaries dealing with future events such as global warming (or, I would 
add, past events such as evolutionary history) is more often metaphorical than 
metonymic.  This is because, in making images of future events—through 
computer animations for example—the filmmaker is working in the 
‘subjunctive’ mode.284  In this mode, writes Mellor, the documentary image 
necessarily ‘establishes a relationship of similarity rather than of contiguity’.285  
In a science documentary that pictures the future, this use of metaphor becomes 
problematic because it makes it difficult for the viewer to read the image as they 
are used to, namely as having a metonymic relationship to reality.  The 
consequent figural ambiguity means that viewers may experience difficulties in 
adjudicating between rival representations of the future on the basis solely of 
scientific ‘accuracy’.  This contributes to confusion over claims about global 
warming.    
It is interesting in this regard to recall the images in the BBC’s evolution 
series, Walking With Dinosaurs (1999).  The scenes in this series were almost 
entirely computer generated animations of dinosaurs; however, they were 
designed to be perceived like an Attenborough-style nature programme—as if a 
human camera operator had been present on Earth at the time.  For example, at 
one moment the ‘camera’ appears to duck to avoid the swinging tail of a 
dinosaur.  In Walking With Dinosaurs the style of the animation aims at 
metonymy, at relating one shot to the next in spatiotemporal contiguity.  This 
conceit (borrowed from the syntax of the observational nature documentary) 
avoids, locally, the potential for ambiguity that Mellor speaks of even though 
globally the entire series is, tropologically speaking, metaphorical, or, we might 
argue, ironic, for in irony, explains Hayden White, ‘entities can be characterized 
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by way of negating on the figurative level what is positively affirmed on the 
literal level.’ 286  
Certainly, in the light of the theory of evolution, the style of Walking 
With Dinosaurs is absurd, not so very different from King Kong (1933) in which 
a giant gorilla wrestles with a Tyrannosaurus Rex while observed by a woman.  
However, irony presupposes, as White says, that the viewer ‘already knows, or 
is capable of recognizing, the absurdity of the characterisation of the thing 
designated in the metaphor, metonymy or synecdoche used to give form to it.’287  
The viewer of Walking With Dinosaurs picks up on the documentary’s irony 
(the irony of it being a documentary at all) and reads the film as a heuristic 
fiction, a game of speculation with a non-fictive address. 
   In Walking with Dinosaurs, or in Chris Marker’s Sans Soleil (1983) or 
Peter Watkins’s The War Game (1965), a conditional mode is adopted in which, 
as Michael Renov writes, ‘the depiction of potential rather than experientially 
available worlds is faithfully (or whimsically) rendered’.288 By contrast, in 
Kevin Macdonald’s documentary, Touching the Void (2003), we have a good 
example of the problems caused for the viewer when the mode is not 
conditional.  The film tells the story of mountaineer Joe Simpson’s remarkable 
survival after an accident climbing Siula Grande in Peru in 1985.  The text 
mixes climbing scenes performed by actors in Peru (filmed on the actual spot of 
the original events) with other shots recreated in the Swiss Alps and narrates the 
story through interviews with Joe Simpson and his climbing partner, shot in an 
abstract space rather like that of The Ghost in Your Genes.  As long as the re-
enacted images of Simpson’s climbing accident are ‘generic’ they remain 
metaphors for his experience but when the actors speak, when ‘Joe’ gasps with 
pain for example, what we had engaged with as metaphor is suddenly figured as 
metonymy and that makes no sense because the implicit contiguity with the 
post-climb Joe Simpson cannot be.  As Nichols put it, ‘When an actor 
reincarnates a historical personage, the actor’s very presence testifies to a gap 
between the text and the life to which it refers.’289   This gap is traversed by 
metaphor but not by metonymy.  In the documentary, such figuration is troubled 
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by the clash between conflicting criteria of authenticity. When the actor playing 
Joe cries out in feigned agony his voice acts not as a metaphor for Joe’s pain but 
as a metonym for his own performance and by that token fails to persuade, 
undermining the effectiveness of the re-enactments.  The more the re-
enactments comply with the conventions of the realist cinema the less effective 
they are as metaphor.   
The mixed mode of Touching the Void also has impact in the other 
direction, weakening the reality claim of the interviews.  The ‘Joe Simpson’ of 
the interviews must conform to the Joe Simpson of the re-enactments (i.e., a 
mythic fiction) which means denying his own historical agency as the ‘Joe 
Simpson’ we see interviewed.  In the ‘making-of’ documentary, Touching the 
Void: Return to Siula Grande (2004), Simpson reveals the confusion and pain he 
suffered in returning to the scene of his accident but none of this is articulated in 
Touching the Void.  Unlike the interviews of holocaust survivors in Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985), for example, Simpson’s role in Touching the Void is 
entirely constrained by the film’s mythic narrative which leaves no space for 
exploring his current state of mind.  He is not on screen to testify to the pain of 
remembering but only to relate the pain he remembers.  And what he 
remembers, especially after so many tellings, has become as much of a myth to 
him as it is for us hearing it for the first time.  
 
On Darwin and progress—a kind of conclusion 
The figurative or tropological aspects of scientific discourse and its manifest 
content are tied up with each other.  Scientific language, no matter how ‘dry’ is 
more than a mirroring (i.e., an icon) of events, it is a mode of explanation in 
which the figurative and the factual are indissoluble.  Style—rhetoric—not only 
affects meaning it creates it.  Even in science, our thoughts about the world are 
shaped by the bricolage of concepts and patterns of discourse we are steeped in 
and so in an important sense the only ‘real’ world is the one constructed out of 
this material.  As Hilary Lawson puts it:   
 
Signs are not transparent; they are not simply marks for something that is 
wholly other.  Put in the language of semiology, there is no signified 
which is independent of the signifier.  There is no realm of meaning 
which can be isolated from the marks which are used to point to it.  
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There is therefore no logos, no unified and coherent account of the 
world, that lies outside the sign or system of signs, that is independent of 
the marks by which ‘it’ is described.290 
 
If our world is held in play by a system of signifiers which are not independent 
of their meanings then there are no fixed meanings, there are in a sense no 
signifieds but just a system of signifiers from which there is no escape.  If a 
particular signifier fails to have a unique meaning then all meaning is ultimately 
undecidable.  Statements of fact do not refer to some independent entity because 
we cannot have experience of that entity, nor speak of it outside of thought, of 
language, of signifying.  The raw data are beyond our reach.  It is not so much 
that one should doubt the existence of the external world as grasp that the 
scientific language that would describe the world is unavoidably caught up in its 
own linguistic universe.  The meaning of a sentence is determined by the play 
that takes place within that web of language.  Experience cannot stand outside 
that play.291  It is not, in other words, that science does not work, only that one 
need not, after all, accept that the scientist’s ‘real world’ is the real world.292  
The scientist is perfectly within his rights to assume whatever he wants in order 
to do his job (to be a motivational realist for example) but one is not compelled 
in any logical sense to go along with those assumptions.   
The Cartesian paradigm of the received view holds nature to be 
bifurcated, the mind of the scientist separate from that which is observed, the 
form of our representations separate from their content.  But in a post-Cartesian, 
constructivist paradigm, form and content are inextricably bound up.  Analysis 
of a text means its deconstruction or ‘desedimentation’ and rather than revealing 
its ‘true’ meaning can only serve to reveal the necessarily linguistic nature of 
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knowledge, the never-ending series of discourses from which knowledge is 
constructed, as David Locke writes:   
  
By its ‘desedimentation,’ the deconstructionist disentangles the 
assemblage and reveals the problematic nature of its formulation.  When 
the task is complete, the deconstructed language lives on, its terms, 
however, now held ‘under erasure,’ altered in their signification by the 
deconstructive process itself.293 
 
The Kuhnian model of scientific history is one of deconstruction—periods of 
‘normal’ scientific activity separated by ‘revolutions’ during which 
fundamentals are interrogated in such a way that terms no longer mean what 
they did: the current paradigm is thus recast or even destroyed.  Darwin’s great 
book, On the Origin of Species, for example, is a profound work of 
deconstruction.  As David Locke points out, the title itself is ironic because by 
the end of the book the notion of species has been entirely undermined and what 
remains of it is not the sort of a thing that can be said to have clear origins.294   
Darwin achieves this new sense by inverting the old hierarchy.  The fixed 
species ‘type’ of Linnaeus becomes, under Darwin’s view, an arbitrary stopping 
place in a more or less infinitely graduated series of individuals. The decision of 
which individuals to designate the ‘type specimen’ of the ‘species’ and which 
mere ‘variety’ is, as Darwin writes, ‘arbitrarily given, for the sake of 
convenience, to a set of individuals closely resembling each other, and … does 
not essentially differ from the term variety,’ which in its turn is arbitrarily 
assigned to emphasise relatively larger variations than between individuals.295  
This inversion of the commonly held idea of species as something fixed, clearly 
definable (and God-given), is achieved at the expense of two chapters (sixty 
pages) of examples of disagreements between botanists about what is or is not a 
variety or a species.  Once the notion of species has been deconstructed in this 
way we can see how the origin of a species cannot easily be assigned either.  
Origin cannot make much sense when a species is but an arbitrarily chosen 
moment in a process of continual change: there is no natural place to draw the 
line between ancestor and descendant.  Darwin’s book then is not about the 
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origin of species but about a process of continual change.  When Darwin uses 
the word species he is using the term under erasure: species.     
Looking at the language of evolution today we find that Darwin’s 
discourse has itself been reconstructed and deconstructed many times since 
1859.  For instance the so-called ‘modern synthesis’ of Darwinism and 
Mendelism which was developed throughout the 1930s and 40s deconstructs 
Darwin’s genetics, re-reading or mis-reading the original text in such a way as 
to provide an explanation for the persistence of phenotypic changes that Darwin 
failed to make convincing in Origin.  Then there are more recent re-readings: 
population genetics (it is populations not individuals that are selected by nature); 
molecular biology (genes are lengths of DNA, chemicals that can be altered by 
random events); epigenetics (heritable changes in gene expression can be caused 
by mechanisms other than changes in the underlying chemical composition of 
the DNA sequence); horizontal or lateral gene transfer (significantly large pieces 
of DNA representing many genes can enter a genome from an unrelated (i.e., 
only very distantly related) organism; endosymbiosis (whole genomes are 
transferred horizontally between microbes); hybridogenesis (whole genomes of 
multicellular animals are horizontally transferred).  Each of these re- or mis-
readings adds further layers on top of Darwin’s discourse.   
It is this many-layered, sedimentary formation of the language of 
evolution (for example) that constitutes our current picture of the real world.  
We read the top layer as reality but this process of sedimentation will surely 
continue so that the final content of science is continually deferred, temporally 
extended and never fully reified.  Scientific discourse is an ever-changing 
structure that forever deconstructs and reconstitutes the world.  As David Locke 
puts it: 
 
The world is always real…but it is also always an invention because it is 
seen through the medium of thought…The world is ever a story, and 
science is but one of the stories of the world.  This is the great dialectic 
of the word and the world.  The word is in the world, but the world is in 
the word; the word is of the world, and the world is of the word; indeed 
the word is the world, and the world is the word.296 
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This notion must affect our idea of progress in science.  The 
experimental report satisfies, as Gross puts it, ‘a recurrent need to justify the 
enterprise of experimental science in the face of the problematic nature of the 
inductions on which that science relies for the creation and certainty of its 
knowledge.’297  In Lévi-Straussian terms such narratives of science are myths; 
they are linguistic vehicles for resolving a deep contradiction within scientific 
culture, namely that between the certain knowledge that science seeks and the 
sense experience that it must use as a basis or a test of that certainty and that 
cannot, I have argued, be so used.298  The myth of induction instantiated in the 
arrangement of the scientific paper is designed to cope with a contradiction that 
cannot be overcome.  Although each scientific paper exhibits what Gross calls 
‘terminological stability, the sine qua non of certain knowledge,’ and thus 
assures us of an indissoluble link between sense experience and the transsensual 
world, this stability is only local.  The history of science as represented by the 
totality of scientific papers—the entirety of the discourse of science—‘exhibits 
terminological instability, the sine qua non of opinion.’299   
This contradiction is inherent in Kuhn’s distinction between normal and 
revolutionary science.  Just as the myth of induction acts to resolve the 
contradiction between objective certainty and subjective experience so too a 
myth that science progresses ever closer to the truth resolves the contradiction 
between the local coherence within a paradigm and the conceptual gaps between 
paradigms.  Extraordinary research that on occasion precipitates a scientific 
revolution—a paradigm shift—cannot be thought of as progressive in the same 
sense that the work of normal science is.  Of course the winners in a revolution 
must claim their victory is progress but along with victory goes the destruction 
of the old paradigm: Newton’s light travels through the aether; but there is no 
aether. Cuvier’s species are fixed; but there are no species.  There are losses and 
gains in scientific revolutions.  The traditional view is that scientific progress is 
evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know but Kuhn would have us understand it 
as evolution-from-what-we-do-know.300   
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The vanquishing of previous paradigms also means their expulsion from 
the textbooks and so, argues Kuhn, the scientist, trained from an early age by 
such books, has a very distorted view of his own discipline’s past.  ‘More than 
the practitioners of other creative fields, he comes to see it as leading in a 
straight line to the discipline’s present vantage.  In short, he comes to see it as 
progress.  No alternative is available to him while he remains in the field.’301  
This myth of progress then is reflected in the traditional form of the science 
documentary that I would wish to subvert in my attempt to fashion a 
constructivist account.  It remains to explore the extent to which Hopeful 
Monsters does indeed reflect the critique I have tried to mount over the last three 
chapters and thereby subvert the received view. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE STYLE OF HOPEFUL MONSTERS: AN EXPERIMENT 302 
 
Having laid out the case for a constructivist view of science and demonstrated 
the rhetorical nature of scientific discourse, I now wish to revisit my own 
documentary, Hopeful Monsters: an Experiment, in light of these ideas.  On the 
face of it at least, one could describe Hopeful Monsters as ‘odd’ for a science 
documentary, both in style and in narrative structure.  As we shall see, Hopeful 
Monsters draws on a number of documentary modes that, in combination with 
an unusual narrative structure, foreground the nature of the film’s construction.  
In this chapter I will analyse the style of Hopeful Monsters and then turn, in the 
following chapter, to its narrative structure.   
 
Introduction 
To the positivist of the received view, talk of ‘style’ in documentary ought to be 
as troubling as speaking of rhetoric in scientific discourse.  The documentary is 
surely ‘documentary’ precisely because it lacks style, it is a mirror held up to 
reality, plain prose not poetry.  But the fact is, there are different styles of 
documentary and this serves to remind us that the documentary film is a 
discourse like any other.  Style or figuration is, as we have seen, an unavoidable 
characteristic of discourse, mediating, as Hayden White describes, between the 
poles of ‘poetry’ and ‘prose’: 
 
…stylistics must seek to analyze the poetic dimension in every merely 
putatively prose discourse, just as it must seek to uncover the prosaic 
kernel of “message” contained in every manifestly poetic utterance.  This 
conflation of the prosaic and the poetic within a general theory of 
discourse has important implications for our understanding of what is 
involved in those fields of study which…seek to be “objective” and 
“realistic” in their representations of the world but which, by virtue of 
the unacknowledged poetic element in their discourse, hide their own 
“subjectivity” and “culture-boundedness” from themselves.303 
 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the ‘objective’ style of a classic 
science documentary like The Ghost in Your Genes and the style of Hopeful 
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Monsters is that the former is marked, as we have noted, by a disembodied, 
narrating voice that organises all the images while the latter eschews such a 
voice.  The documentary theorist, Bill Nichols terms this style of the classic 
science documentary the ‘expository mode’ while Hopeful Monsters may at 
times be called ‘observational’, ‘interactive’, or ‘reflexive’ but each of these 
styles (whose characteristics we will explore presently) is nonetheless a style of 
documentary and we must acknowledge the significance of that possibility.304   
As the duck-rabbit figure demonstrates (see above, p. 82), representation 
rests on ‘guided perception’.  Even the most seemingly prosaic representation of 
reality has, according to Hayden White, a poetical ‘understructure’ that guides 
our perception.305  The sense we make of a particular documentary is therefore 
determined as much by its style as by the logic of whatever argument the film 
offers as an explanation of reality.  Style and the ‘reality effect’ of the 
documentary film are bound up together and in this way the documentary 
attitude toward knowledge is embodied in its aesthetics. 
In his book For Documentary (1999), Dai Vaughan relates an anecdote 
that illustrates how this plays out in practice.  He describes a discussion he once 
had about editing an ethnographic film.  The film was to include a scene of 
female circumcision but when the ethnographers in the field had wanted to 
record the event they had been barred from entering the hut where the operation 
was taking place.  All they could do was film the people waiting outside.  The 
problem, then, was how to represent the circumcision.  One editor argued they 
should lay the sound of a scream over the image of the outside of the hut so that 
the viewer might at least gain the idea that the surgery going on inside was 
painful.  Another remarked that they had in fact recorded a scream during the 
operation so they could use that but a third editor argued that screaming was 
highly unusual so, even though there had been a scream, it would be misleading 
to include it.  ‘What is significant about these three views,’ writes Vaughan, ‘is 
that they reflect three distinct assumptions about the claim documentary stakes 
upon the world: in the first case, symbolic (a scream stands for pain); in the 
second, referential (this is what our equipment actually recorded); in the third, 
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generalisatory (to include the atypical is misleading).’306  There is no such thing 
as ‘the scene itself’ to dictate the right answer.  In the documentary, an aesthetic 
decision becomes an ideological decision because it guides the perception of the 
viewer who takes the documentary image for ‘reality’.  As Dai Vaughan puts it: 
 
Stated at its simplest: the documentary response is one in which the 
image is perceived as signifying what it appears to record; a 
documentary film is one which seeks, by whatever means, to elicit this 
response; and the documentary movement is the history of the strategies 
which have been adopted to this end.307 
 
In its short history, the documentary has developed a number of strategies for 
creating this reality effect; indeed, as Michael Renov writes, ‘the documentary 
has availed itself of nearly every constructive device known to fiction and has 
employed virtually every register of cinematic syntax in the process.’308  Brian 
Winston gives several examples from the early days of documentary filmmaking 
in which reconstructions of events were used in ways that would surely be 
unacceptable as realism today: the Vitagraph newsreels of the ‘Battle of 
Santiago Bay’ filmed on a tabletop using cut-out models of ships in 1898 and 
the Boxer Rebellion restaged on a Philadelphia roof in 1900. 309  That the 
conventions of realism have changed over time goes to underscore the 
constructivist idea that the documentary persists, as the philosopher Richard 
Wollheim argues, in an incorrigibly aesthetic condition that is permanently at 
cognitive risk through changes of culture, convention and perception.310    
 Just as the meaning or content of a scientific theory has the character of 
an institution in that it relies for its existence on scientists’ moment-by-moment 
continuing belief in it, so too the documentary is an institution in that it performs 
only by virtue of being recognized as ‘documentary’.  The difference between 
the documentary and the fiction film lies, then, simply in the moment-by-
moment continuing belief of the audience in the reality of the events depicted 
and this belief is sustained by those predictable stylistic strategies or ‘modes’ 
that have evolved under the selective pressure of changes in perception and 
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culture.  The documentary can be understood therefore as functioning only 
intermittently, raising an inherently constructivist question: not what is 
documentary, but when is documentary?  For example, in the case of ‘Le 
Jardinier et le petit espiegle’, the short Lumière Brothers film of the gardener 
and the boy, we saw that what was once meant as a vaudeville sketch—a 
‘fiction’—may today appear as ‘documentary’ while the reverse is the case with 
a documentary newsreel of the same period, such as ‘The Battle of Santiago 
Bay’.   
In light of this idea, Nichols understands the documentary modes as 
species of the same genus that may be arranged into a kind of a phylogenetic 
tree according to their order of evolution.  One of the earlier modes was the 
‘expository’ which sought to address issues in the historical world directly but 
whose didactic, authoritarian style eventually became less acceptable to 
audiences, giving rise to a new, more ‘open’ mode: the ‘observational’.  The 
perceived short-comings of the observational mode (its lack of historical 
context, for example) gave way to the ‘interactive’ mode which in turn fell short 
in being too intrusive and relying too heavily on witnesses and was superseded 
by the most recent mode, the ‘reflexive’.311  The first three modes have 
definable characteristics that will be discussed later but the last, the ‘reflexive’, 
rather like irony, which Hayden White characterises as ‘metatropical’, is 
metamodal in that it does not offer a worldview of its own but instead acts to 
place quotation marks around the other modes, drawing our attention to how 
they work and inviting us to see how they construct their implicit claims.  
However, as Bill Nichols concedes, all modes were, in principle, available from 
the start and one must beware, as Carl Plantinga urges, the implicit teleology of 
such a ‘phylogeny’ that holds the expository mode to be ‘the most naïve or 
politically retrograde’ and the reflexive the most sophisticated and politically 
advanced.312   
The driver of this evolution of documentary styles is trust.  In viewing a 
documentary in the appropriate way, i.e., as a representation of reality, the 
viewer is entering a trusting relationship with the filmmaker and changes in 
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style have been driven by the imperative of maintaining that trust. This raises 
the question of how we-as-viewers are able to enter that relationship, how, in 
other words, we come to understand the intentions of the filmmaker. 
 
Authorship and Tradition 
In many critical circles, talking about intentions, and the success of an author or 
artist in meeting those intentions, is not only out-dated but out of bounds.  
William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley famously coined the phrase ‘the 
intentional fallacy’ in the 1940s, arguing that, ‘the design or intention of the 
author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of 
a work.’313  But the philosopher, Noël Carroll disagrees.  The artwork, he 
argues, is an artefact that is intended to do something and should be evaluated as 
such.314  The Wimsatt and Beardsley model of narration—‘a communication 
with no communicator—indeed, a creation with no creator,’ as Seymour 
Chatman puts it, cannot fully explain how we engage with works of art and 
evaluate them because there are aspects of an artwork, for example its 
innovativeness or its historical influence that we value highly but which are not 
directly part of our immediate experience.315   Even works that rely on aleatoric 
effects like Jackson Pollack’s drips or Francis Bacon’s flung smears or John 
Cage’s 4’ 33” of silence are nonetheless clearly intended to make use of chance 
effects and can be evaluated in that light. 316   Most importantly, science 
documentaries (like scientific theories) are created within or against traditions 
(e.g., Nichols’s ‘modes’) that provide exemplars.  If we assume that filmmakers 
intend to communicate with their audience then it follows that any similarity to 
an exemplar or mode in their work is intended to cue the receiver to associate 
that work with others in its tradition.  Documentaries we watch resemble others 
we have already viewed and we evaluate each (and come to trust what we see) 
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according to how it matches the conventions of its mode or the rest of a 
filmmaker’s oeuvre.   
For Chatman then, the viewer of a film is not constructing the narrative 
from unauthored stimuli (as David Bordwell argues317) but necessarily 
reconstructing it according to cues and constraints that are understood to 
originate from an organising authority.  By ascribing the inventional tasks to this 
trustworthy organising authority, we are able to both evaluate the skill of the 
filmmaker (which will affect our understanding of what we are viewing) and to 
interpret inflections in the stylistic conventions we have learned to expect.318   
Arguing that intentions may, in this way, be available to the viewer does 
not necessarily reduce all criticism to ‘biography’, as Wimsatt and Beardsley 
suggest.319  We grasp the intended meaning of the observational documentary 
quite differently to the meaning intended by an expository documentary because 
in each case we recognise a particular discursive style that embodies a distinct 
attitude to knowledge.  For example, when the filmmaker, Jill Godmilow was 
asked what enabled her to produce the innovations of her film Far from Poland 
(1984) she replied: ‘When I started that film, I had no intention of ‘expanding 
vocabulary’ or any such thing.  I had to learn to make that film by making it and 
trying to solve the paradoxical documentary issues it presented.’320  The 
paradoxical issues arose because she wished to make a documentary about 
Poland but was barred from entering the country.  As she describes, the process 
of making the film clarified her attitude to the documentary and this 
epistemological position is embodied in her finished film.  This is no different 
to, say, Cezanne’s experience of grappling with certain problems of representing 
space that are embodied in his paintings of the Montagne Sainte-Victoire.  Even 
if Godmilow and Cezanne are unable to say why they finally settled on the 
finished forms of their works there is no reason to think they were not acting 
intentionally in a way that a critic might go on to explain solely through an 
examination of their works since these artists have obviously ratified them.   
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Like Saussure’s parole, each documentary film is an instance of the 
langue of documentary.  Each film repeats or inflects a tradition and that is how 
it communicates.  It is this that creates the struggles of the ‘avant-garde’ whose 
works are at the leading edge of formal innovation and furthest from those 
traditional norms with which we are more familiar.  As Samuel Beckett writes in 
Worstward Ho:  ‘Ever tried.  Ever failed.  No matter.  Try again.  Fail again.  
Fail better.’321  But to speak of failure at all and especially of failing ‘better’ 
means to take a measure of the distance between intention and achievement.  
Even if the artist of the avant-garde says, ‘I don’t know why it works but it does’ 
this indicates that there is a goal he or she evaluates has been reached and that 
goal may be discerned and attributed to the artist by an examination of the 
artwork itself.   
Tradition, then, embodied in the documentary modes, gives the viewer 
and critic an important fix on the filmmaker’s attitude to knowledge.  The 
question for us is, what attitude does the maker of Hopeful Monsters intend to 
articulate and how well does he do so?   
 
The Expository mode 
As we found in our analysis of The Ghost in Your Genes, the classic science 
documentary features a voice-over as well as interviews and a variety of other 
images and sounds—features noted by Gardner and Young as keys to the 
expository mode: 
 
The course of the programme alternates between voice-over and ‘talking 
head’. A talking head is television’s way of saying ‘this is brought 
directly to you without distortion or mediation’. In the case of science 
programmes this form of presentation is usually reinforced by racks of 
test tubes or an impressive piece of apparatus directly behind the talking 
head, a white lab coat or other apparel, and the knowledge that we are 
being addressed by ‘the top man (sic) in the field’ or the ‘rising star’. 
The talking head is either directly addressing the camera or speaking 
across camera to an unseen interviewer whose questions have been 
edited out. This is in striking contrast with interviews on programmes 
where it is accepted that the issue is controversial and open, to some 
minimal degree at least, to public scrutiny, doubt, debate, etc.322 
 
                                                 
321
 Beckett, S. (1983)  
322
 Gardner, C. and R. M. Young (1981) p. 177 
 153 
As we have seen, the expository documentary, with its anonymous narration, 
reflects the passive, objective voice of scientific discourse and is strongly 
aligned with the received view of science.  As Edward Branigan writes, the 
voice-over narration of the classic documentary ‘asserts (usually implicitly) a 
power to know through access to a privileged method or technology’.323  It is a 
voice, as Kevin Beattie puts it, ‘removed from the fallibility of the human 
sphere.’324   
In ‘The Consequences of Genre’ (1996), the philosopher, Frederick Ruf 
terms this expository voice ‘magisterial’ in that its relationship to the persons, 
events, objects narrated is external: ‘The narrator sees actions, events and 
objects from without … The narrator is master of the events, persons, objects 
and their meaning.’325  Carl Plantinga calls the mode ‘formal’ and argues that it 
has two operations: it poses clear questions and it answers them, ‘reserving for 
itself a high degree of epistemic authority.’326  The expository mode is 
something like the voice of the Enlightenment, demonstrating to the viewer, as 
Isaiah Berlin puts it, ‘that all genuine questions can be answered, that if a 
question cannot be answered it is not a question,’ and the effect, as Gardner and 
Young describe, is ‘hegemonic’327  : 
 
…in the precise sense that it induces deference and organises consent by 
eliciting willingness to be the passive recipient of versions of history 
organised and presented for our edification. Patient, restrained, 
conveying in some cases real enthusiasm, but never shrill.328   
 
The film historian, David Pearson concurs: 
 
Whereas in narrative cinema the diegesis is furthered primarily through 
the image track as an autonomous, spatio-temporal universe, in [the 
expository] documentary the diegesis exists as a conceptual universe, 
dependent not so much upon the illusions projected by the film’s images, 
but rather upon the rhetoric of the commentary and the illusion that 
creates.  Thus the commentary becomes crucial in ideologically fixing 
the spectator-subject, in locating the individual’s relationship to the 
conditions of existence haphazardly represented in the images.  
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Contradictions are resolved for the spectator, who is thus encouraged to 
settle into a passive position of acceptance.329  
 
For the magisterial voice of the expository mode to appear to have all the 
answers means, as Pearson puts it, that ‘the way the message is communicated 
can become more important in documentary film than the message itself.’330  
The medium is the message and the viewer of the expository form is 
interpellated (no doubt, willingly) into the rational, progressive and certain 
world that science apparently offers. Many science documentaries therefore 
stress their expository mode of address above all else.  All subjects are presented 
under the same rubric, just as the Methods-Results-Discussion format of the 
scientific paper treats all scientific work the same way.  The epistemology of the 
science documentary is thus self-reinforcing and all science documentaries have 
come to look and sound more and more alike.  Any challenge to this form 
threatens to undermine the ideology of the received view that the mode 
embodies.   
In being external to and ‘above’ the diegesis, the voice-over of the 
expository documentary organizes all the images of the film, and because the 
narrator’s voice must be heard and the meaning of the narration takes priority,  
the film’s images are often stripped of their own synchronous sound and 
spatiotemporal continuity.  Hopeful Monsters, by contrast, emphasizes the 
continuity of its images, preserves their synchronized sound and eschews the use 
of voice-over.  Its so-called ‘observational’ mode productively exploits, as 
Kevin Beattie puts it, ‘the knowledge and pleasure (knowledge as pleasure) 
located in showing.’  It thus offers the viewer an entirely different experience to 
the expository mode: the open-ended process of interpretation and epistemic 
diffidence that arises from a showing rather than a telling and this represents a 
challenge to the hegemonic voice of the expository mode and to the received 
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The Observational Mode 
In her analysis of narration, Mieke Bal distinguishes between the narrator and 
the focalisor.  The narrator ‘tells’ the story but the focalisor sees it, ‘colouring’, 
as Bal puts it, the fabula through his or her perception.332  In Bal’s terms, then, 
the ‘expository’ mode of The Ghost in Your Genes is characterised by an 
absence of ‘internal focalisation’ in that the gaze of the camera is not aligned 
with any of the characters in the diegesis but instead with the omniscient 
narrator who is external to the screen-world. In the observational mode of 
Hopeful Monsters, speech is overheard and the action is focalised internally by 
human agents and divided into ‘scenes’ that are spatiotemporally and therefore 
‘dramatically’ coherent.  Thus, where the expository mode is ‘presentational’, 
addressing the viewer directly, the observational mode is ‘representational’, 
addressing the viewer only indirectly.   
In the absence of presentation (i.e., of commentary) the viewer 
overhears, as in the theatre.  The voice of the observational mode is therefore 
multiple, like the voices of a play in which, as Frederick Ruf puts it, ‘the 
innermost self, in fact, is hidden from view, compared with the penetrations of 
[magisterial] narrative.’333  Plantinga describes this ‘dramatic’ voice as ‘open’: 
‘The open voice observes and explores rather than explains,’ ‘it is more hesitant 
in its epistemological position, and at times opposes the dissemination of 
knowledge within a clear-cut conventional framework.’334   
The scene in which Williamson is interviewed by the journalist 
(00:16:22) illustrates the distinction between the expository and observational 
modes.  It begins with a sequence of four shots: (1) A girl looks off screen at (2) 
the page of a book spread on Williamson’s knee; (3) the journalist leans over to 
study it while (4) Williamson, looking down, explains its significance: 
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In the expository mode, this scene might well have been replaced with a straight 
forwardly didactic (and externally narrated) explanation, (perhaps like the 
animated genetics lesson in The Ghost in Your Genes), but in Hopeful Monsters 
something quite different takes place.  For a start, although the material is 
apparently ‘introductory’, the scene begins a full sixteen minutes into the film 
and then, when we are given this introduction to Williamson’s hypothesis, we 
‘overhear’ it in the form of an ‘internally focalised’ conversation.  As Plantinga 
writes, the open voice is signalled by an avoidance of ‘the overt narrational 
marks and knowledge claims’ of the formal voice.  Both the focalisation and the 
narrative timing of the scene indicate that it is not intended to be read as strictly 
didactic.   
 
WILLIAMSON: 
That looks like a caterpillar.  I would 
take it for a caterpillar, but it is the 
larva of a wood wasp, which is 
nothing like a butterfly or a moth.   
In fact, the wood wasp is related to the 
stinging wasp and bees and wasps, 







So we get these forms turning up in 
different groups.  Under conventional 
theory, this is quite inexplicable, if the 
larva and the adult evolved together.   
 
I puzzled over this for years and years 
and years and I used to lecture to 
students and point out there’s several 
other anomalies, like this, of species 
apparently having the wrong larvae 





First, the scientific ideas in the scene are not presented with the authority 
of the magisterial voice; instead, any claim to epistemic authority is deliberately 
weakened by the use of a dramatic presentation.  Second, although we do get to 
know them, the scene is not, anyway, a didactic presentation of Williamson’s 
scientific ideas but a drama in which he explains them and expresses his 
feelings about them: 
 
First, we witness Williamson’s confidence:  
 
“I’m not blaming Darwin; it was just the knowledge of his day.  He was 
explaining the evolution of adults.  I am trying to explain the evolution 
of larvae.” 
 
Followed swiftly by his sense of dejection: 
 
“Well, the majority of biologists ignore my views, but there is a minority 
that support them, and some very enthusiastically, and I’m very grateful 
to them…” 
 
Then, his determination to carry on:   
 
“I am satisfied in my own mind, but other people aren’t, so what we 
want is more genuine hybrids. And Robert and I are trying to produce 
some right now.” 
 
And finally an expression of humility when the reporter thanks him, saying 
“Well, I hope one day to be able to say I’ve met someone whose theories were 
as important as Darwin’s,” and Williamson replies, “Well, I don’t expect you 
will…mine is a PS to Darwin.”335 
 What then is the purpose of this formal strategy?  What does it indicate 
about the filmmaker’s attitude to knowledge?  The scene may be understood as a 
synecdoche of scientific communication in the constructivist view: if 
Williamson can convince the reporter, and if the reporter does a good job in 
convincing his readers, and if those readers are interested in the subject and care 
to look into it further (if perhaps one or two readers are interested scientists), 
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then there may be the beginnings of a process of conversion to an unorthodox 
view about evolution.336     
But is this scene an adequate representation of constructivism and is the 
observational mode really up to the task?  The observational mode purports to 
be an ‘open’ record that leaves the viewer free to make up their own mind.  But, 
of course, this is a rhetorical effect achieved by using conventions familiar from 
the fiction film, for example, the convention of the point-of-view shot by which 
the image is aligned with the focalisation of one or other character in the 
diegesis.  This is a common trope in the history of the observational mode.  
Recall, for instance, the sequence in Frederick Wiseman’s High School (1968) 
when the school monitor apparently spies on girls in gym class through a 
window in the gymnasium door; or the sequence of a monk feeding his cats in 
Philip Gröning’s observational documentary, Into Great Silence (2005) about 




Or this, from Hopeful Monsters (00:44:24): 
 
 
   
 
The point-of-view is a central trope of psychological realism (i.e., of the 
fiction film) and, like the fiction film, in the observational documentary while 
focalisation may be internal and character-bound, narration remains external.  
The camera is ‘on the scene’ in the observational mode but, crucially, never in 
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the scene and so the narrator remains an omniscient ‘fly on the wall’.  It is 
important to recognise how indebted this makes the observational mode not just 
to conventions of the fiction film but to the positivism of the received view of 
science.  In both the expository and observational modes the narrator is 
rhetorically absent from the diegesis.  The scene with the journalist is 
represented as ‘objective’, a record of an overheard conversation externally 
narrated by the same omniscient story-teller whose magisterial voice we hear in 
the expository mode.  In both these modes, the filmmaker, to use the 
historiographer Herbert Butterfield’s phrase, ‘whittles himself down to a mere 
transparency’, apparently simply transcribing information ‘with colourless, 
passionless impartiality.’337  And so, despite the differences between the formal 
and open voices, both the expository and the observational modes, in the final 
analysis, align with a traditional, received view of knowledge in which, as Emile 
Durkheim puts it, truth is understood: 
 
as a simple thing, a thing quasi-divine, that draws its whole value from 
itself. Since it is seen as sufficient unto itself, it is necessarily placed 
above human life. It cannot conform to the demands of circumstances 
and differing temperaments. It is valid by itself and is good with an 
absolute goodness. It does not exist for our sake, but for its own. Its role 
is to let itself be contemplated. It is so to speak deified; it becomes the 
object of a real cult. This is still Plato’s conception. It extends to the 
faculty by means of which we attain truth, that is, reason. Reason serves 




The styles of both the observational and the expository modes represent not only 
the same epistemology but also represent similar ideas about creativity.  The art 
theorist, Adrian Stokes makes a useful distinction in this regard between two 
modes of artistry that he calls carving and modelling.  The distinction is not 
unlike the one Dudley Andrews makes between intersecting and borrowing, 
designating two very different ways of thinking about what the artist does.339  
Richard Wollheim summarizes the idea in his introduction to Stokes’s book on 
the art of Michelangelo: 
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A work in the carving mode exhibits a distinctive ‘out-therenesss’, or 
independence from the spectator, while the forms of which it is 
composed blend into an unassertive, an uncompetitive, harmony. By 
contrast, a work in the modelling mode tends to envelop, or merge with, 
the spectator, while the forms that make it up are set over against one 
another, and can be reconciled only in an arbitrary, or what Stokes calls a 
‘masterful’, way. 340 
 
Psychologically speaking, in carving the artist assumes that the block of stone 
contains within itself the form invented for it by nature and the artist simply 
liberates that form (like ‘intersecting’).  In modelling, on the other hand, the 
artist gives the stone his own truth and the truth of the stone as a different truth 
is not acknowledged (as in ‘borrowing’).  Stokes’s distinction raises the question 
of how our beliefs about creativity might affect our experience of the 
documentary film.  
If we believe the documentary film is carved, that in some sense it is 
‘found’ and separated from its dross by the objective reporter, then we will have 
one experience; if, on the other hand, we believe it is modelled such that its 
coherence is due to a masterful technique—in short, that it is an assertion—we 
will have a different experience. In carving, truth and beauty are eternal objects 
that we locate and reveal while in modelling they are artefacts whose 
fundamental design we create and continually update.   
The observational mode encourages us to believe in carving because it 
appeals to our experience of separateness: on screen is a record of what is out 
there in the world and the filmmaker simply reveals it to us.  In its carved 
completeness this world also appears to be one we could enter ourselves.  In the 
opening scene of Hopeful Monsters, for instance, we have the impression we are 
in the room with Williamson as he shuffles across to put on a video and that we 
might almost reach out and help him back into his chair.  But a moment later, as 
he watches television, he smiles towards ‘us’ and we, of course, cannot 
acknowledge this look (00:02:00)   
 
                                                 
340




We come up against a serious ethical problem at the heart of the observational 
style: to allow the viewer to feel that a direct encounter is possible, the 
filmmaker who was actually there and able to make such a connection must 
withhold that possibility, withhold, that is, his humanity from his subject.  The 
observational mode stakes its authority on the reality of the act of filming (of 
carving) but it pictures the world as if this has no tangible effect.  The making of 
an observational documentary therefore constitutes an epistemological and 
ethical problem that its appearance of candour does not act to resolve.  
One solution to this problem is for the observational documentary to 
‘come clean’ about this ‘carved’ illusion it creates.  This was the aim, for 
example, of Jean Rouch and Edgar Morin in making Chronicle of a Summer 
(1960).  In that documentary they chose to discuss, on camera, the problem that 
being filmed posed for their social actors.  In doing so they created a film text 
that acknowledged the extent to which the film was the result of collaboration 
between filmmakers and social actors.  Chronicle of a Summer does not pretend 
to be a found object but instead acknowledges, within the text itself, its 
constructed nature.  It is a modelled film that arises and is given coherence by 
the collaboration between those behind and those in front of the lens.  Nichols 
calls this the ‘participatory’ or the ‘interactive’ mode. 
 
The Interactive mode—pseudo-modelling 
The contrast between the observational and the interactive modes becomes very 
evident in the scene in which Don is photographed for the article that the 





The otherwise observational mode of the scene is disrupted when both the 
photographer and Williamson acknowledge their participation with the camera.  




This relationship is reinforced when the operator behind the camera steps into 
the frame to join the other two, becoming, as Nichols terms it, a ‘social actor’ 




          
The photographer photographing is a trope from the early days of the 
observational mode.  In Robert Drew’s Primary (1960) for instance, we view 
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would-be presidential candidate John F. Kennedy being seated and posed for a 
publicity still.  He looks stiff and uncomfortable.  By contrast, the film suggests, 
he is unselfconscious in front of the documentary camera that records the scene.  
He is unselfconscious because, as we have noted, in the observational mode the 
narrator is external, in fact, rhetorically speaking, absent from the space; the 
events we see are apparently self-organising (carved) and speak for themselves.  
The same thing happens near the start of Donald Pennebaker’s, Don’t Look Back 
(1966) when a press photographer invites Joan Baez to pose for him.  She mugs 
at his camera and then says, “I can’t pose”.  The photographer scene from 
Hopeful Monsters makes reference to these well-known moments but with the 
opposite effect.  Instead of reassuring the viewer of the transparency of the act 
of filming, the switch of mode from observational to interactive exposes the 
conceit of the invisibility and impartiality of the fly-on-the-wall.   
 By recording the interaction between the filmmaker and his subjects, the 
interactive mode of Hopeful Monsters goes some way towards articulating a 
constructivist epistemology. The mode lays stress on the dynamics of testimony 
and the social context within which witnesses speak and the filmmaker films. 
The rhetoric of the interactive mode represents the film as arising out of a 
process of exchange between filmmaker and social actor with the film posited as 
a record of its own process of construction.  When the filmmaker questions the 
witnesses on screen, the viewer may judge the nature of those questions (their 
tone and fairness) and therefore also form an opinion about the validity or 
doubtfulness of the answer.  In addition, this open sharing of the filmmaking 
process means that the authority of the text shifts from the filmmaker towards 
the social actors who may take the scene in an unexpected direction. 
 A clear example of this comes from the ‘limerick’ scene in Hopeful 
Monsters when Don is effectively ambushed by Robert and made to read the 
mocking limerick from his American critic, Richard Strathmann.  When 
Williamson finishes reading it and has defended his ideas against Strathmann’s 
criticism, Robert walks away to resume his work.  As he passes Williamson, the 
man smiles gently before getting slowly to his feet and, excusing himself 
politely, leaves the lab, terminating the scene and preventing Robert from 
filming any further.  Is he hurt, does he feel betrayed?  The filmmaker has lost 





In the interactive mode, then, authority is explicitly ceded, on screen, to 
the social actors.  In his essay, ‘Beyond Observational Cinema’ (1975), the 
ethnographer, David MacDougal praises this approach because:     
 
By revealing his role, the filmmaker enhances the value of his material 
as evidence. By entering actively into the world of his subjects, he can 
provoke a greater flow of information about them. By giving them 
access to the film, he makes possible the corrections, additions, and 
illuminations that only their response to the material can elicit. 341   
 
But, in describing the mode as providing ‘evidence’, MacDougal suggests that 
the process of scene-construction we witness takes place entirely within a 
higher-level frame which remains invisible.  In other words, the interactive 
mode is still a mode of carving, the scene is constructed by the interaction of 
filmmaker and his subjects but that process is seemingly recorded ‘objectively’ 
(thus providing ‘evidence’). The mode represents its scenes as having a ‘natural’ 
form independent of the filmmaker’s determinations.  In this sense, then, the 
idea that the interactive mode is fundamentally distinct from the observational is 
undermined.  As Stella Bruzzi writes in New Documentary (2000), ‘purity in 
this context is unobtainable, there are always too many other issues spoiling the 
communion between subject and viewer across a transparent screen.’342   
The rhetoric of the interactive mode does acknowledge the extent to 
which the meaning we make of the documentary results from the intervention 
that filmmaking necessarily requires but absent from that rhetoric is any hint 
that the screen, as Bruzzi rightly implies, is far from transparent.  The interactive 
mode does not acknowledge an important aspect of the documentary experience, 
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namely that the viewer is seated before an opaque screen, not a transparent 
window, and that the shadows that play on that screen are the achievement of 
the filmmaker who has ordered the film’s rushes at the editing bench according 
to what Herbert Butterfield calls his or her ‘imaginative sympathy’:   
 
The historian is not merely the observer ... the historian is something 
more than the mere passive external spectator.  Something more is 
necessary if only to enable him to seize the significant detail and discern 
the sympathies between events and find the facts that hang together.  By 
imaginative sympathy he makes the past intelligible to the present.343 
   
In the end, the interactive mode does not offer a comprehensive alternative to 
the positivism of the observational mode and it cannot be a model for 
representing science from a fully constructivist point of view.  But is Hopeful 
Monsters really an example of the interactive mode? 
 
The Reflexive mode—modelling proper 
From the start of the film, and increasingly as it goes on, the viewer’s attention 
is drawn to various combinations of narration and focalisation that cannot be 
fully understood as carving in either the observational or interactive modes.  
Consider the following moments: 
 
   
(1) Character-bound narrator (‘Robert’); character-bound focalisor (Don) 
(01:10:00) 
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(2) External narrator (Robert); character-bound focalisor (Don)  
(01:01:40) 
  
(3) External narrator (Robert); character-bound focalisor (‘Robert’) 
(00:44:24) 
  
 (4) External narrator (Robert); external focalisor (ROBERT) (00:50:24) 
 
The implicitly character-bound focalisor of the observational mode becomes 
explicit in the interactive mode.  In Hopeful Monsters it is ‘Robert’, the 
filmmaker/lab assistant whom we see and hear on screen.  The interactive mode 
identifies ‘Robert’, the character-bound focalisor on screen with Robert, the 
character-bound narrator.  His is both the literal and the figurative points-of 
view of the film.  But this identification breaks down in the moments above and 
particularly when Robert’s focalisation is narrated externally as in sequences 2, 
3 and 4.  A ‘fictive’ syntax asserts itself at such moments (although it has been 
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implicit almost from the beginning).  At such moments, the film posits an 
impossible identity between Robert, the character-bound narrator and ROBERT, 
the external narrator or ‘Robert’ the character-bound focalisor and ‘ROBERT’ 
the external focalisor.  This confusion of narrators and focalisors is not just 
complex, it is incoherent unless we switch our understanding of the nature of 
documentary filmmaking, unless, that is, we acknowledge, as John Corner puts 
it, the ‘art of record’ that is documentary production.  These ‘impossible’ 
combinations (when conceived as ‘record’) make it impossible for the viewer to 
forget that they are viewing not something carved from the world ‘out there’ but 
something modelled—a text.  In this way the film’s form progressively 
acknowledges the higher level framing that the interactive obfuscates.  In short, 
the film displays stylistic features of what Bill Nichols terms the reflexive 
mode.344 
 
Space and Time 
Mieke Bal’s distinction between ‘place’ and ‘space’ is helpful in grasping how 
the reflexive mode places its ‘quotation marks’ around the observational and 
interactive styles.345  ‘Place’ is where the story happens—in a lab on the Isle of 
Man, or a flat in London—while ‘space’ is an achievement of the modelling in 
rendering that place three dimensional according to certain filmic conventions.    
In the expository mode, ‘place’ may be clearly communicated but a 
perception of ‘space’ or spatiotemporal continuity is minimal or lacking 
altogether: ‘images are wrenched and torn from all manner of locations as 
example, model, and evidence,’ writes Bill Nichols.346  By contrast, in the 
observational and interactive modes, the representation of space and time as 
continuous is definitive.  In the observational mode in particular, logicality 
arises from the apparent spatiotemporal continuity of shots because 
spatiotemporal continuity is the trope of metonymy—it demonstrates causality.  
As in the fiction film, the rhetoric of the observational mode persuades the 
viewer that, within a scene, screen time equals story-time.  However, whereas in 
the fiction film the ‘cuts’ between shots do not cut out time, they merely 
                                                 
344
 See Nichols, B. (1991) p. 69ff 
345
 Bal, M. (1997) p. 133  
346
 Nichols, B. (1993) p. 183 
 168 
reposition the view-point, in the observational documentary, which is posited as 
the continuous record of a fly’s point of view, any cut whatsoever implies a gap, 
a discontinuity in space and time.   
And yet, such cuts are commonplace.  Without them, of course, time 
could not be compressed and controlled and all observational documentaries 
would be as long, uneventful and undramatic as CCTV images.  Most scenes in 
the observational mode necessarily comprise a congeries of discrete elements 
but these elements are joined in sequence to give the impression that they are 
spatially and temporally contiguous. The purpose of this, as Dai Vaughan puts 
it, ‘is to enable the character of film as record to survive, so far as is possible, its 
metamorphosis into language.’347  But this aesthetic, as Calvin Pryluck says, has 
ethical consequences which the reflexive mode brings to our attention.348 
Consider, for example, the following moment from an early scene in 
Hopeful Monsters: Don reaches for a syringe, explaining as he does so that 
finding a place to insert the needle is “very much trial and error…find a soft 
bit…”  This moment is represented by two different shots, call them A and B; A 
is the action of Don’s hand and B of his face.  In the sequence, A is divided by B 
into two parts (00:04:30):  
 
 
                        A                                              B                                         A 
 
This type of parallel construction is common throughout the film but how are we 
to understand what it signifies about the pro-filmic, what indeed does it record?  
There is a range of possibilities: 
 
1. Two cameras were used, one to capture shot A and the other for B and 
the continuity of action in the sequence is genuinely synchronous. 
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2. Both shots A and B are synchronous, created with one camera that tilted 
up to the face and down again to the hand.  The tilting movement was 
removed in the edited scene and cuts in the sound smoothed over. 
 
3. Shot A records what happened at the time but shot B is a ‘cutaway’ taken 
from the same context at an earlier or later time.  Or, vice versa, shot B is 
continuous with the rest of scene two and A is a cutaway. 
 
4. The cutaway (whether A or B) comes from a dissimilar context, perhaps 
another day, and/or another space. 
 
5. The cutaway (whether A or B) was re-enacted after the event by Don. 
 
6. The cutaway (A) was performed by an actor with a hand that looked 
similar to Don’s. 
 
This discontinuous construction masquerading as continuity is typical of the 
aesthetics of the observational mode (As Stella Bruzzi put it: ‘what matters 
above all else is that a sequence of shots appears to be logical, not necessarily 
that it is.’349)  But it raises a question: is this a record of a moment or a more or 
less generalised construct?  The answer changes as we descend the list of 
possibilities from 1 to 6.  Possibility 1 represents a record of ‘Williamson 
injecting a starfish’; possibility 4 on the other hand is not what we might wish to 
call a record; it can be paraphrased as ‘this is the type of activity Williamson 
does’.  In possibility 6, where ‘Williamson’ is partially performed by an actor, 
the sequence means ‘this is the type of activity this type of man (i.e., a scientist) 
does’.  As Dai Vaughan points out, if we select interpretations from the top of 
the list we are in danger of being cheated, if from the lower part we lose the 
particularity of the scene.  As we descend the list of optional readings the scene 
shifts from representing the record of a particular, contingent event to 
representing a repeatable, bowdlerised event-of-a-certain-kind.  As Vaughan 
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concludes: ‘…the aspect of film as record, with its implication of uniqueness 
and contingency, dwindles into insignificance and the particular becomes only 
an exemplar of the abstraction it articulates.’350   
 The list is analogous to what I have described as nominalisation or what 
Jonathan Potter, in his book, Representing Reality (1996) calls ‘a hierarchy of 
modalization’:  
 
The process of fact construction is one of attempting to reify descriptions 
as solid and literal.  The opposite process of deconstruction is one of 
attempting to ironize description as partial, interested, or defective in 
some other way.351   
 
 ‘Statements’ in the documentary, like statements in science form a similar 
hierarchy that undercuts their putative positivism. In Vaughan’s terms, the pro-




X is a fact 
I know that X 
I claim that X 
I believe that X 
I hypothesise that X 
I think that X 
I guess that X 
X is possible 
     ‘X’ 352 
 
While the expository, observational and interactive modes (like the discourse of 
science itself) obfuscate the moral dilemma this hierarchy poses, the reflexive 
mode brings it into the open, ironizing description.  
 Throughout Hopeful Monsters, then, the deliberate incoherency of 
focalisors and narrators ironizes description, creating a growing apprehension of 
the film’s constructedness; a growing apprehension of the problem (of trust) that 
documentary filmmaking poses not just for those ‘in’ the film but for those 
‘outside’ of it—the viewers.  This becomes fully evident in the scene in the 
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London flat when ‘Robert’, seated at a table at the end of a corridor, talks on the 
phone to ‘Lynn’ (00:56:26): 
 
 
Lynn: …and he said, ‘I’m looking out the window 
and I’m looking at…’ what is it, the Irish Sea, is 
that what you look at? 
 
 
Robert (looks out of window): You do, yeah. 
 
Until now, Robert has been represented both on the screen and behind the lens 
but if this phone call sequence is to be understood as a record of a continuous, 
profilmic event, then the multi-shot coverage of the scene serves to ironize and 
draw attention to that conceit.  If the scene is to be read as ‘documentary’ then it 
forces the viewer to reconsider what may be meant by that term.  Reflexivity is 
signalled by the scene’s impossible continuity that includes the sudden 
appearance of the Irish Sea outside the window of a city apartment.  The 
constructedness of the scene is made still more explicit by the convention, 
familiar from fiction films, of hearing what ‘Robert’ apparently hears—Lynn’s 
voice on the other end of the line—and by the abrupt termination of the phone 
call once its ‘information’ has been served up.   
The reflexive style of the scene breaks with the shibboleths of the 
observational documentary, demonstrating the conventionality of documentary 
realism.   By thus drawing attention to the discursive nature of the documentary, 
the illusion of unmediated access to an independently existing world is retarded.  
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Thus reflexivity lifts the documentary experience, as Dudley Andrews puts it, 
‘from the obsessions of the imaginary to the realm of symbolic exchange’.353  
The fact of reconstruction dashes our illusions, but with a purpose: to ‘confound 
any simple sense of truth, any reassurance that things are, indeed, just as they 
seem…to make us see our relation to the world anew through the experience of 
form…’354  Such discourse, argues Terry Eagleton, ‘estranges or alienates…but 
in doing so, paradoxically, brings us into a fuller, more intimate possession of 
experience’: 
 
If a story breaks off and begins again, switches constantly from one 
narrative level to another and delays its climax to keep us in suspense, 
we become freshly conscious of how it is constructed at the same time as 
our engagement with it may be intensified.355 
 
By deviating from the familiar norms of documentary representation, the 
reflexive mode reveals the techniques of the documentary as ideological.  The 
mode awakens the viewer to an apprehension of the limitations of the 
documentary in representing the full range of determinations that make up the 
history that the documentary purports to simply ‘record’.  In psychoanalytic 
terms, the reflexive mode exposes the realist effect as predicated on the viewer’s 
disavowal of their own experience.  Like all modes of documentary, the 
reflexive invites the viewer to look and to believe their eyes but unlike the other 
modes it seeks, at the same time, to persuade them that seeing must not be 
believing.   
By highlighting the conventionality of its representation of space and 
time, the film’s reflexive style also undermines the illusion of access to the 
interiority of characters, revealing how interiority itself is a function of the 
formal strategies of the film, not their cause.  Because of the reflexivity of the 
text, the viewer is decentred, prevented from easy identification with the 
subjectivities apparently offered in the film and in this way the authorial forces 
exterior to the characters may be felt and acknowledged.  As ‘Robert’ watches 
the interviews he has done in the past and takes notes for a film he will make in 
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the future (the film, Hopeful Monsters), we apparently have access to what he is 




At the same time, we recognise that this effect is a consequence of the 
subjectivizing strategies of the film that are borrowed from the conventions of 
fiction.  In short, the psychological unity of the character called ‘Robert’ is a 
result, not a cause, of the film’s rhetoric.  ‘The body,’ writes Jean-Louis 
Comolli, is ‘an empty mask…the character will only appear later and bit by bit 
as effects of this mask, effects in the plural, changing, unstable, never quite 
achieved, thwarted, incomplete.’356   The text is not a record of Robert making a 
film but a story about ‘Robert’ who is an unstable effect of the text.  
The reflexive documentary makes this mythologizing process explicit, 
drawing attention to how the film constructs its own authority rather than being 
an agent of a pre-existing one.  As we saw in our brief analysis of Touching the 
Void in the last chapter, it is the unavoidable fate of the historical person who 
consents to being filmed that they become a signifier in another’s discourse and 
so, just as Robert and Williamson are mythic figures constructed by the text of 
Hopeful Monsters, so too are all the other ‘characters’ in the film, including the 
ill-fated hybrid larva.  By making us aware of the film as a model, a construct, 
so too does the reflexive mode invite the viewer to recognise that scientific 
knowledge is also made not found.   The film’s reflexive style implicitly argues 
that truth is not an eternal object that we locate and reveal by method, carving it 
free of its dross but an artefact whose fundamental design we model and 
continually update within what Foucault calls regimes of truth:   
 
Each society has its regime of truth, “its general politics” of truth: that is, 
the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
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mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
charged with saying what counts as true.357 
 
This political conception of truth represented in Hopeful Monsters is described 
as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘soft’ by Emil Durkheim, a conception of truth consonant with 
a constructivist epistemology: 
 
It is placed in the series of facts, at the very heart of things having 
antecedents and consequences. It poses problems: we are authorised to 
ask ourselves where it comes from, what good it is and so on. It becomes 
itself an object of knowledge. Herein lies the interest of the pragmatist 
enterprise: we can see it as an effort to understand truth and reason 
themselves, to restore to them their human interest, to make of them 
human things that derive from temporal causes and give rise to temporal 
consequences. To ‘soften’ truth is to make it into something that can be 
analysed and explained.358 
 
Conclusion 
The expository and reflexive modes promote distinctly different ideas of truth.  
In the case of the expository documentary (e.g., The Ghost in Your Genes) the 
implicit epistemology is a somewhat rigid positivism whereas in the reflexive 
documentary (e.g., Hopeful Monsters) it is a pragmatic, social constructivism.  
The reflexivity of Hopeful Monsters encourages the viewer to lift their eyes 
from the immediate view and recognise the film’s overall pattern.  As in 
Brechtian theatre, we are made aware of forces at work in excess to those of the 
individual characters in our narrative.  A certain distance between the viewer 
and these characters is thus established, replaced by a connection between the 
viewer and the film as a composition, a construct and an invention of the 
filmmaker operating within a regime of truth that includes the viewer—what 
Brecht calls an ‘apparatus’ of ideology.359  In short, the reflexive mode 
undermines the realist pretensions of the documentary project by pointing out 
the ideological nature of all discourse, including its own reflexive discourse.   
From the point of view of positivism’s rhetoric, the reflexive mode 
seems pointless self-sabotage, problematizing a harmless illusion and making it 
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harder for viewers to imaginatively enter the film’s diegesis to ‘get’ the science.  
But of course, as with Brecht’s theatre, the effect is to alert the viewer to the 
nature of discourse, to emphasise that when we engage with the science 
documentary or with the more technical texts of science we necessarily face 
what Hodge and Kress, in their book Social Semiotics (1988), call an 
‘ideological complex’:  
 
a functionally related set of contradictory versions of the world, 
coercively imposed by one social group on another on behalf of its own 
distinctive interests or subversively offered by another social group in 
attempts at resistance in its own interests.’360    
 
The expository documentary, with its anonymous, magisterial voice asserting its 
privileged access to knowledge would fain adjudicate, pass judgement on 
Williamson’s integrity and competence and judge his hypothesis right or wrong.  
The reflexive style of Hopeful Monsters implicitly critiques the expository mode 
that is intended to justify the rights and privileges of science that exist in our 
present culture, demonstrating that the options of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ are not 
‘real’ so much as discursively determined.  The reflexive mode of Hopeful 
Monsters is implicitly satirical, undercutting the certainties of the expository 
mode, expressing agnosticism with regard to the truth of the film’s realist 
assertions (‘this really happened’) and by analogy with regard to the truth of 
Williamson’s hypothesis.   
Whereas perfection in the classic documentary is defined by invisibility 
and obfuscation of the documentary process, the reflexivity of Hopeful Monsters 
inverts this disavowal.  If the expository science documentary represents what 
Charles Bazerman calls ‘a Baconian history of the phenomena themselves’ then 
the reflexive science documentary represents ‘a history of the natural philosophy 
embodied’ in the form itself.361 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 




In this final chapter I aim to compare the sorts of stories of science that The 
Ghost in Your Genes and Hopeful Monsters offer the viewer, hoping to 
demonstrate that these stories are decidedly distinct and that this distinction may 
be attributable to their differing attitudes to the nature of scientific practice and 
scientific knowledge.  In making this comparison, my structuralist analysis will 
be informed to a large extent by the work of the historiographer Hayden White, 
who has devised a rubric for analyzing the basic story patterns or myths that 
histories commonly articulate.  I am, then, interested in how both Hopeful 
Monsters and the classic science documentary transmogrify a given present of 
scientific activity into a past, and what lessons such histories offer the viewer 
about the nature of that scientific practice and the security of scientific 
knowledge.  
Perhaps the most obvious difference between the histories of science 
represented by Hopeful Monsters and The Ghost in Your Genes is that the latter 
is a history of success while the former, seen from the perspective of the classic 
science documentary, is a history of failure.  Of course, the received view of the 
history of science is replete with stories of failure, for example Johann Joachim 
Becher’s development of the phlogiston theory in the seventeenth century or 
Michelson and Morley’s search for the luminiferous aether in the late nineteenth 
or, as we learnt at school, Lamarck’s eighteenth century theory of evolution.  
However, these failures are usually recounted, at least in textbooks and popular 
accounts of science, in the context of success: the phlogiston theory is replaced 
by the concept of oxidation, the absence of an aether wind gives support to 
Einstein’s relativity, Lamarckism gives way to Darwinism.362  The state of 
knowledge in the past is assumed by such accounts to have been inadequate or 
wrong.  Failures are remembered in the received view only to show how such 
mistakes are left behind in the inevitable progress towards the present state of 
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correct knowledge.  Such accounts of science, then, are what Herbert Butterfield 
terms ‘whiggish’:363  
 
It is part and parcel of the whig interpretation of history that it studies the 
past with reference to the present; and though there may be a sense in 
which this is unobjectionable if its implications are carefully considered, 
and there may be a sense in which it is inescapable, it has often been an 
obstruction to historical understanding because it has been taken to mean 
the study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the present. 
Through this system of immediate reference to the present day, historical 
personages can easily and irresistibly be classed into the men who 
furthered progress and the men who tried to hinder it; so that a handy 
rule of thumb exists by which the historian can select and reject, and can 
make his points of emphasis.364   
 
According to Butterfield, whiggish histories ‘emphasise certain principles of 
progress in the past and…produce a story which is the ratification if not the 
glorification of the present.’365  As we have seen, the classic science 
documentary, exemplified by The Ghost in Your Genes, does precisely this: it 
ratifies the science of the past in the sense of representing it as a necessary, if 
flawed conception that paved the way to the glories of the present.  Science is 
thus represented as a self-correcting method, an algorithm by which the 
continuous march of progress is made possible.   
As we found, The Ghost in Your Genes communicates this received view 
in many ways, not least in the sequence that first introduces its chief protagonist, 
Marcus Pembrey, striding straight ahead across Trafalgar Square (in slow 
motion) while pigeons scatter and people swerve to avoid him:  
 
 
           (00:05:48) 
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Pembrey is a man heading in one direction only.  By contrast, Hopeful Monster  
first introduces Williamson as a man literally travelling in a circle (00:00:10):  
         
 
         
 
 
         
 
                      
 
These two sequences encapsulate the narrative distinctions between the two 
films.  Compared to The Ghost in Your Genes, the narrative of Hopeful 
Monsters is both more meandering and less resolved, representing science as a 
process of trying things out, backtracking and digression—far from the focused 
clarity and directionality that the word ‘method’ connotes.  Hopeful Monsters 
presents a history that is cyclic, i.e., not necessarily progressive, while The 
Ghost in Your Genes represents the history of science as linear, progressing 
towards ever greater knowledge and understanding.   
 The cyclic narrative structure of Hopeful Monsters alerts us to the 
whiggishness of our usual assumptions about the history of science 
(assumptions that are taken for granted in The Ghost in Your Genes) for such an 
incomplete narrative raises the question of how one may distinguish success 
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from failure in the first place.  While The Ghost in Your Genes gives the 
‘received’ answer to that question (‘a successful theory is one that fits the 
facts’), the incomplete narrative of Hopeful Monsters reframes the question to 
ask not what is success but when is success.  The film is concerned not to 
demonstrate the truth of Williamson’s theory but to represent the process by 
which it is made true—a process that takes time.  This distinction only makes 
sense in a constructivist view of science.  
According to the whiggish narrative of The Ghost in Your Genes, history 
is synonymous with progress and so any ambiguity in representing that progress 
is simply a failure of exposition.  The narrative of the classic science 
documentary therefore records a chronology of ‘crucial’ experiments or 
‘breakthroughs’ that comprise successful research in the received view.  Such a 
classic narrative leaves largely unrepresented the more routine business of 
scientific work that is pictured in Hopeful Monsters, especially if this work 
comes to nothing at the end of the day (consider, for example, the non-spawning 
starfish and dead urchins of the film’s first experiment).  The classic, diachronic 
narrative of science may, then, be described as ‘thin’ compared to the narrative 
of Hopeful Monsters; for it is concerned only to demonstrate the logic of a 
causal chain rather than the texture of the daily efforts that make up much of 
scientific research.  (Such a narrative is thin too in what it demands of the 
viewer who is expected to be interested but unsophisticated.)  
By contrast, the narrative of knowledge-manufacture that, for example, 
Karin Knorr-Cetina explicates in The Manufacture of Knowledge (1981) and 
Bruno Latour develops in Science in Action (1987) and that Hopeful Monsters 
clearly aims to emulate, is multilayered or what the anthropologist Clifford 
Geertz calls ‘thick’.366  A ‘thick’ narrative is one that emphasizes the synchronic 
over the merely chronological, as the cultural theorist Stefan Szczelkun 
describes:     
 
A synchronic approach allows us to create a picture of life at a time or 
place in much finer detail, showing the complexities and essential 
redundancies. It allows us to include that which is unchanging or 
mundane but which is essential to character and atmosphere, and so to a 
fuller understanding. Because it allows more to be included it can be a 
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more democratic approach which can include the texture of lives and 
processes which are unremarkable by the traditional historical criteria. 
The unremarkable is also often the typical, that which is held in 
common.367 
 
Of course all narratives, to be narratives, are organized as a chronological chain 
of events but those events may be more or less ‘thickly’ rendered.  To move 
from the diachronic to the synchronic is to move from a narrative mode to a 
more descriptive mode.  Narrative creates time within time but description 
creates space within time and so, as one moves from the diachronic to the 
synchronic one experiences a change in intelligibility.  As Hayden White 
explains, there is consequently a dialectical relationship between information 
(description) and comprehension:     
 
The more information we seek to register about any field of occurrence, 
the less comprehension we can provide for that field; and the more 
comprehension we claim to offer of it, the less the information covered 
by the generalizations intended to explain it.368      
 
Hopeful Monsters is a relatively thick description of the world, representing the 
micro-level of the historical field; in the film there is great particularity of 
description provided by a largely metonymic discourse.  The Ghost in Your 
Genes is relatively thin as description, representing a macro-level of the 
historical field in which there is less particularity, scientists are ciphers and 
images are generic, in short, the film is a highly metaphoric discourse.   
All discourse necessarily mediates between the poles of metaphor and 
metonym and the relative weight given to each in a history of science 
communicates what the author holds to be most significant for explaining that 
history.  For example, in being highly metonymic and showing experimental 
procedures in more or less ‘real time’ and in great detail (i.e., in making space 
for description), the narrative of Hopeful Monsters gives greater weight to 
detailed process and to ‘character’ than does the metaphoric narrative of The 
Ghost in Your Genes that is determined by ‘plot’ and rules of inference.369  Like 
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the structure of the scientific paper or a syllogism, the narrative of The Ghost in 
Your Genes is more generic (as we discussed in the previous chapter) than the 
narrative of Hopeful Monsters.  
Metonym or metaphor are figurative choices that face the documentary 
filmmaker right from the start; for the filmmaker must determine which events 
to include in the film.  The problem with this is that ‘the number of details 
identifiable in any singular event is potentially infinite; and … the ‘context’ of 
any singular event is infinitely extensive or at least is not objectively 
determinable,’ writes Hayden White.370  Events are not ‘givens’ and so while on 
one hand documentary narratives point towards the details of the events they 
describe (metonym), on the other they point towards an explanatory, generic 
story form (metaphor).  This means there can be no truly ‘objective’ history. 
There is an unavoidable perspectivalism—a ‘Rashomon effect’—to all 
narratives and so all histories necessarily embody an ideology.371    
The metaphor of the detective trail that explains the events of The Ghost 
in Your Genes embodies the ideology of the received view.  The question for us 
here is what ideology does the more metonymic narrative of Hopeful Monsters 
embody?   
 
Metahistory 
To answer this question I turn to Hayden White’s analysis of the historical 
narrative as first outlined in his book, Metahistory (1973) and developed in other 
books and papers in the years since.372  White deconstructs the historical 
narrative into the following levels of conceptualization:  (1) chronicle; (2) story; 
(3) mode of emplotment; (4) mode of argument; and (5) mode of ideological 
implication.  The first elements of the historical field are organized as a 
chronicle or list of events in temporal sequence but this is not yet a history 
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because chroniclar statements contain no explanations of events.  In order to 
provide such explanations the events of chronicle are transformed by 
characterizing some as ‘inaugural’, some as ‘terminating’ and others as 
‘transitional’.  When organized in this way the chronicle becomes a ‘story’ with 
a recognizable morphology that, by enclosing a passage of time explains the 
ending as a consequence of the beginning.   
‘Story’ then is this first (Proppian) level of explanation, answering 
questions like ‘what happened next?’ or ‘how did it all end up?’  But to grasp 
the deeper meaning of a particular story, argues White, requires an appreciation 
of how the story might have been different; requires, that is, a comparison with 
other stories that might have been crafted from the ‘same’ chroniclar events.  I 
write ‘same’ in inverted commas because, of course, as noted above, we cannot 
consider chroniclar events as either ‘raw’ or ‘hard’ data.  Indeed, simply by 
designating some events as inaugural and others as terminating, the 
documentary filmmaker imposes a form on reality that cannot be found in the 
events themselves. All historians and documentary filmmakers must necessarily 
fall back on certain principles to guide their choices and we need not even 
elaborate these principles to recognise that they involve value judgements that 
cannot come from the level of the chronicle itself.  A history then can only be 
told from a metahistorical standpoint. 
Hayden White identifies three levels of metahistorical explanation: 
‘explanation by emplotment’, ‘explanation by argument’ and ‘explanation by 
ideological implication’.  According to White, historians choose particular 
options on each of these different levels and in this way, two people may create 
distinctly different explanations of the ‘same’ events without any ‘objective’ 
version to adjudicate between them.   
 
Explanation by Emplotment: Tragedy, Comedy, Romance and Satire 
Hayden White’s ‘explanation by emplotment’ is the same as Silverstone’s 
‘mythic narrative’, the dramatic dimension that plots the hero’s struggle and 
victory.  As White sees it, there are four possible types of plot by which to shape 
the historical events of the hero’s struggle and success:  Romance, Tragedy, 
Comedy and Satire.  To grasp the differences between them it is best to consider 
each in relation to Romance:  
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Romance is fundamentally a drama of self-identification symbolized by 
the hero’s transcendence of the world of experience, his victory over it 
and his final liberation from it—the sort of drama associated with the 
Grail legend or the story of the resurrection of Christ in Christian 
mythology.373   
 
In a Romantic mode of emplotment we would expect to find binary oppositions 
between good and evil, light and darkness, truth and falsehood, failure and 
success etc. and these are precisely what we do find in the classic science 
documentary:  Romance is ultimately a plot of redemption.  Satire is its 
opposite, a plot that instead demonstrates the slavery of man to his fate which, in 
the end, is always death.   
Comedy and Tragedy are less pessimistic than Satire but less fulsomely 
triumphal than Romance.  ‘In Comedy hope is held out for the temporary 
triumph of man over his world by the prospect of occasional reconciliations of 
the forces at play in the social and natural worlds.’374   These reconciliations are 
symbolized by the festivities traditionally used to terminate comic narratives.  In 
Tragedy, by contrast, there are no festivities at the end; instead there is an 
intimation of incorrigibly terrible states still existing between people.  In 
Comedy, society is represented as being cleansed by the harmonization of 
apparently irreconcilable forces.  Tragedy, by contrast, acknowledges limits to 
the degree of harmony that is possible.  Its reconciliations are not so much 
harmonizations as resignations.  Both Tragedy and Comedy find the Romantic 
notion of human redemption naïve and can be understood as qualifications of 
Romance in which the persistence of conflict is not denied.  The difference 
between them is that Comedy sees conflict at least temporarily resolved whereas 
Tragedy reveals opposing forces to be irreconcilable.   
Satire, in contrast to these three plots, is reflexive, including its own 
model of reality in its critique; for it ‘presupposes the ultimate inadequacy of the 
visions of the world dramatically represented in the genres of Romance, 
Comedy and Tragedy alike. … Satire paints its ‘gray on gray’ in the awareness 
of its own inadequacy as an image of reality.’375   
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By this analysis, The Ghost in Your Genes is emplotted as Romance 
while Hopeful Monsters appears to be a tragedy.  But what does it mean to call a 
history of science a tragedy?  What does that explain? 
 
The History of Science as Tragedy 
If Tragedy simply meant a plot of accidental misfortune then, outside of the 
perhaps pleasurable experience of feeling sympathy, we would probably not be 
interested in such stories, but a tragic plot offers a lesson, as Richard Eldridge 
puts it in The Persistence of Romanticism: 
 
Tragedies instruct us not only about the occurrence of particular 
incidents, as a chronicle or list of events might, but further about human 
life and its liabilities in general. … we can say that tragedy clarifies or 
illuminates what is pitiable and fearful in human life.  It makes clear to 
us how the human life we share with tragedy’s protagonists, with whom 
we identify, is typically liable to include significant, undeserved, and 
unanticipatable suffering.376       
 
Tragedy is more than a lesson in the insecurity and illusory happiness of the 
human condition.  For a story to be tragic, for it to illuminate what is pitiable 
and fearful in human suffering and thus bring about catharsis in its audience, the 
protagonist must suffer from a flaw, the notorious tragic flaw or error that is 
woven into the hero.  Significantly, this flaw is not presented as blameworthy.  
The hero of a tragedy is always a good character and the disaster that befalls him 
or her is not the result of blind, natural misfortune, which would clarify nothing 
for us about the nature of existence, but a result of those very qualities that make 
the hero good: courage, wisdom, integrity and selflessness to name but a few.  
The tragedy, then, is that under certain circumstances these qualities may lead to 
disaster and the plots of tragedies demonstrate how this can happen.  The force 
of Tragedy is that these highest virtues, ‘the qualities that are most necessary for 
any well-led life—themselves can defeat the achievement of their appropriate 
end, eudaimonia, a well-led, happy human life.’377  Our virtues cannot protect 
us.  Indeed, in so far as certain social structures are themselves predicated on 
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these same virtues, those structures are unstable; for the virtues may, as Eldridge 
puts it, come to war with themselves. 
This internecine warfare, I submit, is what Bruno Latour identifies as 
characteristic of the social structures of science.  Latour’s ‘science in the 
making’ is a battleground; the weapons with which its warrior-scientists defend 
one theory or attack another are a series of generally accepted criteria or rules 
but (and here’s where the trouble starts) these rules turn out to be vaguer than 
we thought and can become a source of potentially irresolvable dispute.   
Five of these criteria are discussed by Kuhn in The Essential Tension 
(1977): accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness.  The difficulty, as 
Kuhn explains, is that (a) the meanings of these words are fluid and open to 
challenge and (b) even if their meanings were stable, a theory may score highly 
on one criterion and do poorly on another.  Even though these criteria are ‘good’ 
they may yet come to war with themselves.    
Accuracy, Kuhn avers, is the most decisive of the criteria, ‘partly 
because it is less equivocal than the others but especially because predictive and 
explanatory powers, which depend on it, are characteristics that scientists are 
particularly unwilling to give up.’378  However, in practice accuracy is not 
always decisive.  In Hopeful Monsters, for example, Williamson describes what 
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WILLIAMSON: 
Well, this is the story so far.  By the 2nd of 
August we had forty larvae, thirty of which 
were kidney-shaped bipinnarias.  That is a 
normal starfish larva.   
 
I thought they were continuing to grow, but 
by the 9th of August it became apparent that 
they were not growing, they were actually 
getting shorter.  And I measured some on the 
9th, the longest was .26 millimetres, whereas 
we’d had one .4 millimetres five days before.  






Williamson implicitly interprets the shortening of the bipinnarias as a result of 
their hybridicity and therefore the accuracy of his hypothesis (and a justification 
for making such accurate measurements in the first place).  When the one 
remaining ‘hybrid’ dies in the following scene the question arises: is this a 
failure of Williamson’s theory?  In the ‘limerick’ scene that follows, the viewer 
is made aware of another interpretation: the larval ‘rounding-off’ was a sign of 
unhealthiness not hybridness. But there is no way, at least as demonstrated in the 
film, of adjudicating between these two explanations on the basis of 
‘accuracy’.379   
Simplicity or parsimony is another criterion of theory choice: the simpler 




Williamson defends his position: “Nature with a capital ‘N’ is not sitting around 
thinking about the shortest ways to get from A to B.  It does it by trial and error, 
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     There once was a man from Port Erin, 
     whose phylogenies were quite daring;  
     larvae flew between trees 
     with the greatest of ease; 
     Occam’s razor was needed for paring. 
I got several about .2 by .16 millimetres.  And 
others were completely spherical.  And 
though there was food in the gut, the mouth 
and anus were probably closed.  There was 
no... effectively no mouth or anus.   
 
They are now dying off rapidly.  We only had 
about thirty to start with.  We’re down to, err. 
Well, yesterday, the 13th, we were down to 
two, one of which was swimming, the other 
was apparently intact, looking like a good 
larva but no longer swimming.” 
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and trial and error seldom produces the shortest way.”380  Parsimony, in 
Williamson’s view, is incompatible with another of Kuhn’s criteria: consistency.   
Epistemologists of the received view commonly concede that these 
criteria are vague but argue that they concern only the context of discovery, not 
the more important context of justification—of testing.  As exemplars of 
objective testing, they point to famous crucial experiments, for example 
Foucault’s pendulum.381  But, says Kuhn, although Foucault’s pendulum may 
demonstrate that the Earth moves, this so-called test of the hypothesis was only 
carried out after the hypothesis had already been accepted.  To consider crucial 
experiments as the means by which choices are determined in the first place is to 
mistake the pedagogic context for the context of justification: 
  
The exemplary crucial experiments to which philosophers again and 
again refer would have been historically relevant to theory choice only if 
they had yielded unexpected results.  Their use as illustrations provides 
needed economy to science pedagogy, but they scarcely illuminate the 
character of the choices that scientists are called upon to make. 382           
 
The Ghost in Your Genes is just such an economical, didactic narrative of 
crucial, ‘breakthrough’ experiments but does that make it an adequate history of 
science?  While, as Henry Kissinger said, history never reveals its alternatives, 
those alternatives exist in the contemporary moment and choice is neither so 
unproblematic nor so obvious as the whiggish history of The Ghost in Your 
Genes implies.  There are always some good reasons for conflicting choices and 
this means, as Kuhn points out, that:   
  
Considerations relevant to the context of discovery are then relevant to 
the context of justification as well; scientists who share the concerns and 
sensibilities of the individual who discovers a new theory are ipso facto 
likely to appear disproportionately frequently among that theory’s first 
supporters.383    
  




 Like a gyroscope, the pendulum keeps a fixed direction in space while the Earth rotates under 
it. 
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Kuhn’s evidence comes from his study of the ‘Copernican Revolution’.  While 
Copernicus’s universe might appear (whiggishly) to be a simpler model than 
Ptolemy’s, it was, in its first description, no more accurate as a means of 
predicting celestial events.  Nonetheless, Kepler adopted the heliocentric theory 
from early on and backed it strongly during the decades it took for him to adapt 
the model to be more accurate than Ptolemy’s earth-centred system.  Had Kepler 
not had other reasons for choosing Copernicus over Ptolemy the idea of a sun-
centred planetary system might have been ignored and perhaps forgotten 
altogether.  Accuracy and simplicity cannot be used as a sole or sufficient 
criterion of theory choice; indeed, there is no single objective algorithm for 
theory choice and even if, or when, the scientific community eventually comes 
to agree on a theory, we cannot be sure that each individual comes to agree for 
the same reasons.   
 In Hopeful Monsters we find a plot (and thereby an explanation) in 
which unresolved disagreement is central to the scientific method the film 
depicts.  This is what it means to emplot the history of science as Tragedy.  The 
narrative of Hopeful Monsters demonstrates that in the history of science the 
same ‘good’ values of accuracy, simplicity etc. may come to war with 
themselves.  The criteria that Kuhn invites the reader to consider seem to have 
the quality of rules but in practice they are more like maxims.  Values are shared 
but this does not imply that they can be objectively applied.  We may all agree 
that a good theory ought to be parsimonious but in an individual case we may 
disagree about whether or not this particular theory is.  Scientists know this all 
too well for they often disagree with each other but their journal articles (and the 
classic science documentaries that reflect that discourse) deny disagreement any 
place in scientific method.  Hopeful Monsters, by contrast, makes it central. 
  
A History of Science as Tragicomedy 
But the plot of Hopeful Monsters is not wholly tragic.  Williamson does not 
actually fail: he does not learn ‘the error of his ways’ or consider his hypothesis 
falsified by apparently negative experimental results.  On the contrary, the film 
is a story of his determination to keep going because of disagreement.  In 
Kuhn’s version of the history of science, this is a common pattern:   
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…much work, both theoretical and experimental, is ordinarily required 
before the new theory can display sufficient accuracy and scope to 
generate widespread conviction.  In short, before the group accepts it, a 
new theory has been tested over time by a number of men, some working 
within it, others within its traditional rival.  Such a mode of 
development, however, requires a decision process which permits 
rational men to disagree, and such disagreement would be barred by the 
shared algorithm which philosophers have generally sought.  If it were at 
hand, all conforming scientists would make the same decision at the 
same time. ... what from one viewpoint may seem the looseness and 
imperfection of choice criteria conceived as rules may, when the same 
criteria is seen as values, appear an indispensible means of spreading the 
risk which the introduction or support of novelty always entails.384 
 
In Hopeful Monsters, Williamson tries to make the hybrids he theorises.  This is 
because in the Kuhnian/Latourian model of scientific activity, concrete results of 
a new theory may be persuasive to proponents of the opposing, traditional view 
even if these scientists are not yet willing to concede on the grounds of other 
criteria.  As Williamson explains:   
 
“I am satisfied in my own mind, but other people aren’t, so what we 
want is more genuine hybrids.  And Robert and I are trying to produce 




“The best we can do is show that hybrids between distantly related 
species are possible, and that some of these turn out to produce 
recognisable (a) larvae and (b) juveniles.  We have been using 
concentrated sperm and in some cases at least, the barriers between 
distantly related species seem to be broken down.” (01:14:00) 
 
If persuaded that a hybrid can be made, a traditional neo-Darwinian scientist, 
perhaps even Williamson’s enemy, Eric Davidson, may make the effort to 
imagine the world from Williamson’s perspective (just as Kuhn did in trying to 
grasp Aristotle’s mechanics) and thereby learn its language.385  At some point in 
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this process such people may discover they can speak the new theoretical 
language like a native.  They will, in other words, find they are practising the 
new theory without having consciously made a choice.  They have undergone a 
quiet conversion, risking doing so based on the values Kuhn has outlined.  In 
Hayden White’s terms, such a plot of reconciliation (at least a ‘local’ 
reconciliation) could be described as Comedy.  
  There is, however, a problem with this analysis because a narrative can 
only be a Comedy or Tragedy (i.e., deliver a lesson) if it is complete.  Every 
child knows this.  As Hayden White puts it: ‘the demand for closure in the 
historical story is a demand for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real 
events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama.’386  
But, as a Proppian analysis indicates, Hopeful Monsters has no clear ending:  
   
Initial situation:  Once upon a time there lived a marine biologist 
who had spent his entire career at the same laboratory doing 
traditional scientific work. 
 
Absentation: He became successful in his narrow field of marine 
biology but is an outsider (i.e., professionally absent) in the field 
of evolutionary studies in which he has come to take an interest.   
 
Interdiction: Through obedience to the injunction against 
dabbling in areas outside of his expertise a misfortune befalls the 
science of evolution.  
  
Villainy: Anomalies abound in the understanding of the 
evolution of larvae.  
 
Lack: These anomalies cannot be squared with the traditional 
view. 
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Mediation: Don Williamson is (self-)identified as the man to 
liquidate this lack:   
 
Departure: He formulates a hypothesis and begins a series of 
successful hybridization experiments. 
 
1st Donor function: Lynn Margulis supports him to come to 
Boston to explain his ideas. 
 
Receipt of magical agent: Williamson receives help from Robert 
for further work.  
 
(Non-)Victory, (non-)Liquidation, The new experiments fail, 
papers are no longer published and opponents remain 
unconvinced.  There is no victory or liquidation of the lack and 
consequently no Return, Recognition, exposure, transfiguration, 
punishment of the villain or wedding.   
 
However, enthusiasm only temporarily dimmed, Williamson 
departs again…  
 
In Hopeful Monsters we see that Williamson will not be resigned to failure but 
neither can he celebrate even a temporary success and so the moral of this 
unresolved plot is ambiguous.  Hopeful Monsters is neither Tragedy nor 
Comedy but a hybrid: Tragicomedy.  The voice of Tragicomedy is characteristic 
of so-called ‘art-house’ cinema in which, as Carl Plantinga writes: 
 
The salient detail and the urgent moment are exchanged for meanderings 
and digressions, explorations that may or may not contribute to an 
answer to overarching…questions.387 
 
During the drive from the lab to the beach, for example, Williamson describes 
his background and his education but the conversation is interrupted by Robert’s 
hunt for heart urchins.  Williamson picks up the threads of this conversation 
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later, in his study/bedroom, as he shows Robert his father’s copy of Darwin’s 
Voyage of a Naturalist.  The film does not indicate which scene—the beach or 
the study—is more important; both are treated equally even though their 
connection is not clear or ‘causal’.  Robert’s return to London is another 
sequence that, in a classic science documentary, would be a clear digression.   
 
 
        (00:34:00) 
 
This sort of meandering plot creates an ‘open’, non-expository narrative that is 
then offered as a representation of scientific investigation itself—a voyage with 
a hoped-for destination but without a clear map or a sure way of reading it.  This 
is quite a departure from the linear detective trail of the classic science 
documentary which often claims ignorance of the destination but expresses 
complete confidence in the method of map-reading that eventually leads there.  
The moral of the classic science programme, with its fully resolved narrative, is 
that, by the application of the scientific ‘method’ (with all that suggests of the 
received view), ‘truth will out’.  However, the ‘science in action’ narrative of 
Hopeful Monsters, with its meandering cycle of experiment, failure, despair and 
the resurgence of optimism, undermines such reassuring certainties. 
 
Explanation by Formal Argument 
Alongside the explanation by emplotment is another level of the organization of 
the events by which the historical narrative suggests meaning.  It matches 
Silverstone’s ‘mimetic narrative’ or what I have simply called ‘argument’, 
which is the term Hayden White prefers.  There are four paradigms of 
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explanation by ‘formal argument’: Formist, Organicist, Mechanist, and 
Contextualist.  
The Formist explanation demonstrates the individuality of all the objects 
being scrutinised in order to dispel any impression that their history is the result 
of a historical process greater than each in its turn.  One might say that 
Broomfield and Churchill’s Soldier Girls (1981) is a Formist documentary 
because it seeks to demonstrate how a history of women recruits in the US army 
is a story of numerous biographies (in this, it is uncritical of the army as an 
engineer of human souls); similarly, a film like Les Blank’s Garlic is as Good 
as Ten Mothers (1980) incorporates, as Carl Plantinga puts it, ‘micro-narratives, 
or “small” stories, within the overarching structure of the film,’ and is therefore 
Formist, dispersing the elements rather than integrating them. 388  (Plantinga 
calls such a structure ‘topical’.) The weakness of a Formist approach is the 
weakness of all case studies: that its generalisations, ranging as they do across 
an array of individuated elements tend to lack focus, however they can be very 
vivid because they reconstruct the detailed lives of particular agents and actions.   
The Organicist seeks, by contrast, to demonstrate that the disparate 
elements of the world are integrated.  White suggests that the Organicist strategy 
is a metaphysical commitment to the paradigm of the microscopic-macroscopic 
relationship.  Documentaries expressing an Organicist paradigm of reality will 
consequently tend to be somewhat abstract, emphasising the process of 
integration rather than characterising the individual elements.  One can see how 
such a paradigm would tend to represent history as goal-oriented, as having a 
final end.  A valid explanation in the Organicist mode however does not propose 
causal laws as guiding the integration of elements but rather principles or ideas 
that individuals hold.  One might suggest that Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will 
(1934) or Watt and Wright’s Night Mail (1936) offer Organicist explanations of 
the social world.   
The Mechanist historian or documentary filmmaker is similarly 
interested in demonstrating how individual people or social groupings are 
integrated but unlike Organicism, Mechanism does not explain the integration 
by the holding of shared ideas but by the action of causal laws that are 
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independent of a particular time and place.  The individuality of people in a 
Mechanist narrative is less important than the over-arching law that guides their 
behaviour and so Mechanist histories, like Organicist ones, tend to abstraction 
and reduction.  The mimetic narrative of a classic science documentary like The 
Ghost in Your Genes is a Mechanist history of science in which scientists are 
essentially ciphers, their individuality reduced to more or less interchangeable 
‘talking heads’, seeming voices of authority that are ‘operated’ by the higher 
authority (represented by the narrator) of a syllogistic logic.  In this view science 
is a ‘meritocracy’, blind to special interests; no social group holds power so an 
‘outsider’ like Pembrey, provided he is logical, will always win through. 
Contextualism, as the name implies, presupposes that events can be 
explained by the relation they have to other events in their immediate historical 
surroundings.  Like Formism, Contextualism produces a representation of 
history that is dispersed, even chaotic and lacking in any overarching structural 
principle.  Unlike a Formist argument that considers entities in their isolation 
and uniqueness, the Contextualist argument explains ‘what happened’ by 
examining the functional interrelationships between elements in the historical 
field:   
 
Contextualism seeks to avoid both the radically dispersive tendency of 
Formism and the abstractive tendencies of Organicism and Mechanism.  
It strives instead for a relative integration of the phenomena discerned in 
finite provinces of historical occurrence in terms of ‘trends’ or general 
physiognomies of periods and epochs.389   
 
The Contextualist seeks to identify the threads that link the event to be 
explained to the features of the circumambient historical space.  Contextualism 
looks backward in time to locate origins and forwards to suggest influence or 
impact on future events.  The end point of such a history, the terminating event, 
is when the threads are swallowed up into the context of another discrete 
event—history as a chain of ‘significant’ events.  Kuhn’s history of science as 
comprising long periods of relative conceptual stability (the paradigm) divided 
by periods of intellectual uncertainty and dispute over fundamentals 
(revolutions) is a Contextualist explanation of history.   
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And so too is Hopeful Monsters.  On a number of occasions, the 
narrative demonstrates a clash of irresolvable intellectual trends and special 
interests.  For example, Margulis’s recounting of Eric Davidson’s criticism:   
 
“And then one guy, it was Eric Davidson of Cal. Tech.  He’s a very 
important scientist.  He’s a Cal. Tech. professor.  Right?!  He gets up 
and he starts screaming at him saying...  I mean, he was apoplectic.  And 
I can’t remember the details, but I don’t think anybody can but it was, 
‘this is such wrong stuff, it is so based on nothing and there’s no 
evidence…’” (00:59:30) 
 
This recounting is then closely followed by Richard Strathmann’s criticism that, 
among other things, appears to conflate Williamson’s ideas with creationism:   
 
“You know if I were in Williamson’s position, first of all, in good 
science, you should set up a hypothesis that’s testable and then be 
willing to put it to the test.  This is something the creationist’s in the US 
don’t want to do, which is why it’s not really science.  And it’s 
something Williamson doesn’t seem to really want to do.” (01:01:10) 
 
In fact, Strathmann compares Williamson’s science to religion not once but 
twice:  
 
“I mean the book is sprinkled with the phrase ‘I believe’.  This is like, 
this isn’t the Nicene or Apostolic creed, this is science!  It’s not a matter 
of deep belief, it’s a matter of testable propositions and beliefs are 
provisional.  And it’s that constant scepticism and self-doubt, not quite 
paranoia, but always wondering ‘could this be right, is there another 
possible explanation?’  That’s what makes science productive and 
possible and insightful.  And that’s what’s disturbing to me about the 
direction Williamson’s going.”  (01:04:00) 
 
Strathmann and Davidson both position Williamson and his ideas in another 
world, another weltanschauung, which they ridicule (as does Jimmy Carr in the 
opening scene: “Oh, what he’s done there is he’s not understood and I mean fair 
enough because it is complicated”).  As far as Strathmann and Davidson are 
concerned, Williamson and his idea are beyond the pale, outside of the accepted 
paradigm, and therefore can contribute nothing to science.  From a Kuhnian 
perspective this attitude is quite to be expected but it gives the lie to the notion, 
articulated by the received view, of science as an incremental, mechanical 
accumulation of knowledge.  Instead, Hopeful Monsters represents science as a 
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contest between paradigms and such a contest may only be resolved, as Kuhn 
suggests, through struggle and revolution.   
 Every explanation of history therefore has implications for action in the 
contemporary moment, offering, as White puts it, ‘a set of prescriptions for 
taking a position in the present world of social praxis and acting upon it (either 
to change the world or to maintain it in its current state).’390  Such a prescription 
is what he calls an ‘explanation by ideological implication.’  
  
Explanation by ideological implication 
White identifies four ideological prescriptions that may guide such action in the 
contemporary moment: Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism and Liberalism. 
A history plotted as Tragedy, for example, might explain or justify its 
emplotment by reference to laws of causal determination or laws of human 
freedom.  In the first, people are represented as essentially trapped in their fate 
while in the second they have some control of their destinies.  The ideological 
thrust of the first is Conservative while that of the second is Radical.  These 
ideological implications need not be drawn explicitly, says White, but emerge 
from the tone or mood of the resolution of the drama.  One might say that 
Wiseman’s Titicut Follies is a Conservative Tragedy while the Maysles’ Gray 
Gardens is a Radical one because it suggests that the only way that Edie senior 
and her daughter can escape their awful mutual dependence is by taking the 
radical step of separating.  That they do not, is a consequence of the ‘tragic flaw’ 
each possesses.  (‘Tragic’ because in other circumstances such qualities of 
mutual care and support would be wholly positive.)   
Conservatives and Liberals see change as best managed or brought about 
in a gradual, piecemeal fashion, not through the programmatic, structural 
transformations envisaged by Radicals and Anarchists.  Conservatives and 
Liberals favour a ‘natural’ or ‘social’ pace of change, while Radicals and 
Anararchists embrace the possibility of cataclysmic transformations and are 
suspicious of the inertial power of institutions to prevent this happening.  
Conservatives see the current state of society and institutional structures as the 
best that can be hoped for.  By contrast, Liberals project forward to a remote 
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future time when the current structures will have been improved (remote so as to 
discourage revolutionary, cataclysmic actions).  Such precipitate action is 
envisioned by Radicals who picture Utopia as almost within our grasp and so 
encourage revolution while Anarchists hold to a picture of an ideal remote past 
in contrast to which today’s society is far from ideal.  Each of these positions 
argues for a distinct idea of what constitutes reality and of how we ought to 
behave.    
There are, then, argues White, ‘elective affinities’ between these three 
metahistorical standpoints:391 
 
       Mode of                   Mode of              Mode of Ideological  
               Emplotment                  Argument                        Implication 
 
                 Romantic                      Formist                          Anarchist 
                    Tragic                       Mechanist                         Radical 
                    Comic                       Organicist                     Conservative 
                   Satirical                   Contextualist                       Liberal 
     
Considered as a history of science, The Ghost in Your Genes is, by this analysis, 
emplotted as Romance.  Its mode of argument however is Mechanist and its 
mode of ideological implication is Conservative, that is, representing the current 
state of the institution of science as the best that can be hoped for.   
Unsurprisingly, this combination strains the elective affinities White 
posits; for recall that in our earlier analysis of The Ghost in Your Genes, we 
noted that the aims of the mythic narrative and of the film’s argument are at 
cross-purposes.  The argument seeks to explicate a scientific idea that is 
implicitly already acceptable to scientists because it is logically (i.e., 
mechanistically) compelling while the mythic narrative tries to tell a (romantic) 
story of ‘science in the making’ as Pembrey and his virtual band of helpers 
defeat the villainous orthodox model of genetics ‘personified’ by the Human 
Genome Project.  
 As for Hopeful Monsters: first, its inconclusive narrative denies the 
closure required for the story to be emplotted outright as either Tragedy or 
Comedy.  Given the film’s reflexive style we may, I would argue, understand 
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this plot as ‘aware of its own inadequacy’, i.e., what White terms Satire.  
Second, the highly metonymic figuration of the narrative emphasizes context. 
The fate of Williamson’s hypothesis is thereby shown to be determined not by 
mechanistic laws (as the fate of the epigenetic hypothesis of The Ghost in Your 
Genes is depicted), but by Williamson’s position, or that of his ideas, in relation 
to the values and beliefs of the scientific community.  The formal argument of 
Hopeful Monsters thus explains the history of science as Contextual, in keeping 
with a Kuhnian model.  Third, the explanation of Hopeful Monsters by 
ideological implication is apparently Radical, critical of the inertial power of the 
institution of science.  But although the outcome of a general acceptance of 
Williamson’s ideas would be ‘revolutionary’, the narrative does not prescribe 
radicalism, rather it suggests that acceptance will come, if at all, only in a 
piecemeal fashion.   
 In White’s terms, then, Hopeful Monsters is a satire of ‘science in action’ 
that offers a view of theory choice in the contemporary moment that is 
thoroughly constructivist in explaining that choice as determined by the social 
and intellectual context in which the scientific work is conducted and 
disseminated.  Furthermore, by reflexively drawing attention to its own 
inadequate narrativising, the film is implicitly critical of the certitudes (what 
Renov calls ‘epistemological violence’) that underpin narratives of the received 
view like The Ghost in Your Genes. 392   The history of science represented by 
The Ghost in Your Genes, with its romantic plot and mechanist argumentation 
seems too good to be true because it lacks the context and contingency that the 
metonymic, meandering narrative of Hopeful Monsters offers us. 
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
This thesis comprises two parts, the film, Hopeful Monsters and this written 
exegesis.  Hopeful Monsters is ‘experimental’ in eschewing the key features of 
the classic, expository style and narrative structure of the science documentary.  
In this dissertation I have shown that the expository mode may be aligned with 
the so-called ‘received view’ of science, a view that philosophers and 
sociologists have found increasingly problematic in recent years.  In trying, 
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therefore, to make a science programme that is unlike the classic science 
documentary, I have been exploring not just formal alternatives in filmmaking 
but philosophical alternatives to those aspects of the received view that are 
inherent in the classic form.  In the second part of this dissertation I have 
attempted to lay out the grounds for doubting the received view of science and 
have developed an alternative called ‘constructivism’ that emphasises the social 
and rhetorical dimensions of science over the ‘logic of scientific discovery’.  In 
these last two chapters, I have analysed the style and narrative structure of 
Hopeful Monsters to ascertain first, whether it does indeed offer a non-received 
view of science and second, whether that alternative represents a ‘constructivist’ 
view.   
 We may finally answer yes to both these questions.  Before we even see 
the first images of Hopeful Monsters, we hear these words from Williamson: “I 
have an edited version of the film”.  This sentence alerts us to the reflexive style 
of Hopeful Monsters by which, as Renov puts it, the film takes responsibility for 
its representations, demonstrating that they are not ‘natural’, not found ‘out 
there’ in the world but constructed by the filmmaker ‘up here’ on the screen.393  
Similarly, Williamson’s controversial hypothesis is represented as constructed 
by the discourse of science, a rhetorical invention that is stabilised (or not) in the 
economy of scientific discourse not because it matches an objective ‘reality’ (a 
philosophically problematic concept) but because of its on-going promotion 
within the scientific community whose members debate its merits in terms of a 
number of vague criteria like accuracy and simplicity. 
Of course, no one film makes the perfect case study and, as I noted in the 
introduction to this dissertation, the work Williamson and I did together was 
carried out in a less socially complex environment than is commonly the case in 
science.  In a typical molecular biology lab, for example, we may expect to find 
a hierarchy comprising a senior researcher, post-doctoral workers on short 
contracts and PhD and Masters students working for little or no pay.  It is rare to 
find just two people working without financial constraints or institutional 
control.  Hopeful Monsters cannot, therefore, represent the typical complex of 
interests that is to be found in larger labs.  However, the film does offer some 




strong hints of the social forces in play in science, for instance through Lynn 
Margulis’s telephone account of Williamson’s Boston seminar, through the 
interview with Richard Strathmann and his limerick and through the comments 
of the referees that Don reads out in the penultimate scene of the film.  Through 
all these, one is made aware of what Latour calls the ‘hostile environment’, the 
adversarial habitat of scientific culture.394   
The adversarial structure of science acts as a brake on the acceptance of 
controversial (i.e., non-paradigmatic) ideas and so, as Kuhn has argued, science 
can only ‘progress’ by a series of revolutions which not only replace old ideas 
but destroy them in the process.  The classic science documentary, then, with its 
traditional linear view of a more or less steady accumulation of knowledge, 
cannot successfully represent a Kuhnian view of scientific history while the 
cyclical narrative of Hopeful Monsters, in emphasising the resistance and inertia 
of established paradigms does so quite well.   
This cyclic structure resembles the narratives of Akira Kurasawa which 
Donald Richie notes often take the form of ‘the full circle, or the spiral, the 
return to the beginning with a difference, the cyclic.’395  He argues that this form 
arises because the conflict of the narrative is ‘one of character rather than 
situation’. 396  Kurosawa’s films are concerned, writes Ritchie, with ‘the totality 
of a character, the totality of a situation,’ and certainly a constructivist narrative 
of science must also place its characters in the totality of a situation because it is 
this situation, this contextual web of special interests, that determines the fate of 
scientific ideas.397  How complete, then, is this sense of the character’s context 
in Hopeful Monsters and is it different to The Ghost in Your Genes?  
In Hopeful Monsters, we visit Williamson’s home on two occasions and 
what we see of it (and of his little lab) creates an impression that the scientific 
life is rather monkish.  Don lives in a small bungalow where he appears to work 
and sleep in a tiny cell furnished with a single bed and a narrow shelf of (holy) 
books (00:33:00):   
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On the face of it, this same picture of the scientific self is also painted by The 
Ghost in Your Genes; for in that film the scientific community is only a virtual 
one and highly dispersed.  We either see scientists as isolated talking heads set 
against abstract backgrounds or (the graveyard notwithstanding) on their own in 
their offices.  Here is Pembrey for example, alone, not in an office but in a 
garden speaking (in voice-over) of isolation as a positive feature that allows him 




The image may recall for some of us that stereotype of scientific isolation, the 
horticulturalist and ‘father of genetics’, Gregor Mendel.  However, this idea of 
the scientist as a solitary, ascetic genius is actually not what Hopeful Monsters 
represents because in that film there is only one moment when Williamson is 
represented as truly alone.  This is when he skims through a book after his first 
experiment fails to get off the ground: 
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This short scene, in the observational mode, comes quite early in the narrative 
(00:12:30).  It is a lyrical moment that serves to contrast with the next scene 
(with the photographer) in which Robert comes out from behind the camera to 
take his place, permanently (and literally) as Don’s right-hand man.  In this 
moment, the isolated scientist becomes ‘a team’.  But Don and Robert are not 
simply two men working together; Robert is there to do what Don cannot, 
namely to work with his hands.  Robert and Don, then, represent two aspects of 
the scientist.  Just as Cinderella divides the mother into her ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
attributes, personified by the fairy godmother and the step-mother, so Hopeful 
Monsters posits the scientific self as a dyad: Robert is body while Williamson is 
mind; Robert is the apprentice, Don the master; Robert represents connection 
(the phone call with Margulis, the interview with Strathmann) where Don is an 
island (signified, not least, by the Isle of Man itself).  
One comes across many such dyads in narratives of science, for 
example, Darwin and Huxley, Einstein and Eddington, Watson and Crick, and 
although Williamson and Sternberg cannot, of course, be compared to these, the 
dyad affords the biographer/documentary filmmaker the same opportunity for 
separating and resolving any number of structural antinomies that comprise the 
idea of the scientific self.  For example, unlike the interlocutor in Hobbes’s 
dialogues, in the course of Hopeful Monsters, Robert does not become converted 
to his Master’s beliefs, rather he becomes increasingly sceptical.  The scientist is 
thus shown in Hopeful Monsters as torn between conviction and diffidence, his 
mental stability and the stability of his ideas always under threat.  Don and 
Robert, in representing opposite poles, give the filmmaker a means to represent 
the scientist’s oscillation between doubt and certainty.  This is a very different 
dynamic to that represented by the actions of the hero of The Ghost in Your 
Genes who seems to travel, as befits an algorithmic view of the scientific 
method, with steady, machine-like competence in one direction only until he 
reaches his goal.  It is true that Williamson appears similarly confident almost 
all the time (although he is clearly knocked-back by the death of his putative 
hybrid) but Robert acts as a counter-weight, expressing growing doubts and so 
together they paint a picture of the complete, scientific self.   
The oscillating psycho-dynamics of the dyadic scientist of Hopeful 
Monsters matches the cyclic structure of the film’s narrative and together they 
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articulate an idea of the scientific life that accords with Popper and Kuhn’s view 
of the history of science, namely that the quest to prove a scientific theory is, 
logically at least, unending and it may therefore be unending in practice too. 
Williamson himself remarks that he believes he is ‘on a straight-line course for 
posthumous recognition’ and later, as his voice tails off in the last moments of 
the film (he is making yet another pitch for his theory at the conference on Lake 
Como) we have a strong sense that this is not the end of the matter.398  The 
inconclusive, cyclic narrative thus has the effect of creating a distant perspective 
on all the activity we have witnessed.  We seem to step back and view the 
narrative from afar and the impact is something like what Edith Kern describes 
in her essay, ‘Drama Stripped for Inaction’ (1954): 
 
Seen from a distance, all human activity shrinks, in fact, into 
nothingness, its ultimate irrelevance, its qualities of repetition and habit 
come to the fore and deprive it of all claim to individual importance so 
that, almost, it becomes equivalent to inactivity. … In the perspective of 
distance, even the most active life becomes one long wait that is barren 
of fulfilment.399   
 
However, this distant view that we get only at the end of the film contrasts 
sharply with the idea of science we construct as we witness the purposeful daily 
life of laboratory work in ‘close-up’ with its ups and downs, its frustrations 
(unripe starfish, urchins dead in their bucket, the hybrid larva ‘cooked’ under the 
microscope) and its brief triumphs (a beaker of eggs, hatching blastulas, a less 
negative referee).   
In creating this bifocal perspective, Hopeful Monsters provides a more 
complex picture of the scientific life than is possible in the classic science 
documentary.  The point I wish to emphasise is that Hopeful Monsters is able, 
because of its mode and narrative structure to represent an aspect of the 
scientific life that the classic documentary simply cannot, even in principle, 
because it represents science as a Baconian ‘machine’.  In Hopeful Monsters, the 
scientist is not the Baconian ‘plain-thinking man of facts and calculations’ that 
Peter Medawar lampoons but something closer to a ‘poet fellow’, a person who, 
through the ‘versatile and ardent’ scientific imagination that Goethe speaks of, 
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constructs a model of the world and tries to persuade the rest of his community 
to share his vision.400 
In the end, style is all-important; for by not abandoning the sensory 
realm of spatiotemporal continuity for the abstract argumentation of the 
expository mode, the style of Hopeful Monsters engages the viewer more deeply 
than the classic science documentary can.  The film invites the viewer not 
simply to acknowledge the place in which science is being done but to imagine 
themselves entering the diegetic space itself.  At the same time, the film’s 
reflexivity makes the viewer aware of having this imaginary experience and thus 
Hopeful Monsters empowers the viewer by demonstrating, as Goethe argues, 
that the well-spring of the scientific imagination—experience of nature—is 
available to us all:  
 
Experiencing, looking, observing, contemplating, connecting, 
discovering, inventing are mental activities which, singly and severally, 
are exercised a thousandfold by more or less gifted people … From these 
various powers named here, and many other related ones, Mother Nature 
has excluded no one.401 
 
And so, in articulating a constructivist view of science in which, as Ernst von 
Glasersfeld says, ‘the thinking subject has no alternative but to construct what 
he or she knows on the basis of his or her own experience,’ Hopeful Monsters 
enriches our idea of science and invites the viewer to claim it as their own.402   
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APPENDIX 1 





















OVERLAY IMAGES OF 
WORLD EVENTS & 
ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 



















We are on the brink of uncovering a 
hidden world, a world that connects 
past and future generations in ways we 
never imagined possible.   
 
SKINNER: 
What this means is an environmental 
exposure that your grandmother had 
could cause a disease in you, even 
though you’ve never been exposed to 
the toxin, and you are going to pass it 



























WITH B/W ARCHIVE 
V/O: 
These extraordinary discoveries have 




It’s not just the genes but also the 
environment in the early life of your 
ancestors.  It’s not so much you are 
what you eat, it’s that you are what 
your mother ate and maybe you are 
what your grandmother ate, and if you 
take our data, you are what stress your 
grandmother or grandfather had. 
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MONTAGE B/W ARCHIVE 
CHILDREN AT PLAY 
TO CAMERA 
V/O: 
It will change the way we think about 
our relationship with every generation. 
 
WOLF REIK: 
It makes me feel closer to my children.  
What I experience in terms of 
environment will have some type of a 













The science of inheritance is being 
turned on its head. 
 
MARCUS PEMBREY: 



































BLEED TO B/W 
B/W ARCHIVE STILL 
FARMERS & FAMILY 
 
V/O: 
This small Swedish town may hold the 
evidence to launch a medical 
revolution.  Overkalix lies huddled on 
the edge of the Arctic Circle, 





HARVESTING POTATOES   
It was cut off from the rest of the 
















MARCUS & OLOV 









BOTH IN GRAVEYARD 
OUT OF FOCUS 
 
 
Marcus Pembrey has travelled here to 
meet his colleague, Olov Bygren.   
 
They believe that the story lying 
buried in these graveyards may hold 
the proof to their radical ideas. 
 
BYGREN: 
Here we have at least two generations. 
 
PEMBREY:  
In the same grave? 
 
BYGREN: 




























This group of people could contribute 
to really a sea change in the way we 
think about inheritance. 
 
V/O: 
They have come to this churchyard to 
find grandmothers and 
granddaughters, grandfathers and 
grandsons, connecting people who 
lived almost a hundred years apart in 
entirely new ways, uncovering links 
that confound scientific thinking. 









Prof Marcus Pembrey, 





Up till now inheritance is just the 
genes, the DNA sequence.   I suspect 
there we’re going to demonstrate that 
the inheritance was more than that. 
 




















It is the culmination of more than 
twenty years work.  And for the first 
time, Pembrey is confronting the 
magnitude of their discovery. 
 
PEMBREY: 
Really it’s come alive for me, coming 
here, more than I had expected.  It’s, 























C/U PEMBREY HOLDING 
POLAROID OF HIM & 
WIFE IN FRONT OF HIS 
FACE 
 
MS PEMBREY & WIFE AS 
HE LOWERS POLAROID 
C/U SCIENTIST HOLDING 
POLAROID 
MS SCIENTIST & FAMILY 
MONTAGE SCIENTIST 
FISHING 
C/U OLD PAINTINGS OF 
ANCESTORS 








Marcus Pembrey is one of a select 
band of scientists, a band of scientists 
who are daring to challenge an 





They believe the lives of our parents, 
grandparents and even our great-


















SECKL WITH FAMILY 
C/U WILD MEADOW 





REIK WITH FAMILY MS 
well-being, despite never experiencing 

























TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 











FERTILISATION OF EGG 
PROCESS 
C/U CHROMOSOME & 
GENETIC CODES 
REIK: 
You cannot predict where important 
discoveries will be.  The only thing 








Conventional biology has always 
believed that our genetic inheritance is 
set in stone at the moment of our 
conception.  At that instant, we each 
receive a set of chromosomes from 
both our mother and father.  Within 
these chromosomes are the genes, 





C/U FERTILISED EGG IN 
CHAIN 
ANIMATION – CELLS 
After conception, it was assumed that 
our genes are locked away inside 









ZOOM OUT TO BABY 
DEVELOPING INTO 
ADULT 
DRINKING AND SMOKING 
 
ZOOM INTO LOCKED UP 
GENE IN BODY 
untouched by the way we live. 
 
 
So what you do in your life may affect 
you but your genes remain untainted, 
































FADE TO BLACK 
FAMILY GROUP IN 
COVENT GARDEN 
C/U FATHER 
PAN TO C/U DAUGHTER 
FAMILY GROUP 
 
In classic genetics, your parents and 
grandparents simply pass on their 
genes.   
 
 
The experiences they accumulate in a 
lifetime are never inherited,  
 
 
lost for ever as the genes pass 






The biology of inheritance was a 
reassuringly pure process –  
 
 



















In the early 80s Marcus Pembrey 
headed the Clinical Genetics 









PEMBREY IN OXFORD 
STREET 




He was frequently treating families 















We were constantly coming across 
families which didn’t fit the rules, 
didn’t fit any of the patterns that 
genetics were supposed to fit so you 
think of chromosome abnormalities 
and you check the chromosomes and 
they’re normal.   
 
So you then have to start imagining as 
it were you know what might be 
underlying this and you’re really 
driven to try and work it out because 











C/U GENETIC DIAGRAM 






The more families he saw, the more 
the rules of inheritance appeared to 
break down, diseases and conditions 
that simply didn’t fit with the textbook 
convention.  One condition in 
particular caught his eye: Angelman’s 
syndrome. 
00:06:44 MONTAGE OF CHILDREN 
WITH CONDITION 
PEMBREY: 
Named after Harry Angelman, the 
paediatrician who first described 
Angelman syndrome, he referred to 
them as happy puppet children 
because this described in some sense 
the features.  They have a rather jerky 
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sort of movement when they’re 
walking.  These children had no 
speech, they are severely incapacitated 
in terms of learning but are 
uncharacteristically happy.  They are 







C/U BOYS WITH 
SYNDROME 





The condition was caused by a genetic 
fault. A key sequence of DNA was 
missing, deleted from chromosome 15.  
 
PEMBREY: 
Then we came across a paradox.  At 
the same time the same change, the 
same little deletion of chromosome 15 
had been clearly associated with a 
quite different syndrome, much milder 
in terms of intellectual impairment, the 







































These children are characterised by 
being very floppy at birth but once 
they started eating properly and so on, 
they then had an insatiable appetite 
and would get very very large.   
 
V/O: 
What Pembrey saw simply made no 
sense.  Here were two completely 
different diseases – Angelman’s 
Syndrome and Prader-Willi Syndrome 
– being caused by exactly the same 























So here we’re in a bizarre situation 
really.  How could one propose that 
the same deletion could cause a 
different syndrome?   
 
V/O: 
It appeared to Pembrey as if the simple 
view of inheritance was beginning to 
unravel.  But his doubts were contrary 












SLOW MOTION CROWDS 
OF PEDESTRIANS 
OVERLAY ROWS OF 
GENETIC CODES 
FADE TO OVERLAY 








In the early 1990s the biggest project 
ever undertaken in biology was 
captivating the world.   
 
NEWS: 
The human genome project will be 
seen as the outstanding achievement in 




















FADE TO CROWD SCENE 
& GENETIC CODES 
ZOOM OUT TO FRONT 
PAGE NEWS STORY 
 
 





The human genome project was to be 
the pinnacle of a century of work on 
genes and genetics.  It seemed as if the 




The genetic blueprint of mankind – 
Mapping out nearly the whole human 
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IMAGERY & HEADLINES genetic code –  



















Human genome is like a bible where 
everything was written down.  The 
hope and the expectation was that 
once we had that book in front of us, 
and all the letters, we could just read 
down the pages and we would 





























C/U TO NEWSCAST 
 
 
LIGHTS OUT OF FOCUS 
V/O: 
It would offer a complete 
understanding of human biology at a 
molecular level.  The hope was that 
once the code was written down, 
scientists could find the genetic cause 
and cure for every disease.   
 
NEWS: 
It could lead to the end of diseases like 
cancer and – 
 
CLINTON: 
Alzheimers, Parkinsons, diabetes – 
 
NEWS: 








CAPTION IN/MUSIC OUT 
Prof Jonathan Seckl 
Edinburgh University 
CAPTION OUT 
MUSIC IN/GENETIC CODE 
SECKL: 
We were thinking of genes in a very 
mechanical way.   
 
We were thinking of them just in 
terms of the sequence of the letters.  
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SEQUENCES We were working out how we could 














HI SPEED PHOTOGRAPH 
NEW YORKERS 
CROSSING BRIDGE 





TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 
Prof Michael Skinner 
Washington State University 
CAPTION OUT 
V/O: 
Scientists estimated that the human 
genome, the book of life, would 
contain around a hundred thousand 





And then when they started 
sequencing, they realised there may be 
a hundred thousand genes and then it 
popped down to sixty and then it 
popped down to fifty.  I mean – and 
slowly it went down to a much smaller 
number.  In fact we found out that the 
human genome is probably not as 
complex and doesn’t have as many 














HI SPEED PEDESTRIANS 
 
TO CAMERA/MUSIC OUT 
 
MUSIC IN 
HI SPEED PEDESTRIANS & 








So that then made us really question – 
well, if the genome has less genes in 
this species versus this species and 
we’re more complex potentially, 





Now scientists estimate there are 














TO CAMERA/MUSIC OUT 
C/U MOVING PETRI 
DISHES 
ARTICLES & GENETIC 
CODE OVERLAY 
ZOOM INTO FIGURE OF 
30,000 
TO CAMERA 
SLO MO PEDESTRIANS ON 
BRIDGE 
SECKL: 
We believed, I believed naively, that 
we would be able to find the genetic 
components of common diseases and 
that’s proven to be very difficult.   
 
 
The idea of one gene, one disease does 
not explain it all. 
 
V/O: 
Thirty thousand genes didn’t appear 
enough to explain human complexity.  


















FADE FROM SWIMMER 
TO SPLIT SCREEN 
B/W ARCHIVE WITH 
ANGELMAN’S SUFFERERS 
 





The first hints of what was missing lay 
in the curious paradox of the Prader-
Willi and Angelman syndromes: two 
quite different diseases caused by 
exactly the same genetic fault.   
 
When Pembrey looked at the 
inheritance pattern for the conditions, 






What really mattered was the origin of 
the chromosome 15 that had the 
deletion.  If the deletion was on the 
chromosome 15 that the child had 
inherited from father, then you would 
have Prader-Willi syndrome whereas 
if the deletion was inherited from the 
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It was a complete surprise that the 
same missing strip of DNA could 
cause one disease when it came from 
the mother, and a completely different 
disease when it came from the father.  
It was as if the genes knew where they 









You’ve got a developing foetus 
manifesting this condition.  How does 
the chromosome 15 know where it 
came from?  It, there must be a tag or 
an imprint placed on that chromosome 
– join either egg or sperm formation  
in the previous generation – to say hi, I 
came from mother, I came from father 
and we are functioning differently so 
that’s the key thing, that although the 
DNA sequence is the same, the 
different sets of genes were being 
silenced depending on whether it came 























It showed that there was clearly more 
to inheritance than simply the coded 
sequence of DNA.   
 
PEMBREY: 
We then realised that we were dealing 
with what is now known as genomic 
imprinting.  What genomic imprinting 
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00:13:23 TO CAMERA means is in a nutshell that genes have 























MS FAMILY GROUP 





BODIES WITH B/W 
ARCHIVE FOOTAGE OF 
BABIES AT PLAY 
 
CHANGE ARCHIVE TO 
OLDER CHILDREN AT 
PLAY 
ARCHIVE CHANGE TO 
ADULTS 
FAR EASTERN FAMILY 
GROUP 
C/U MOTHER 
PAN TO SON 
CGIs GENES 




Something other than just the DNA 
was capable of moving between 






It was a tantalising glimpse into this 
unknown and unexpected world, a 
hidden layer acting on and able to 
directly control how or genes function.   
 
 
It meant that inheritance was not 





but whether those genes were silenced, 









TO CAMERA/MUSIC OUT 
LIGHTS ON & OFF 
MONTAGE & MUSIC IN 
 
C/U CELLS 
MONTAGE OF LIGHT 
IMAGES OFF & ON 
TO CAMERA/MUSIC OUT 
REIK: 
You can think of it as a light switch.   
 
Switch on the gene, the light is 
shining, the gene is active.  Makes 
this, makes the cell do a certain thing.  
Or the light switch is off, everything is 
dark. That gene is off.  The switches 
remain on or remain off, and that gives 














ANIMATION – GENE & 










The activity of genes was being 
controlled by a switch, the attachment 
of a simple chemical which dictated 
whether the gene was switched on or 
off.   
 
SKINNER: 
Whether those genes are turned on or 
off is called epigenetics. 
 
PEMBREY: 

















Not only is the sequence important of 
the DNA which we’ve studied for a 
long time, the past few decades, but 
we now understand that in addition to 
that there’s this overlying epigenetic 
phenomenon that allows the genes to 











LIGHTS PULL TO FOCUS 












Epigenetics could explain how a 
human could be created with less than 
thirty thousand genes, and why the 




Now if we actually put epigenetics on 
top of it, where it makes it much more 
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complicated and where the genes get 
activated into a certain level and so 
forth, then you have a complexity that 
can start to explain biology much 
more effectively in the simple 




















So clearly we have additional levels of 
complexity that we now need to 




The next huge challenge for modern 
biology is to now decipher the 
epigenetic code, to understand all the 


























An accurate chemical map of the 
human genome tells us surprisingly 
little about how it actually works.  
Transcribing the code of the genes, the 
genome project, is not an end but 












C/U MOTHER & BABY 
PAN TO DAUGHTER 
PAN TO SON 
PAN TO ELDER SON 
FADE TO COLOURS THEN 
If inheritance was not just about DNA,  
 
 
if these gene switches were so 
important,  












C/U STEPHANIE HOLDING 
DEVELOPING POLAROID 
C/U AS STEPHANIE 
LOWERS POLAROID 
MS FAMILY GROUP 




Stephanie and Eamonn Mullins have 













TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 
Stephanie Mullins 
CAPTION OUT 
FAMILY PLAYING IN 
GARDEN 
STEPHANIE MULLINS: 
When you’re trying to conceive, and 
you see all your friends around you 
getting pregnant, having children, as 
each month went on you become more 
and more desperate. 
00:16:56 CIARAN WITH DAD IN 
GARDEN 
V/O: 
Doctors recommended IVF treatment.  
In the UK alone, around 8,000 babies 
are conceived every year using 






CIARAN WITH DAD 
CIARAN STEPHANIE & 
DAD 
 
After the third attempt Stephanie 














At the time they, they didn’t really 
highlight any risk to us. 
 
And then we went for our routine scan 
and I did feel that the scan was taking 








Basically what they’d found was 





MUSIC IN  
Ciaran’s abdomen which basically 
means that part of the bowel is still on 












Doctors suspected that Ciaran might 
be suffering from Beckwith 
Wiedemann syndrome, a rare 
condition where babies are born very 
large, often have over-size tongues 


















HIGHLIGHT TONGUE ON 
SCAN 




But they couldn’t say one hundred 
percent that the baby did have 
Beckwith Wiedemann syndrome, but 
it was showing signs.   
 
They could see his tongue protruding 
on the scan and he said that he had 
very big thighs  
 
 
But until Ciaran was actually born we 
didn’t know how severely affected he 





COLOUR STILL DAD AT 
COT 





When Ciaran was born, it was clear he 













Within a few hours of the birth, Ciaran 
had to have surgery to have the bowel 
that was on the outside of the abdomen 









C/U SCAR ON CIARAN’S 
TUMMY 
 







Ciaran also had surgery to reduce the 
size of his tongue and every few 
months he has scans to check for 
tumours. 





Good boy Ciaran, you are a very, very 





VIEW OF SCAN IMAGES 
EX C/U CIARAN’S FACE 
 




Cases of Beckwith Wiedemann 




















WOLF AT MICROSCOPE 
 
 









Wolf Reik worked in developmental 
genetics.  He was fascinated by this 
emerging epigenetic ghost world.  He 
wanted to know what could throw the 
switches on or off. 
 
 
To his surprise he found that simply 
placing a mouse embryo in a culture 


















CGIs SWITCHES TURNING 
ON & OFF 







C/U CULTURE DISH 
 







After we had seen relatively easy it 
was to change the switches in mouse 
embryos, we thought that perhaps the 
same could be true of human embryos.   
 
In IVF you also have the embryo for a 
brief period of time in a culture dish 
and so we were asking the question 
whether as in a mouse embryo, the 
mere fact of human embryos having 
been in a culture dish or been 













Wolf knew that Beckwith Wiedemann 









So what we were looking at was a 
group of babies, children that have 
Beckwith Wiedemann syndrome, what 

















Could IVF be switching genes on or 
off?  Could IVF itself cause the 
syndrome? 
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What we found was an increased 
occurrence of this epigenetic 









C/U IVF PROCEDURES 
 
 
LS TO STEPHANIE & 
FAMILY AT 
PLAYGROUND 




Although the disease is extremely rare, 
the risk appeared to increase three to 
four times with IVF.  It seemed that 
the simple act of removing the embryo 
from its natural environment could 








CIARAN & SISTER ON 
ROUNDABOUT 
STEPHANIE: 
And I do feel frustrated that Ciaran 
might possibly have Beckwith 
Wiedemann syndrome because we had 
IVF, but at the time it was the right 

























And I think that we should look again 
at the IVF procedures, the conditions 
that are being used, and carry out 
better and more precise experiments to 
see how we can avoid throwing these 




LIGHTS GOING OFF & ON 







Wolf had shown a simple change in 
environment was enough to turn a 



















Everyone thought that any altered 
switches could not be inherited. 
 
 
He took some mice with altered gene 








Our expectation was that as the altered 
genome was passed to the children, 







IMAGE ERASED FROM 
SCREEN 






When he looked at the gene profile of 










You had dots that you were looking at 
and every dot means a gene is on, and 
all of a sudden you know somebody 
















The epigenetic switch thrown in one 
generation was clearly also present in 
























thing before so it was the first time 
and all the people looking at the 
genome saying no this can’t be right, 
you know it’s the wrong gel, you 
know how you get excited about it and 
then you think oh maybe this is wrong 
and you’re not on the right track and 
we were very excited.   











LIGHTS OFF & ON 
FAMILY GROUP SHOTS 
 
V/O: 
This meant that the genes were not 
locked away.  A simple environmental 
event could affect the way genes 
















C/U PUNK DAUGHTER 






C/U YOUNG WOMAN  
PAN TO GRANDMOTHER 
& DAUGHTER 
 
As if a memory of an event was being 
passed down through generations.   
 
It was something many scientists 
regarded as impossible.  If this effect 
could be observed in humans the 
implications would be profound.   
 
It would mean that what we 
experience could affect not just us but 




















While these observations were just 
emerging from laboratories, Pembrey 
was still working at Great Ormond 
Street.  He began to wonder why these 
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Now my reputation was made as a 
clinical geneticist and so I was much 










I also like to stir things up a bit and it 
amuses me to speculate because I have 
got nothing to lose, and if I’m right 







PEMBREY IN GARDEN 







He speculated why genes would carry 
a memory from one generation to the 
next, what evolutionary purpose could 
it serve? 




Maybe imprinting was used as a 

















He thought it could be used for a 
mother to send messages to her baby 





ZOOM INTO BABY IN 
WOMB GOING INTO 
PEMBREY: 
Something that always puzzled me 





ANIMATION OF THEORY 
SHOWING SIZE OF PELVIS 
& EGGS & DEVELOPMENT 
OF BABY 
was, what stops the baby’s head 
jamming up in the birth canal?  The 
baby of course is growing in one 
generation but the mother’s pelvis was 
grown in the previous generation so if 
the mother was starving when she was 
growing so she had a small pelvis, 
maybe her eggs had captured that 
information and so they were 
instructing the growth genes of the 
future babies to not work so much and 
for the baby not to grow too much so 
as to jam up the birth canal.  So there 
was some sort of co-ordination 
between the growth in two 

















ZOOM INTO BYGREN’S 





He published his ideas in an obscure 
journal and largely forgot about it.  
After all, there was no evidence for 
any of this.  It was pure speculation.   
00:25:49 MUSIC OUT 
C/U E-MAIL 
 
Then four years later Marcus received 
















It really came as a bolt out of the blue.  
I just got an e-mail in May 2000 
saying my paper was the only thing he 
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00:26:02 TO CAMERA could find in the literature that in any 




















The e-mail was sent by Olov Bygren.  
He was studying the population 






















What made these records unique was 
their detail.  They recorded births and 
deaths over hundreds of years but they 











B/W PERIOD STILL LOCAL 
FARMERS & C/Us 
INDIVIDUALS 
 
More significantly Overkalix’s 
isolated location on the Arctic Circle 
meant that it was particularly 











TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 
Prof Lars Olov Bygren 
University of Umea 
CAPTION OUT 
BYGREN: 
In the 19th century this was a very 
isolated area.  They could not have 
help from outside.  As it was so poor 
they really had a hard time when there 
was a famine and they really had a 
good, good time when the harvest 
were good. 















Bygren appeared to be seeing links 







I sent Marcus Pembrey an e-mail 
telling him that we had some, some 










BYGREN AT MICROFICHE 
READER 
 











I was terribly excited to get this 
completely out of the blue.  And for 
the first time it seemed that there was 
some data that we could then start to 
explore, so that was the beginning of 














Overkalix offered Pembrey a unique 
opportunity to see if the events that 
happened in one generation could 







VIEWS FROM SHIP TO 
NEW YORK 
WATERFRONT & 





While Pembrey and Bygren sifted 
through their Overkalix data, someone 
else had stumbled on another group of 



















Rachel Yehuda is a psychologist.   
 
She’s interested in how people 











Well trans-generational effects were 
not on my radar screen at all until we 









B/W ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 











While treating the Holocaust survivors 
for stress, she was surprised that many 
of the children of the survivors were 












TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 
Prof Rachel Yehuda 




About five children of Holocaust 
survivors were calling us for every 
Holocaust survivor and what these 
children said was that they were 
casualties of the Holocaust too, that 





























the children was caused by continual 







Our studies had really convinced me 
that it was the later experiences of the 
child, as the child was growing up 
bombarded with years and years of 
symptoms from the parents, that 












C/U SECKL HOLDING 
DEVELOPING POLAROID 
 









However in Edinburgh Jonathan Seckl 
was interested in stress exposure in 
pregnant women and wondered if 
stress effects could be transmitted to 
their children.   
He started some experiments with 
pregnant rats to see if exposing them 













And we found that the next generation 
for the rest of the lifespan of those 
animals themselves had altered stress 
responses, and showed behaviour that 
























themselves, he decided to breed them 
and see if the stress effects could be 
found in generations never exposed to 
the stress hormone. 
00:30:19  SECKL: 
And their daughters and sons also got 

















CGI GENE SWITCH 






For Seckl the only explanation was 
that a stressful event was throwing a 









His work might have stopped there 
























When on 9/11 the planes crashed and 
the towers came down Yehuda and 
Seckl were critically aware of the 
potential for the impact to be far-
reaching, even affecting generations 
yet to be born. 
 
Ailsa Gilliam was working in a 







TO CAMERA/CAPTION IN 
Ailsa Gilliam 
GILLIAM: 
As I left my building coming out 
through the doors, there was a lot of 
ash floating through the air and some 
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00:31:12 CAPTION OUT 
ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 
9/11TOWERS BURNING  
office papers.  So I knew that if I 
looked up I may see something that I 

















Just the thought that people had died 
close to me, I broke down. 
 
I got very upset. 
 
 
I wanted to get out of the environment.  
Being pregnant I did not want to open 
myself up to more emotional 

















After the events of 9/11 unfolded, 
Yehuda and Seckl teamed up to study 
women like Ailsa who were pregnant 












AILSA WITH SON 
YEHUDA: 
There were a lot of different 
opportunities to examine what the 
effects of 9/11 would be on the 
children who might be born to parents 
who developed post-traumatic stress 
disorder in response to 9/11, and 
particularly those who had been 















When exposed to a stressful event a 
person produces cortisol, the hormone 
that helps regulate the body’s response 
to that stress.  If cortisol levels are too 
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low, a person finds coping with stress 
very difficult and are prone to PTSDs, 




AILSA WITH SON 







They found nearly two hundred 
women of whom a number had 








AILSA & SON LOOKING 
AT STATUE OF LIBERTY 
FROM BOAT 
 





Half of them developed post-traumatic 
stress disorder.  We then looked at 
those women and found they had 
abnormal cortisol in their saliva.  The 










AILSA & SON ON BOAT 
 
 
TO CAMERA/MUSIC IN 
The argument in the Holocaust 
survivors had been that their children 
showed abnormal stress hormones 
because they themselves had been 
stressed by listening to the tales 
recounted by their parents of their 
awful exposure during the 1940’s.  
That could not be the case with the 

















Nor only did infants have lower 
cortisol levels but they were different 
depending on how pregnant the 













The main effect was only seen with 
those mothers with PTSD who were 
pregnant in the last third of pregnancy.  
Mothers with equal levels of PTSD 
who were pregnant in the first and 
second thirds of pregnancy at 9/11, 






















It suggested to us that it couldn’t just 
be about genetics, that there was 
something that was being transmitted 
in the late stages of pregnancy where 
the mother’s symptoms were having 
some effect on the development of the 







AILSA’S SON PLAYING 
INTERCUT WITH 9/11 






It appeared that epigenetics might be 
responsible, that an event had altered 
the stress response in the children. 
00:34:27 TO CAMERA 
MUSIC OUT 
YEHUDA: 
What these findings did was suggest to 
us that we need to be looking where 




AILSA WITH SON  
V/O: 
To know for certain that this was an 
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epigenetic effect, they’ll need to be 
sure that their observations weren’t 
simply due to high levels of stress 






Now - and here is the bit where we 
have to speculate - the animal work 
would suggest that this might then 



















If they find the same stress effects in 
the children’s children of 9/11 then it 
will be clear that a genetic memory of 








It’s the key thing next to find out, but 
the 9/11 population will be very, very 
important for us to be able to follow 


















The work of Yehuda and Seckl offers 
tantalising evidence of proof of 
inherited epigenetic effects in humans, 
but they need data that extends beyond 












The only way forward was to look 
back to the past.  In Sweden Pembrey 
and Bygren had data that provided the 
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chance to study the effects of famine 









BYGREN IN LIBRARY 
MUSIC OUT 
 





Olov Bygren was looking to see if 
poor nutrition had an effect on health 













B/W ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 
HARVESTING POTATOES 





PAN TO GRANDCHILD 






It appeared that a famine could effect 
people almost a hundred years later 
even if they never suffered a famine 
themselves. 
 
He wanted to know how this might be 












Olly first reported that the food supply 
of the ancestors was affecting the 
longevity or morality rate of the 





BYGREN AT MICROFICHE 




Pembrey had a hunch that the 
incidence of one disease, diabetes, 
might be an indicator that epigenetics 
was involved. 
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00:36:50 TO CAMERA PEMBREY: 
Specifically I wanted to know the 
results of the diabetes because this was 












BYGREN IN LIBRARY 




So Olov trawled the records for any 
deaths due to diabetes and then looked 
back to see if there was anything 




















C/U MICROFICHE PAGES 
PEMBREY: 
A few months later he e-mailed me to 
say that indeed they had shown a 
strong association between the food 
supply of the father’s father and the 
chance of diabetes being mentioned on 
the death certificate of the grandchild.  
So of course I was really rather excited 
by that because it really did look as if 
there was some trans-generational 



























It looked as if there were clear links 
through the generations between 
grandparents and grandchildren. 
 
They found that the life expectancy of 
grandchildren was being directly 
affected by the diet of the grandparent. 









C/Us HEADSTONES & 
CROSSES 
 
It appeared that Overkalix held the key 
to finding the first evidence of 
















It really did look as if there was some 
new mechanism transmitting 
environmental exposure information 




















Because these ideas were so heretical, 
Pembrey knew that the results could 
be dismissed as nothing more than a 
curiosity. 
 
They needed to get an understanding 
of how this was happening.  How 
could the grandparent capture the 










We wanted to tease out when you 





C/Us BYGREN & 
PEMBREY CHECKING 
DATA 
C/U FICHE FILES 
V/O: 
So he and Bygren went back to the 
data and looked again.  The more they 





















B/W ARCHIVE CORN 
FADE TO MODERN DAY 
FIELD 
MUSIC OUT/TO CAMERA 
 







We were able to look at the food 
supply every year in the grandfather 
and the grandmother from the moment 
they were conceived right through 
until the age of twenty.  We found that 
there are only certain periods in the 
ancestor’s development when they can 
trigger this trans-generational 
response.  They’re what one might call 























STILL OF FOETUS 
C/U GRANDFATHER 
ARCHIVE 




They discovered that when a famine 
was able to trigger an effect was 
different for the grandmother than the 
grandfather. 
 
The grandmother appeared susceptible 
while she herself was still in the 
womb.   
 
While the grandfather was affected 



















And the timing of these sensitive 
periods was telling us that it was tied 
in with the formation of the eggs and 
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C/U B/W STILL ARCHIVE 
BOY 





B/W ARCHIVE CORN 
INTERCUT WITH 
SWIMMING SPERM & EGG 




This was critical because now they 
knew how it was happening. 
 
Environmental information was being 
imprinted on the egg and sperm at the 











MEADOW FLOWERS & 
LAKE VIEWS 
 






WS BYGREN IN LIBRARY 
At last a clear picture of an inherited 




All they needed to do now was to 
compile their findings.  Bygren drew 























Hand drawn, this is what Olly sent me, 
you know he was too excited to wait 
for the thing to be drawn out properly.  
You know he sent me the data and in 
fact I was recovering from having 
something done on my heart so he sent 
it saying you know I hope this helps 
you get better quickly you know 











C/U PEMBREY & C/Us 
DIAGRAM 
V/O: 
When Pembrey plotted out the 













B/W ARCHIVE STILL 
LOCALS & OVERLAY 
DIAGRAM 
PEMBREY: 
Once I had plotted out the full extent 
of those results, it was so beautiful and 
such a clear pattern I knew then quite 
definitely that we were dealing with a 
trans-generational response.  It was so 
coherent and that’s important in 
science, that the effect was coherent in 
some way was tying in when eggs and 
sperm were being formed. 
00:41:20  V/O: 
The diagram showed a significant link 
between generations, between the diet 
in one and the life expectancy of 
another. 
00:41:30 TO CAMERA BYGREN: 
When you think that you have found 
something important for the 
understanding of diseases itself, you 










It’s up there with, I’m a sort of fair 
weather supporter of Liverpool, it’s up 
there with Liverpool winning the 
Champions’ League.  
00:41:53 
00:41:55 




You can only have it once in your 
lifetime. 
00:41:58 TO CAMERA WITH PEMBREY: 
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DIAGRAM This is going to become a famous 
diagram, I’m convinced about that.  I 
get so excited every time I see it.  It’s 
just amazing. 
00:42:05 C/U DIAGRAM 
TO CAMERA 
Every time I look at it, I find it really 



















BYGREN HOLDING UP 
DEVELOPING POLAROID 




BODIES OF CHILDREN 
 
C/U EGG & SPERM 
B/W ARCHIVE OF 
HARVEST PROJECTED 





Pembrey and Bygren have the first 
conclusive proof of an environmental 






The impact of a famine being captured 
by the genes in the eggs and sperm 
and the memory of this event was 
being carried forward to effect the 








We are changing the view of what 
inheritance is.  You can’t in life in 
ordinary development and living 
separate out the gene from the 








B/W ARCHIVE WAR 
SCENES PROJECTED 








Pembrey and Bygren’s work showed 
















B/W ARCHIVE CHILDREN 
EATING 
ARCHIVE FIRE SCENES 
MUSIC IN 








C/U SKINNER IN LAB 
could affect our health.  Increasingly it 
appeared as if all sorts of 
environmental events were capable of 




And in Washington State, Mike 
Skinner stumbled on some results with 
profound implications.   
He triggered an effect with commonly-
used pesticides and fungicides. 
 
He exposed a pregnant rat with a high 
dose of one of these pesticides and 









And so I treated the animals, the 
pregnant mother with these 
compounds and then we started seeing 
between six months to a year a whole 
host of other diseases that we didn’t 
expect and this ranged between 
tumours such as breast and skin 
tumours, prostate disease, kidney 
disease, and immune dysfunctions. 
00:43:53 ANIMATION OF MOUSE 
EXPERIMENT 
V/O: 
He bred these rats to see if these 













The next step was for us to go to the 
next generation and go to the third 
generation out in the same disease 






repeats and got the third generation 
showing it and then a fourth 
generation, we sat back and realised 
that the phenomenon was real. 
00:44:17 SKINNER IN LAB WITH 
COLLEAGUE 
We started seeing these major diseases 
occur in approximately 85% of all the 
animals of every single generation. 
00:44:25 HELICOPTER CROP 
SPRAYING 
V/O: 










































We knew that if an individual was 
exposed to an environmental toxin that 
they can get a disease state potentially.  
The new phenomenon is that when 
environmental toxin no longer affects 
just the individual exposed but two or 
three generations down the line. 
 
 
I knew that epigenetics existed.   
 
I knew that it was a controlling factor 
for DNA activity whether genes are 
silenced or not but to say that 
epigenetics would have a major role in 
disease development - so I had no 
concept for that.  The fact that this 
could have such a huge impact and 
could explain a whole host of things 
we couldn’t explain before, took a 














The exposure of a single animal to a 










FAMILY GROUP BY EROS 
STATUE 
BLACK FAMILY GROUP 
C/U CAUCASIAN GIRL 
PAN TO SISTER  
diseases in almost every individual of 
the following generations. 
 
And because epigenetic effects have 
been observed in humans, this may 





LARGE FAMILY GROUP 
TO CAMERA 
SKINNER: 
What this means then is what your 
grandmother was exposed to when she 
was pregnant could cause a disease in 
you, even though you’ve had no 
exposure and you’re going to pass it 




















B/W ARCHIVE FOOTAGE 







The work of these scientists is at last 
throwing a spotlight onto the 
mysterious hidden world of 
epigenetics. 
 
They appear to show that the lives of 













FAMILY GROUP – 
LONDON 
C/U FATHER  





These results are provocative.  Some 
find them, them difficult to accept. 
 
 
But it’s quite clear now that a number 
of laboratories are finding similar 
findings in the various systems that 
they are interested in.  So the 
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Epigenetics has the capacity to reach 
into every aspect of our lives and links 
our past present and future in 








I think this will be the next revolution 
in molecular biology.  This is, this 
really could be a paradigm shift we did 











B/W ARCHIVE IMAGES 
PROJECTED ONTO 
BODIES OF CHILDREN 
REIK: 
There are many diseases, very 
common diseases such as Alzheimers 
disease of the brain, diabetes which 
are very difficult to explain currently 
genetically.  Maybe a lot of these kind 
of very common diseases are actually 














OTHER FAMILY GROUP 
 
V/O: 
We are just at the beginning.   
 
There is much that is unknown but 
what is clear is that it will change the 









C/U PEMBREY HOLDING 
DEVELOPING POLAROID 







I’ve thought of nothing else really for 
the last five years.  It is said the first 
time you know one had a photograph 
of the earth you know this sort of 











through the universe you know, it had 
a huge effect on the sort of save the 
planet type of feeling.  You know I’m 
sure that’s part of why the future 
generation think in a planetary way, 
because they’ve actually seen that 
picture you know and this might be the 
same.  It, it, it may get to a point 
where they realise that you live your 
life as a sort of  -  
 
I don’t know, as a sort of guardian of 
your genome.  It seems to me you’ve 
got to be careful of it because it’s not 
just you.  You can’t be selfish because 
you can’t say well I’ll smoke or I’ll do 
whatever it is because I’m prepared to 
die early.  You’re also looking after it 
for your children and grandchildren.    
 
































































DON WILLIAMSON shuffles 
across his sitting room to the 








He inserts a video tape and 
heads back to his chair.  The 













WILLIAMSON raises the 






















I have an edited... 
 
 ...version of the video 
 
I think this is it...‘Don Williamson’, 
yes 
 










V/O STEPHEN FRY: 
So, for a bit of fun with genetics now.  
What do you get if you cross a 















I feel such a fool! 
 
JIMMY CARR: 
Can I just say, I’m reading a book at 
the moment and I haven’t finished it 
about a very very hungry 
caterpillar…I think I kind of might 
know where it’s going but I don’t 
want to spoil it. 
 
CLIVE ANDERSON: 
















































































































species that reproduces half way 
through its life-cycle… 
 
STEPHEN FRY 
No, there is a theory which a man has 
put forward which is that actually 
they are different species.  I know this 




Oh, what he’s done there is he’s not 
understood. That’s what’s 
happened…and I mean fair enough 
because it is complicated and you 




His name, I’ll tell you his name.  His 
name is Donald Williamson, formerly 
of the University of Liverpool.   It’s 
called Hybridogenesis apparently.  
Now it does seem pretty off the wall 
to say that they are two different 
species, but  he has some- 
 
CLIVE ANDERSON: 
That’s a fantastic idea though 
 
STEPHEN FRY: 
It is an amazing idea 
 
JIMMY CARR: 
You know but sometimes you see an 
old guy like in St. Tropez like with a 
really beautiful young girl and you 
think well maybe…could be a similar 








His star witness in this is a starfish 
called Luidia Sarsi. It starts life as a 
small larva with a tiny starfish inside.  
As the larva grows the starfish 
migrates to the outside and the larva 
settles on the seabed and they 
separate.  This is normal.  But in this 
one something remarkable happens.  




























swims off and lives for several 
months as an independent animal.  
It’s as if the caterpillar and the 
butterfly were alive at the same time.  
And he reasons…the point is that for 
millions upon millions of years 
particularly in the sea, sperm and seed 
have been mixed hundreds and 
thousands if not millions of different 
species and just once every million 
years they happen to create a double 
species.  He thinks it’s not 
impossible. We’re not sure whether 
we believe it but we’re intrigued by 









































A large room, lit from 
translucent windows.  In front 
of us DON hauls himself onto a 
low walkway of wooden slats.  
The sound of flowing water is 
loud.  
 
Title: “Ten years Earlier…” 
 
DON makes his way to the far 
end of the room where he 
reaches a deep metal tank, 
bends over it and looks inside.   
 
A star fish 
 
DON examines the starfish 
clinging to the side of the tank 
beneath the water, then, 
standing back as if to make 






ROBERT appears from off-
screen, brandishing a net on a 
pole with which he fishes out a 
large starfish and hands it to 




DON injects the animal with a 
small syringe before returning it 
to the water.  It sinks down to 
the bottom of the tank (about 
































You’ve got it. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 



















































ROBERT leaves and we watch 
Don make his way much more 
slowly between the tanks of 
water, stepping down from the 
walkway and shuffling past 
some smaller aquaria in which 
are hermit crabs and an 
octopus.  He lifts a small white 
bucket and carries it before him 
into “the room”.  
 
 
interrupting its dinner to induce it to 
spawn. Inject about 1cc…and put it 
back. 
 




Very much trial and error.  Find a soft 
bit, there we go.  I hope that within an 
hour they will turn their thoughts to 
reproduction.  Before they spawn, 
they will crawl up to the surface, or 
near the surface, and – which is very 
convenient, and we can then put them 
on the rack and hold a can underneath 




ROBERT: Okay, so what’s the next 
step for us? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Next step, go back to the room and do 

















DON places the white bucket 
on the side of a large basin.  He 
takes two urchins out of the 
bucket and places them on clear 
watch glasses that are on the 
side of the basin.  There are 
others of these watch glasses 




DON moves an urchin from the 
top of one of the watch glasses 
on to the top of another one, 
picks up the watch glass on its 
own, turns around and takes it 
WILLIAMSON: 
We can examine them now, see if we 






































































over to the work surface 
opposite the basin.  He places 
the watch glass under the 
microscope and sits down to 
view it. 
 
CU of DON’S hand as he tries 
to view the contents of the 




DON turns the microscope off 
and gets up.  He shuffles back 
over to the large basin and 
throws the contents of the 
watch glass into it.  He takes an 
urchin off one of the other 
dishes, picks up the watch glass 
and takes this over to the 
microscope, placing the watch 
glass under it.  He sits down 
and views the contents of the 
watch glass using the 
microscope. 
 






















CUs of his face peering down 




































Err, again ciliates, and sand grains.  
But neither eggs nor sperm. 
 
ROBERT: 
What does ‘ciliates’ mean? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 




That’s a bad sign is it?  From our 
point of view? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
They tend to accumulate if there’s 
anything rotting or going a bit off.  















the microscope and turns the 
microscope off. 
He washes the watchglasses 
under the tap and lays them 












DON empties the white bucket 
of sea urchins into one of the 
big tanks we saw previously, 
which contains the starfish.   
 
DON’s face is reflected on the 














































DON dials a number using a 
wall-mounted phone and holds 






We see ROBERT in the ‘tank 
room’ whilst hearing DON’s 
side of the telephone 
conversation.  We cut back to 
DON on the telephone, then 
back to ROBERT, who is 
decanting the starfish out of the 
large tank using a net and into a 
large white bucket on the side 
of the tank. 
 
 





Cut back to ROBERT, who 
puts down the net and takes the 
white bucket from the side of 
the tank.  He disappears off 
camera. 
 
We hear gulls in the 
background. 
 
Cut back to DON on the 
telephone.  He ends the call and 
places the receiver back. 
WILLIAMSON: 
Hello Mike, I thought you would have 
gone – Don.  We would like more 
Marthasterias.  This batch seems to 




Ah well, today nothing worked.  Our 
stock of Echinocardium were all 
dead.  So that was, err, useless.  And 
the stock of starfish which were 
collected by divers last week were all 
healthy, but although we injected six 
of them, none of them spawned.  I 
think we can get more heart urchins.  
We can dig in the sand at low water at 
Darby Haven.  But I think we’ll 
probably have to go for another 
species of starfish. 
 
Mmm, the ones that have produced 
have been medium to big.  But the 
really biggest ones have not produced 
and the really smallest ones have not 







Right, thank you.  Thank you, bye. 
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00:11:53 We follow ROBERT (holding 
the white bucket) walking past 
the outside ponds, through the 
front gate, and down a steep 
flight of stairs which leads to 
the sea.  He pours the contents 
of the bucket (including the 







DON is flicking through a book 
(‘The Handbook of 
Echinoderms of the British 
Isles’).  We cut between CUs of 















Cut to outside, a man is walking 
along a jetty towards a boat.  
Another man, onboard the boat, 
is clothed in diving gear.  The 
boat departs from the jetty.  We 
see another man is also clothed 
in diving gear. 
DEREK: 






































We are back in the room with 
DON and a photographer taking 





























Would it be possible, could you 
manage just to get in a little bit closer 






Little bit closer I think, would you 
normally work closer? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
No.  About there. 
 
PHOTOGRAPHER: 
I know it’s a little bit awkward for 
you.  That’s better.  Okay…at the 
camera now.  That’s good. And again.  
Cheer up a little bit.   
 
 
That’s fine, thank you very much 
indeed.  Right, how long are you 




Well, I’ve got to the stage when I can 













































View from the bench:  
ROBERT’s arm blocks the 
shot.  We see the photographer 

















Camera has been picked up by 
ROBERT again.  We see the 
photographer and DON talking. 
me.  Robert is going to London 
tomorrow, he’ll be back in about ten 
days and do another three or four 
weeks work and that will be all for 
this session.  But we might be able to 
resume it next Spring. 
 
PHOTOGRAPHER: 
Next Spring, right.  Okay, could we 
have Robert in one of the photographs 
do you think? 
 
ROBERT (off camera): 
I’m totally incidental to this process, 
I’m merely a pair of hands. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, I can’t work without a good 
pair of hands so you’re essential. 
 
PHOTOGRAPHER: 




Yes in Port Erin.  I’ve lived here for 
forty, fifty years.  Port Erin and Port 




I don’t know how I haven’t come 
across you before? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 




















CU of DON, then a girl.  DON 
puts his glasses on.  We see 
another man in the room, who 
DON is speaking to. 












Shot of the man holding a 
notepad, interviewing DON. 
WILLIAMSON: 
This is my one and only book…That 
looks like a caterpillar.  I would take 
it for a caterpillar, but it is the larva of 
a wood wasp, which is nothing like a 
butterfly or a moth.  In fact, the wood 
wasp is related to the stinging wasp 
and bees and wasps, and bees and 






So we get these forms turning up in 
different groups.  Under conventional 
theory, this is quite inexplicable, if 



































































DON flicks through the book. 
The reporter looks at the book 
off screen on Don’s lap. 
 






















CU of REPORTER scribbling 


















together.  And I puzzled over this for 
years and years and years and I used 
to lecture to students and point out 
there’s several other anomalies, like 
this, of species apparently having the 
wrong larvae which couldn’t 
adequately be explained. In many, 
many invertebrate animals the larva 
does not simply ‘develop into’ the 
juvenile.  In the case of Luidia sarsii, 
the starfish juvenile started to form 
within this very big larva, it 
eventually migrated to the outside and 






But the larva repairs any damage 
done by the juvenile and it goes on 
swimming.  And there are two 
recorded cases of this taking place in 
an aquarium and the larva has gone 
on swimming for a further three 
months after the juvenile has 






I think it could not possibly have 
evolved by natural selection and 
gradual changes over thousands and 






And I say this as a clear indication 
that the larval…form…and the 







And the fact that they can exist 
simultaneously, side by side, is fully 
consistent with my view.  There’s the 
larval genome and the juvenile and 

















































































CU of notepad. 
 
CU of REPORTER writing. 
CU of girl. 



























right from the start and have remained 
so, to this day.  It was never taken 
seriously that larvae can be swapped 
from one group to another.  But this 
seemed to be the only explanation for 






And I eventually hit upon the idea, 
the most convenient way to get a 
larva from one group to another is by 
hybridising.  A member of one group 
will hybridise with a member of the 




Is there, is there any particular reason 
why a species would hybridise?  Is 
that, I mean…  
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, they normally don’t, as is well 
known.  We’re talking for the most 
part about species which…release 
their eggs and sperm into the sea and 
they mix.  And, the egg of one species 
is always more readily fertilised by 






But I’m theorising that once in a 
million years, or even once in ten 
million years.  The first sperm that 
that egg would come up against 
would be the sperm of another species 
and we’d get a successful 
hybridisation.  And it’s only 
necessary, millions and millions of 
times in between, one species would 
breed with the same species.  But just 




Through sheer random chance? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 































































CU of book. 
 
 
CU of REPORTER writing 
CU of the book 




Tilt up to REPORTER’S face. 
 




CU of REPORTER’s face. 
 
 






REPORTER’s face, both 










REPORTER’s face, then to CU 













you say.  And that’s all that is 
required for my theory. 
 
REPORTER: 
But I always thought species couldn’t 
interbreed in that way under such sort 
of different.  I mean, from my point 
of view, I would have thought the 
DNA would have been sufficiently 
dissimilar to prevent that happening. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, years ago, well ten years ago.  I 
got eggs from a sea squirt, which is a 
group vaguely related to the 
vertebrates, and of course we are 
vertebrates.  And I fertilised these 
eggs with the sperm of a sea urchin, a 
very different group with very 
different larvae.  The sea squirt would 
normally have a tadpole larva…and 
the sea urchin has a larva that swims 
with its own cilia…very fine, 
undulating whiskers, if you like.  






Well, in spite of many failures, one of 
my attempted hybridisations worked, 
and I get 3000 eggs…these are 
ascidian eggs…sea squirt eggs that 
would normally hatch as tadpoles, 
they all hatched as little ciliated 
larvae and in fact very definitely sea 
urchin larvae from a sea squirt egg. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
The sceptics say this was a fluke.  It 
couldn’t really have worked, although 
I have…since explained in detail all 
my experimental methods and I took 
great precautions to avoid mixing 
cultures and all this sort of thing.  So, 
I claim that I have a theory of 
evolution, which I’m not knocking 
Darwin.  Darwin also had a theory of 
evolution, and a very good one, and 
he could explain about three quarters 
of evolution.  But in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when he 
published his famous book, very little 






























































































And had Darwin the knowledge that 
we have today, he would have written 
his book very differently.  In fact, he 







I’m not blaming Darwin, it was just 
the knowledge of his day.  He was 
explaining the evolution of adults.  I 




So what would be next, what would 




Well, the majority of biologists ignore 
my views, but there is a minority that 
support them, and some very 
enthusiastically, and I’m very grateful 
to them…and they are spread about 
the world, so I, in fact there are more 
in the United States and Korea and 






I am satisfied in my own mind, but 
other people aren’t, so what we want 
is more genuine hybrids.  And Robert 




Great.  Well, I hope one day to be 
able to say I’ve met someone whose 




Well, I don’t expect you will 
 304 
but…mine is a PS to Darwin. 
 
REPORTER: 
[Laughs].  Right.  Well thank you 
very much and very good luck with it.  
Thanks very much for agreeing to be 



















We see the divers (that we saw 
earlier) on the surface of the 







































A car engine is started.  CU of 
man’s hand.  CU of DON’s 
face. 
 
Shot looking out of the 
windscreen of the car, 
ROBERT can be seen in the 







The car drives along the sea 















Don, where did you study originally? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I went to Newcastle University which 
was then part of the University of 
Durham, in 1940.  And my university 
studies were interrupted by the war.  I 
did two years and then I went into the 
navy for the next two years.  But I got 
ill in the navy and I was invalided out, 
so in 1945 I came back to college in 
Newcastle, finished my original 
degree, and went to do a PhD.  After 
that I got a job with Liverpool 
University but not at Liverpool, in the 
Isle of Man where they have, and still 
have, a marine biological station. 
 
ROBERT: 
Was it unusual in your family?  I 







































































The car reaches a junction at 






















DON’s face.  Zoom out to 





Sandy beach at low tide. 
 
DON in car. 
 
 
Sandy beach at low tide.   
 
ROBERT comes into frame 
holding a pitchfork. 
 
DON in car. 
 
ROBERT walking down the 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, from the biological point of 
view, my father was a very keen 
amateur naturalist, so the- that side of 
it I got from him. 
 
ROBERT: 
What was your father? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
He was a school teacher, a rule school 
teacher, a village school master in 
North Northumberland.  And he used 
to…He was very keen on birds and 
very keen on pondlife in general, 
freshwater life.  And he used to keep 
freshwater aquaria and that was all 
the sort of thing that interested him.  
Of course, my original intention was 
to teach, like my father, but I would 
have been a teacher of biology.  But 
when I contracted tuberculosis during 
the war, one of the – well it was the 
doctor at the sanatorium – were 
discussing what I would do when I 
was fit and I said I intended to teach.  
He says, “not a good idea…there’s 
always the possibility that your 
disease will become active again and 
you could then be potentially 
infecting school children”.  And of 
course I had to acknowledge the truth 
of this.  But I suppose if I had been a 
school teacher, it’s very unlikely that 






It’s rather…not very low spring tide 
tonight but it should be low enough.  
And you don’t have to go right to the 
water’s edge.  Anywhere where it’s 
sandy and digable.  You look for very 
small indentations in the sand.  You 
dig up a fork full of sand and if you’re 
lucky there will be one or two heart 
urchins in it.   
 
You’ve plenty of time, half an hour 


























































sandy beach with the pitchfork 
and a big white bucket. 
 
A Time Cut 
 
ROBERT back at car showing 
DON what he has in the bucket.  
ROBERT closes car door. 
 
ROBERT is driving, we see the 
road ahead through the 
windscreen with ROBERT in 
the rear view mirror.  The car 
enters a suburban housing 
estate and parks in front of a 
garage door. 
 
Shot of a bungalow. 
 
 





Shot of bookshelf, CU of the 
book. 
 
DON gets up and gets the book 








Zoom in towards DON.  
Camera follows DON’s gaze 
then Tilt down to the book.   
 
CU of DON’s face 
 






























My father was a compulsive reader.   
 
 
There were not many books of, his 
own books on general science 
although he had a copy of Darwin’s 
‘Voyage of a Naturalist’ which I have 
inherited and it’s up there. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I suspect it was a college set book that 
he had to read.  I don’t know.  I think 
he thoroughly enjoyed reading it 
anyway and he was…He knew about 
evolution…he loved to talk to the 
children…it was not in any syllabus, 
but he would talk about the evolution 
and the way animals in particular – to 
a certain extent plants but particularly 
animals – had evolved.  And here we 
have Dad’s ‘Voyage of a Naturalist’ 





Well, at random: ‘describe the habits 
of the condor’; ‘describe methods of 
coal mining in Chile and conditions 
of mines in general in that country, 
explain why the condition of the 
agricultural labourer there is worse 
than that of miners’; ‘describe the 
inhabitants of New Zealand’; ‘give an 
account of the inhabitants of Tierra 
del Fuego’; ‘how does Darwin 






DON flicks through the book. 
quantity of vegetation in South 
America?’.  And the answers are on 
page 44 to 45 but what the answers 
are I do not know, but there’s that sort 
of thing.  And there are marginal 
marks and occasional marginal 























A white tiled annex at the 
marine labs.  DON is filling a 
white bucket with water from a 
large basin.  ROBERT comes 
into shot and picks some water 
up in the bucket he is holding 








ROBERT exits with two 
buckets, through a small 
alleyway between two 
buildings, and into the tank 
room.  DON is following 
behind.   
 
DON releases the starfish into 





























We’ll see which if any release eggs 
and sperm. 
00:37:24 ROBERT lays out empty watch 
glasses on to the work surface 
in the other room.  He covers 
each with a plastic mesh.   
 
We hear the sound of running 
water, then cut to a shot of 2 
white buckets being filled with 
water by ROBERT.  He is 
removing urchins from them at 
the same time.   
 
Cut to the urchins being placed 

















































CU of one of the urchins.  
ROBERT then injects it. 
 
MS of ROBERT injecting the 
rest of the urchins. 
 
CU of the urchins 
 
DON shuffles into the room. 
 
 
CU of DON’s face 
 
 
Cutaway of DON’s hand, then 
shot of his face. 
 
DON places one of the watch 
glasses (minus netting and 
urchin) under a microscope 
 
CU of microscope 
 
DON looking down microscope 
 
ROBERT looking at the rest of 
the urchins still on the watch 
glasses. 
 
CU of one of the urchins 
 
 
DON places another watch 
glass under the microscope and 
looks down it. 
CU of ‘big blob of sperm’ 
 




DON takes the watch glass 
from under the microscope and 














Something came out? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 






Oh hundreds of eggs…no shortage of 










It’s a big blob of sperm, very 
concentrated.  That’s marvellous. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
If only the starfish will do their stuff, 
the Echinocardium have done their’s 
(without the apostrophe?).  That 
sperm, very concentrated.  So it goes 












Three different CUs of a 
starfish in one of the tanks. 
 
DON peering down into one of 
the tanks 
 
CU of a starfish 
 








Don, this one’s releasing something, 









































peering over the tank. 
 
ROBERT picks up a net. 
 
 
DON peering over tank alone 
 
ROBERT lifts starfish out of 
the tank with the net.  He hands 
it to DON (off-camera). 
 
CU of starfish in DON’s hand.  
Followed by CU of DON’s 
face. 
 
Shot of starfish upside down in 
a plastic drinking cup. 
 
CU of starfish on the side of the 
tank 
 
DON peering down into tank 
 
CU of starfish in the cup, DON 
takes it off the cup and pulls off 
some tube feet.  
 
 
ROBERT watches him do so.  
The starfish is put back in the 
tank, where it sinks to the 
bottom. 
 
DON smiles at the camera 
(CU),  
 
then makes his way out of the 




















DON pours the contents of the 
plastic cup into a watch glass 
and places it under a 
microscope.  DON peers down 
microscope. 
 
CU of down the microscope – 
the eggs. 
 
DON empties a watch glass into 




He carries it across the room 
and empties the contents in to a 
filter on a retort stand. 
WILLIAMSON: 
Eggs of Marthasterias 
glacialis…large starfish.  And we 
have thousands, probably hundreds of 








































































DON looks at his watch.  
ROBERT and DON peer over 








CU of dish being placed under 




ROBERT looking out of the 
window. 
 
Shot of a boat passing along the 
water outside, POV shot. 
 
ROBERT looking out of 
window. 
 
Shot of two cyclists riding past 
outside, POV shot. 
 
ROBERT looks down and 
empties the dish that has been 
collecting the drips back into 
the vessel above. 
 
DON looking at diagrams in a 
book. 
 
CU of DON’s watch. 
 
 











WS of the room.  DON watches 
ROBERT as he does the 
‘washing-through process’. 
WILLIAMSON: 




So the idea is to keep the eggs 























So we’re just coming up to twenty 








Would you like to do that or would 
you like me? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Err, well you’re nearer.  And you 
have a steadier hand, or two steadier 
hands….But just a little at a time.  
Before squirting through the filter to 
get the eggs in the glass bowl. 
 
ROBERT: 
What’s the idea of this stage? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Getting rid of excess sperm.  First of 
all, you can’t see the eggs when they 




























































Robert squirts water through 
filter 
 
CU of the liquid running 
through the filter 
 
 
CU of filter with a bowl 
underneath collecting fluid. 
 
CU - ROBERT swaps the bowl 
for an empty one and removes 
the filter from the clamp 
holding it.  He sprays the filter. 
 








CU of the bowl on the 
microscope.  DON looks down 
the microscope. 
 
CU of microscope view: eggs 
 
 





CU of bowl under microscope.  











CU of ROBERT’s hands using 
forceps to pick apart the urchin. 
 
 
CU of ROBERT’s face. 
suspension.  Also, the sperm 


















You think that will be it? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 




Although there are two or three at the 
surface, floating.  There are two or 
three thousand at the bottom, sunk.  
Which is encouraging. 
 
ROBERT: 
I suppose I also need to produce the 
samples for the DNA testing? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
We already have tube feet from the 




So we just want the, bit of the male? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Bit of the male. 
 
ROBERT: 
This is the bit I don’t like, having to 
kill the animal. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I share your feelings. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 



























































ROBERT empties the contents 
of the urchin into the basin 
nearby. 
 





CU of what’s down the 
microscope. 
 
ROBERT taking apart the 
urchin.   
 
 
ROBERT places a bit of the 














Shot of ROBERT writing in a 








Shot of DON’s face 
 
 
Shot of book again, being 
closed. 
Also, two or three that have divided 
very unequally and I don’t think these 
will come to anything. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
But I also have at least one equal 
division and I’m very hopeful for it. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Whether they divide equally or 
unequally, some of them might be 
possible.  If they reach a many-celled 
state, I hope that they will be capable 




How long will that take do you think? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Round about twenty-four hours, but 
“round-about” is as precise as I can 
say.  I’ve had hybrids hatch in 
eighteen hours, others failed to hatch 
within twenty-four hours but they still 
have hatched later. 
 
ROBERT: 
And Don, this morning, what would 
you like me to do with the starfish 
that are in the tank? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Return them to the sea, thank you.  
They’re just taking up tank space.  So 
the best thing for them is to return 










Outside, looking out to sea.  
ROBERT walks to the wall in 
shot. 
 
Sky shot, dark clouds. 
 
The moon covered in dark 
clouds. 
 
A daytime shot of the harbour, 
gulls heard overhead. 
 
Shot of the marine station, 
followed by one further away.  












Sky.  Gulls wheel about. 
 
DON and ROBERT shuffle 
towards the wooden gate that 
gives access to the side of the 
marine station.  Reaching this 
gate, they pass through.   
 
On the other side they re-bolt it 
and then, continue to shuffle 
slowly past the side of the 
building.  In the foreground are 
concrete, water-filled  pools and 



































Shot of the harbour through a 
window. 
 
Pan round to DON sitting at the 
microscope. 
 
ROBERT labelling tubes, DON 
in the background. 
 
DON seated at the microscope, 
camera looking over his 
shoulder. 
 
DON looking down 
microscope, ROBERT in the 
background. 
 
CU of bowl under microscope. 
 
Back to view of DON looking 
down microscope with 
ROBERT in background.  











































































DON looking down 
microscope, ROBERT in the 
background. 
 















Microscope view, using a 




ROBERT uses the pipette to 
squirt the hybrids into a ‘cell’. 
 
DON looking down 
microscope. 
Umm, I can’t, slowly turning… 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Slowly turn it. 
 
ROBERT: 
Is it in the centre? Oh yes.  Oh yes. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
So something has hatched. 
 
ROBERT: 










I’m agreeably surprised that there 
are…I’ve seen up to ten already, 
moving, which is more than I 
expected.  And I think others are 




It’s good.  Have you means of 
photographing such things if I could 
fish one or two out? 
 
ROBERT: 
This is the dish so we could put them 































































CU of hands preparing a slide 
 
 
Pan up to MONTAGNES face. 
 
 
Shot of MONTAGNES’s hands 
pipetting liquid, then looking 
down the microscope. 
 
MONTAGNES adds liquid to a 








MONTAGNES gets up and 
goes to put the slide under his 
microscope. 
 
Shot of computer screen (linked 
to microscope).  We see a 















MONTAGNES looking down 
his microscope. 
 
CU of computer screen with 










DON shuffles off, out of the 
MONTAGNES: 
That’s going to support the coverslip, 
above the slide so that the organisms 






Just get this up over the lip of glass 
here. You can just see some little 
white dots in there barely, but those 
are all your little guys swimming 
around.  They’re all there, I’m just 
getting rid of excess water.  And then 









There we go.  Like that one? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
That’s fine.  A hollow ball of cells. 
 
ROBERT: 
And that was created from the egg of 




Right!  Now we do not know what 
form these hybrid larvae will 
take…whether they will be paternal, 




Now that one I think is...has 
gastrulated or it could be just a 
distorted blastula.  It’s certainly 
nothing like spherical.  A kidney-
shaped blastula – new to science. 
 
MONTAGNES: 
I can get better shots. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Yes…and I’ll get back to picking out 












CU of computer screen with 





There you go. 
 
MONTAGNES: 
Beautiful.  Yeah, it’s got long cilia on 
it.  They extend up to about there.  
You can just barely see them there.  




00:55:47 View from an airplane 
 
An air stewardess closes an 
over-head locker 
 
Shot of the plane’s wheels from 
inside the plane, the wheels are 



































ROBERT sits at the end of a 


























Closer shot of ROBERT on the 









Lynn, can you hear me? 
 
MARGULIS: 
I hear you perfectly, can you hear me? 
 
ROBERT: 
Lynn, I’m just trying to… 
 
MARGULIS: 
No, but Robert.  Robert just keep 
talking about Williamson because I 
hear you perfectly. 
 
ROBERT: 




Well listen you just keep talking all 
the time because I hear you perfectly, 
I’ve never lost the signal. 
 
ROBERT: 
When did you first hear about Don? 
 
MARGULIS: 
I heard about him in a way that must 
go into…that must go into your 

























































Even closer shot of ROBERT 
on the phone. 
 
ROBERT opens a book, we see 
a U of the front page where 
DON has written a ‘thank you’. 
 
ROBERT flicks through the 








ROBERT flicking through the 






































following: I received a letter about 
five years ago or so, we can check it 
for sure, and the letter said, “I’m Don 
Williamson, I’m 68 years old.  I’m 
from a short-lived family and I’m on 
a straight-line course for posthumous 
recognition”.  Did you get me? 
 
ROBERT: 
I got you yeah. 
 
MARGULIS: 
And I said, I must read the rest of this 
letter because usually by that part of 
the letter I throw them out.  And I 
read the rest of the letter and he said 
“I’m at the Isle of Man, the 
University of Liverpool marine 
station”.  And he enclosed one of his 
early papers called ‘Incongruous 
Larvae’.  He said he’s writing a book 
and he’s been rejected everywhere.  
And so, I mean, there are more letters 
than this, then we went back and forth 
and I got him the Chapman and Hall 
book.  You know that book? 
 
ROBERT: 
Yeah, I’m looking at it now. 
 
MARGULIS: 
I worked very hard with the editor, 
the Chapman and Hall guy.  He got 
Tauber, you know Tauber?  Have you 
actually met Tauber? 
 
ROBERT: 
No, I never met him. 
 
MARGULIS: 
Well Tauber was doing a programme 
on ‘Self’.  And so when Tauber told 
me he was doing this programme of 




I read the book on Self. 
 
MARGULIS: 
Yes excellent.  So, what happened 
was, Tauber went to England.  Well, 
you know he went to Don’s lab.  
Tauber actually called me from Don’s 















































CU of ROBERT getting a book 
from his bookshelf. 
 
ROBERT sits down at the table 
agin with Tauber’s ‘Self’ book. 
 
ROBERT flicks through 
Tauber’s book, camera is 
behind him looking over his 
shoulder.  He stops on a chapter 
of the book written by DON. 
 
Shot of ROBERT on the phone. 




Shot of the sea. 
 
 
Shot of a lighthouse by the sea. 
 








Back to ROBERT flicking 
through the Tauber book at the 
table. 
 
CU of starting page of DON’s 
chapter of the Tauber book.  
ROBERT flicks through the 
pages. 
 
Shot of ROBERT reading book. 
 
Shot of the book, one of the 










Shot of the book from over 
ROBERT’s shoulder. 
 
you something.  The man is not a 
charlatan.  And he’s not a phoney in 
any way and he’s not incompetent. 
 
MARGULIS: 
He may be hard to understand but 
he’s a totally serious scientist”.  And I 
felt I needed to know that before I 
actually paid his way to come to the 
Self meeting.  And he said “I want to 
just…I’m looking out the window, 
and I’m looking at”…what is it, the 
Irish Sea, is that what you look at? 
 
ROBERT: 
You do, yeah. 
 
MARGULIS: 
Well, he said, this is what Tauber 
said: “I’m looking out the window at 
the Irish Sea, I’ve been a guest 
of…Williamson has been marvellous.  
He’s a totally interesting guy and I’m 
going to invite him.  I wanted to tell 
you that, I’m going to invite him to 
my Self meeting.  So he came to the 
Self meeting.  It was held in the 
Boston University Law School.  It 
was a huge auditorium, way too large, 
and there were probably about forty-
five people there.  And Williamson 
gave his spiel and it’s wonderful, his 
talk.  He gave this seminar and 
afterward, you could hear a pin drop.  
Nobody said anything.  And then one 
guy, it was Eric Davidson of Cal 
Tech.  He’s a very important scientist.  
He’s a Cal Tech professor.  Right?  
He gets up and he starts screaming at 
him saying.  I mean, he was 
apoplectic.  And I can’t remember the 
details, but I don’t think anybody can 
but it was, “this is such wrong stuff, it 
is so based on nothing and there’s no 
evidence…”…and you know, he got, 
and…and Tauber got up at the end 
and he said, “Ladies and Gentlemen, 
either you’ve heard something that is 
entirely wrong and will go away 
without a ripple, or you can count 
yourself lucky because you are in 
…on the beginning of a new, a new 
zoology”.  And that, I think, was 
probably the last time I saw Don.  I 





















ROBERT gets up and puts the 
receiver down. 
 
Shot from behind, ROBERT 








































ROBERT setting up a video 
camera (in shot).  He presses 
play. 
 
Shot of the back of ROBERT’s 
head. 
 
Shot of a TV set playing what is 
on the tape.  A man, 
STRATHMANN, is sitting 
down with books behind him. 
 
 
Shot of ROBERT writing in a 
notebook ‘Richard Strathmann’. 
 
Shot of TV set with 
STRATHMANN. 
 
Shot of ROBERT watching. 
 
 















Richard, you were asked to review 




Err, it’s a little hard.  The question 
that immediately came to my mind: is 
this deception, or tunnel vision?  You 
know if I were in Williamson’s 
position, first of all, in good science, 
you should set up a hypothesis that’s 
testable and then be willing to put it 
to the test.  This is something the 
creationist’s in the US don’t want to 
do, which is why it’s not really 
science.  And it’s something 
Williamson doesn’t seem to really 
want to do.  If he really wanted to do 
it and if I were in his position of 
trying to make my case, I’d first of all 
try to show that you couldn’t, you 
really couldn’t plausibly explain some 
of these incongruities between larva 
and adult…by convergent evolution.  

















































































Shot of ROBERT 
 
 









Shot of ROBERT 
 





Shot of ROBERT 
 












It’s an interesting question isn’t it, 
that balance between sticking to your 




Yeah, and I would say that a new 
hypothesis really deserves a little 
leeway.  It’s very…so I’m not, I’m 
not just jumping on Williamson 
because he has a weird idea and I 
don’t think we should ‘pooh pooh’ 
the idea that horizontal gene transfers 
are important.  I think they could be 
and I think we now have the tools to 
look a lot more for that.  It’s not 
going to be entirely easy to use them 
to distinguish Williamson’s 
hypothesis because you need to look 
at quite a few genes and you maybe 
need to know how they operate.  I 
think that should be done, but 
Williamson has not made a…a good 
attempt to present his case. 
 
STRATHMANN: 
Well he has, if he wanted to pick 
something, a hobby-horse to ride, he 
has some good protections.  And one 
is that he can say that you might 
never see this in the lab.  I could be 
completely disproved in my 
experiments, but over half a billion 
years it only has to happen a few 
dozen times.  And how can you 
disprove such a rare event? I mean 
that, that gives him a nice safety 
fortress to hide in.  But there’s other 
problems, I wouldn’t…try to counter 
his arguments by saying, it simply can 
never happen.  I’d be trying to look 





And umm, what disturbs me when 
somebody like Williamson goes a 
little bit off of…I mean the book is 
sprinkled with the phrase ‘I believe’.  
This is like, this isn’t the Nicene or 
Apostolic creed, this is science.  It’s 










































Back to ROBERT on the couch.  
He is leaning down to the floor, 
clearly changing tapes in the 
camera, etc 
 
Shot of TV set – a young DON 






Shot of ROBERT watching 
 








Shot of ROBERT, followed by 
shot of ROBERT writing notes 
in his notebook 
matter of testable propositions and 
beliefs are provisional.  And it’s that 
constant scepticism and self-doubt, 
not quite paranoia, but always 
wondering ‘could this be right, is 
there another possible explanation?’.  
That’s what makes science productive 
and possible and insightful..and 
umm…that’s what’s disturbing to me 








In the dim and distant past two 
animals, two different unrelated 
animals, neither of which had larvae, 
hybridised.  The sperm of one 
fertilised the eggs of another, and 
whereas they would not normally 
hatch, on one occasion this happened.  
And the resulting fertilised egg had 
the genome, all the genes, to make 
both animal A and animal B.  And 
what happened was, animal A was 
expressed as the larval form and 
animal B developed later as the adult 
form.  It’s very difficult to prove this 
– things that happened hundreds of 
millions of years ago.  But there are 
lots and lots of examples that fit the 
theory.  There is an adult form in so 
many many cases that is related to the 
larval form of an apparently distantly 
related animal. 
01:06:24 View of plane wheels from 
inside a plane.  The plane is 









Shot of clouds 
 
Shot of plane wheels as the 
plane is in descent, grass fields 
and the runway are seen behind 
the plane wheels 
ANNOUNCER: 
Good evening ladies and gentlemen, 
you’re very welcome on 
board…???...for your flight to the Isle 
of Man and onwards to Belfast city.  
Your captain today is Captain 
Andrew O’Mallett.  My name is 
Michelle and I shall be looking after 

































































Shot of a computer screen, 
DON’s diary.  Followed by a 
shot of DON’s face. 
 
Shot of computer screen.  Shot 









































Camera follows DON reaching 
 
ROBERT: 
So Don, can you let me in on what’s 
happened since I was away. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, this is the story so far.  By the 
2nd of August we had forty larvae, 
thirty of which were kidney-shaped 
bipinnarias.  That is a normal starfish 
larva.  I thought they were continuing 
to grow, but by the 9th of August it 
became apparent that they were not 
growing, they were actually getting 
shorter.  And I measured some on the 
9th, the longest was .26 millimetres, 
whereas we’d had one .4 millimetres 
five days before.  And the next day I 
measured more.  I got several about .2 
by .16 millimetres.  And others were 
completely spherical.  And though 
there was food in the gut, the mouth 
and anus were probably closed.  




They are now dying off rapidly.  We 
only had about thirty to start with.  
We’re down to, err. Well, yesterday, 
the 13th, we were down to two, one of 
which was swimming, the other was 
apparently intact, looking like a good 
larva but no longer swimming. 
 
ROBERT: 
Did something else happen while I 






Something else happened when I was 




Ah yes, well.  Here are copies. 
 
ROBERT: 
What do you think of the article? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 






























to pick something up from the 
bookshelf. 
 




Shot of DON’s face 
 




Shot of DON 
 
 




CU of DON’s face, followed by 








Don’s face, camera pans down 





Shot of DON’s face, article, 





DON’s face, then of article 
being put down.  MS of DON. 
 
CU of computer printing. 
was admittedly not a biologist, he did 




‘Experiments continue as marine 
biologist challenges Darwin’s theory’.  
Well, my theory is an addition to 
Darwin’s theory, not a challenge to it. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
‘Darwin’s spectre might have risen 
from the grave as a fresh battle breaks 
out over evolution’.  Well, that’s the 
opening sentence, and again it’s 
misleading.  As I say, I’m adding a 
P.S., it’s not a challenge. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
The picture, incidentally, illustrates 
err…’Mr Williamson pictured with 
research assistant, Robert Sternberg’. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I’m not very good at recognising my 
own photograph.  I’m much more 
familiar with my mirror image.  The 
microscope shows up quite well…It 
might be an idea to ask the computer 
to print out the story so far.  And then 
we’ll go to the lab and see if there are 











Shot of a microscope, pan to 
DON’s face. 
 
Shot of a computer screen 
showing what is under the 
microscope. 
 
DON fiddling with the watch 
glass under the microscope and 


































































CU of computer screen 
 
Shot of microscope, CU of 
DON turning the dial on the 
microscope, CU of DON’s face. 
 
CU of computer screen 
 
 
Shot of DON’s face 
 
 
Shot of screen, then of DON’s 
face. 
 













Shot of computer screen 
 
 
Shot of DON’s face, then back 
to computer screen. 
 
Shot of DON, then computer 
screen (now empty).  Shot of 
watch glass under microscope, 
then of DON turning the dials 
on the microscope. 
 








WS of DON as he gets his 
glasses out. 
 
CU of DON 
I can get the hair and the air bubble 
showing up beautifully.  But where 
the larva is…I wish we had dozens or 
hundreds rather than one.  Here we 
are.  We now have something that 
moves, so…I’m saying here we are, 
might be something… 
 
ROBERT: 
Try the ABC controls Don. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Ah.  That’s different.  It’s not 
completely spherical.  But we can’t 
make out any internal structure.  It’s 
just a ciliated larva.  If it develops 
into anything recognisable it will of 
course take our ideas one step further 
forward.  Obviously we are not trying 
to replicate actual hybrids that took 
place millions or hundreds of millions 
of years ago.  The best we can do is 
show that hybrids between distantly 
related species are possible, and that 
some of these turn out to produce 
recognisable a) larvae and b) 
juveniles.  We have been using 
concentrated sperm and in some cases 
at least, the barriers between distantly 




And I have now lost the swimming 




That again, is a bubble in the glass, 
and that doesn’t move. 
 
ROBERT: 
That looks like it though doesn’t it?  
Even though it’s not moving much. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I suppose that’s it.  I hope we haven’t 
cooked it.  Well, let’s take it down to 
the downstairs lab which is cooler 
anyway, and we’ll see if we can find 
it, under one of those microscopes. 
 
ROBERT: 


















































CU of dead larva down the 
microscope, then shot of DON 
looking down the microscope. 
 
 
CU of what’s down 
microscope, then shot of DON 






CU of ROBERT removing a 
folded bit of paper from his 
pocket. 
 
Shot of DON 
 












CU of DON taking off his 
glasses. 
 
Shot of the microscope as DON 




















So we haven’t achieved a 
hybridisation in this instance? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I’m afraid we have not. 
 
ROBERT: 
Don, when I was in London, Richard 
Strathmann sent me a poem about 
you.  He said this should explain the 




‘There once was a man from Port 
Erin, whose phlogenies were quite 
daring.  Larvae flew between trees 
with the greatest of ease, Occam’s 
razor was needed for 
paring’…Occam’s razor…I have to 
be reminded what Occam’s razor was. 
 
ROBERT: 
I think it’s the principle of parsimony.  
You know, the simplest explanation is 








Parsimony, in my mind, is a concept 
thought up by biologists for the 
convenience of biologists.  It makes 
things simpler.  But I don’t think 
nature, well I don’t believe in nature 
as a force with…that thinks in 
advance.  Certainly Nature with a 
capital N is not sitting around 
thinking about the shortest ways to 
get from A to B.  It does it by trial 
and error, and trial and error seldom 
produces the shortest way.  So by 
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CU of ROBERT putting the 
folded paper back into his 
pocket. 
 
WS of DON with ROBERT in 
the background. 
 
CU of DON.  The camera 
follows him as he leaves the 
room. 























































Through a window-pane, 
looking down at the water-filled 
ponds outside. 
 
Shots of documents, papers. 
 
Shot of DON searching for 
something. 
 
Shot of the papers he is rooting 
around in. 
 






































All these all papers by you Don? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Yes.  An incomplete selection.  Many 
of them, I still have dozens of the 








Not an enormous number.  Certainly 
over seventy but, err…seventy plus. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Lots of rejects from journals but not 
the, the paper published in 1988 in 
‘Progress in Oceanography’. 
 
ROBERT: 
That was your first successful paper 
on the theory? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Yes.  There again, after seven rejects 
by different journals the editor asked 
to publish it. 
 
ROBERT: 
Would be good to see a copy. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
I’ve seen them within the last year but 












































drawing from one of the stacks 







CU of DON’s face, pans out. 
 
Shot of the drawing, followed 


















DON flicks through some 
papers underneath the drawing 
 











That is my version of a chimera…of a 
hopeful monster.  The head of a lion, 
the body of a she-goat, and the tail of 
a serpent.  And it’s in my best Greek.  
I’m not sure if I’ve got it right, but 
it’s something like that.  Homer, if 
I’ve got the right author, described a 
chimera and it was like that.  He 
didn’t draw it, but this is based on his 
description.  I’m going on with the 
same concept of an animal with two 
or more different forms coming from 
the same egg.  But they are, in this 
case, they are expressed 
simultaneously and in actual animals 
with larvae, they are expressed in 
sequence.  Or one following the other.  
And I maintain that the only 
explanation of this is that the genes 
which prescribe the larva and the 
genes which prescribe the juvenile, 




Do you have any copies of the 
referees’ comments from papers that 
you’ve tried to publish, and that have 
been rejected…just to see what they 













































































































The paper is taken out of shot, 
shot of DON’s face 
WILLIAMSON: 
‘The National Academy of Science of 
the USA…’89, 1989’.  ‘This is a 
fascinating paper which makes 
exceptional claims about the ability of 
echinoderm sperm to fertilise ascidian 
eggs.  If correct, this thesis will form 
a profound rethinking of metazoan 
evolution and genetics.  This is a very 
big if.  But on balance, I recommend 
publication of the paper if only for the 
reason that interesting experimental 
work will be done in attempts to 
refute the author’s claims.  As seen by 
modern embryologists and 
geneticists, this paper has a crazy 
premise.  But come to think of it, so 
originally did most of the major 
scientific theories that we now 
accept’.  But from another referee: ‘Is 
this contribution of sufficient interest 
to justify publication in ‘The 
Proceedings’?  No.  Is the overall 
quality of the paper suitable for the 
journal? No.  Does the evidence 
justify the conclusions drawn?  No.  
Is this paper clearly written for a 
diverse audience of scientists?  No’.  
And he says, ‘at the risk of 
overstating a truly simple point, this 
paper is not suitable for publication 
because it presents no actual evidence 
to support its claim.  Mere verbal 
statements of such startling results are 
insufficient evidence. Minimal 
evidence of the claim requires sharp 
an unequivocal photographs of 
ciliated larvae in the process of 
hatching out of the ascidian chorions.  
It was my attempt to get further 
Echinus to repeat the experiment, in 
the hope of getting hatching eggs, just 
as he said.  That was when I had my 
accident and went into hospital from 






















When…just trying to think.  When 
was the last time I was with you? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
When was the last time? 
 
ROBERT 




















































Shot of a trolley-cart at the 
airport, camera pans round to 
DON in a wheelchair. 
 

























Shot of DON 
WILLIAMSON: 
I think three years ago. 
 
ROBERT: 
And this trip that we’re on now, 
would you explain what it’s about and 
where we’re going. 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, we’re going to Italy, to Bellagio 
on Lake Como, for a conference on 
‘Human Brain in the Context of 
Natural History, Three Tousand 
Million Years of Evolution of 
Sensory Sytems’.  And the idea is that 
this method of…evolution that I have 
called ‘Larval Transfer’, which might 
also be called ‘Hybridogenesis’, 
applies not only to larvae but also to 
some organ systems of animals or at 
least some animals.  And it could 
perhaps directly be…responsible for 
the evolution of human brains…but 
that is pure conjecture at the moment. 
 
ROBERT: 
And how are you feeling Don, about 
giving the paper? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
Well, it’s been many years since I did 
give a paper or a public talk, but I’m 
reasonably confident that I can give a 
fairly intelli- I have difficulty with 
some words – intelligible 
presentation.  I have to speak slowly 
so I hope they don’t impose the half-
hour rule too rigidly. 
 
ROBERT: 
Are the talks half an hour long? 
 
WILLIAMSON: 
That’s the rule.  Which mine will go 
into half an hour but if I have too 
many word blocks or too many words 
that I cannot pronounce, it might take 































Shot through the windscreen of 
a car showing a road sign to 
Lake Como, then a tunnel, and 


















Shot of Lake Como. 
 






I think I am the only contributor to 
this conference on the human brain, 
who admits to being brain damaged.  
But my talk is not about brain 
damage.  It’s about a recently 
discovered type of evolution that has 
affected all animals and I call it 
‘Larval Transfer’.  The human brain, 
of course, is a product of animal 
evolution.  Well, Darwin assumed 
that larvae and adults evolved 
gradually from the same genetic 
stock.  It took me thirty-five years to 
decide that this theory was untenable.  
Francis Balfour said much the same 
thing in volume two of his treatise.  
He, and Charles Darwin, both died in 
1882.  Balfour was thirty-one, Darwin 
was thirty–two.  Balfour and I have 
independently come to the same 
views… 
 
 
 
 
